The nature and function of knowledge in morality for the Cambridge Platonists by Bonney, WL
THE NATURE AND POCTION OP KNOWLEDGE IN =ULM 
POR - UN 
CAMIDGE PLATONISM 
0 
A Thesis 
submitted for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
in the 
University of Tasmania 
by 
William L. Bonney, LA. (Hone.) 
• 27th July, 1954. - 
4300 
• 
-CONTENTS- 
Preface 
I The Problem 	1 
II Whichcotels Rationalism 	5 
III Cudworth and the 'New PaycholoW 33 
IV Morels 'Right Reason' and 'Intell-ectual Lave'. 	63 
V Smith's Intuitionism 	90 
VI The Virtue-Knowledge Relationship for the Cambridge Platonists 	116 
Biographical Note 	141 
Bibliography. 143 
• 
i . 
- PREFACE - 
Under the terms of the Alfred Houston Scholarship, research into the 
thought of the Seventeenth-Century Cambridge School of Platonists was 
carried out during 1953. In particular, an examination was made of 
their views on the problem of the relationship of knowledge and virtue; 
and the aim of this thesis is to analyse and interpret this particular 
aspect of their thought. No attempt is made to give a comprehensive 
interpretation of the thought of the Cambridge Platonists; their works 
deal with so many problems of both philosophical and theological inter-
est that a comprehensive treatment would require a far larger work than 
this. 
• 
Through the cooperation of the Tasmanian University Library, and 
with 	assistance of the Inter-Library Loan system, it was possible to 
, obtain many of the published7Works of the Cambridge Pla 	to. Where 
thieves not possible, the text was studied in abbreviated form in such 
modern publications as Campagnac's . 'The CaMbridge Platoniets% In the 
case of gore, only one major work (apart from his 'Poems' and extracts 
published in Mackinnon's 'The Philosophical Works Of Henry More') was 
available, namely, the English version of his .°Enchiridion Ethicue. 
But as this is apparently his only major ethidal work, it was thought 
sufficient to enable an investigation of his views an the problems with 
which this thesis is concerned to be undertaken. Cudworth's major pab-
licationewere available, but unfortunately much of his most mature thought 
remains unpublished. The manuscripts in the British Museum have been stud-
ied recently, however, by .T.A. Passmore, and sufficient extracts are pub- , 
lished in his work, 'Ralph Cudworth', to enable reference to be made to 
them in this thesis. It was originally intended to make an analysis of 
the views of Cukverwel as well as those of Whichcote, Cudworth, Smith and 
Fiore, but his one publication, 'Discourse on the Light of Nature', is not 
sufficiently concerned with the problem of the relationship of knowledge 
and morality to enable an adequate assessment of his views on this problem 
to be made. 
Since the works of the Cambridge Platonists are not widely known, 
it has been necessary throughout the course of this thesis to quote from 
them at considerable length. And in some cases, the liberty has been 
taken of modernising the spelling, and to some extent, the punctuation, 
of the original text. 
• 
• 
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1 . 
The problem of the relationship of knowledge to morality has always been 
a vexed one in philosophy, since, and even before, the statement of the 
Socratic dictum: Virtue is knowledge. Most ethical theories, if analysed, 
contain a theory of the relationship of a certain kind of knowledge to 
virtue, but it is in the precise nature of this knowledge and in the 
nature of the relationship it bears to virtue that there is disagreement. 
Morality is concerned with behaviour values, and moral distinctions 
are distinctions *tic Ism. If it is held that these distinctions are real 
: ones - that is, if it is held that there are distinctions in moral value 
- between one kind Of behaviour and another, which are not constituted by 
their relation to our subjective feelings - then some theory of the way in 
Which we come to know such distinction' s, a in of the effect of such know-. 'ledge on our conduct, is necessary. If, however, it is held that moral 
distinctions are subjective, there is no place for a theory of the relat-
ionship of knowledge and morality. For if there are no distinctions on 
moral grounds between different kinds of conduct which are independent of 
our subjective feelings, there is no such study as ethics. A subjectivist 
maintains that when we make a moral judgement we are not asserting anything 
'about the nature of the conduct to which our judgement refers; moral judge-
ments are merely expressions of subjective feelings about certain kinds of 
conduct. Moral judgements say something about the psychological make-up 
of the person ;making the judgement, but nothing about the nature of the 
conduct to which they refer. Or, it may be maintained, as it is by Ayer l , 
•that 'when, we make a moral judgement we are neither asserting anything 
about - certain kinds of conduct nor expressing our feelings about them, 
but merely evincing our feelings; that is to say, we are not saying what 
our feelings are but simply evincing ,them in the form of an exclamation.. 
Neither Ayer's View nor the ordinary subjectivist view presuppose any 
theory: of the relationship of knowledge and morality. Knowledge is of 
• reality, and if it is held that moral distinctions have no place in reality, 
then there can be no relationship between knowledge and morality. 
But if it is held that there are real moral distinctions between 
different kinds of behaviour, some theory of the relationship of knowledge 
-1. Language,. Truth and Logic, Chapter 6. 
• 
and virtue is presupposed. Some theories maintain that the function of 
knowledge in morality is to provide a criterion or criteria by which we 
are able to judge what, in any concrete situation, is good conduct. A 
utilitarian, for example, maintains that the good act is the one that 
gives rise to the greatest proportion of pleasure over pain. Thus, assum-
ing that we know what we mean by pleasure and pain and that we are able,to' 
• calculate the consequences of various courses open to us, it is held that 
we can decide which act, of a set of possible acts, is the one of meat 
moral value. The kind of knowledge that has a place in morality, in a 
•theory such as this, is the intellectual calculation of consequences. Like= 
•wise, a legalist maintains that good conduct is law-abiding conduct. On 
this kind of theory,, therefore, what we need to know in order to behave 
well is whether or not a particular kind of act comes under a law. And 
other rationalist theories provide similar criterions of good and bad 
conduct. Kant, for example, maintains that the reason, in its capacity 
as practical judgement, is able to judge how we ought to behave. 
The kind of knowledge that has a place in morality in the above theor-
ies is some form of intellectual activity; it has no relation to desire or 
feeling. Even the utilitarian who holds that good conduct is that which 
elves rise to pleasure, maintains that the knowledge which enables us to 
decide which act is the good one is the intellectual activity of calculat-, 
ing consequences. Now since it is clear that we do not necessarily behave 
as the intellect dictates - that is, that we do not necessarily perform 
acts which are intellectually judged to be of a certain kind - theories 
such as the above have to introduce the concept of 'duty'. Tbeymaintain 
that it is our duty to behave in ways that the intellect judges to be of 
a certain kind. Thus the legalist, for example, maintains that it is our 
duty to obey laws. In other words, the function of knowledge in morality 
for the above types of ethical theory is not to determine behaviour but 
merely to indicate in which direction the good act lies. And such knowledge 
has to be related to behaviour by the moral 'ought"; it has to be said that 
we ought to do what is intellectually judged to be good. In such theories, • 
	
	there is always a distinction between knowing what is good, and deciding 
whether or not to do it. And once a distinction is made between knowing 
what is good and deciding how: to act such that both are separate and auto-
nomous activities; the concept of duty is bound to be introduced. For if 
the intellectual apprehension that a particular act is of a certain, kind 
(law-abiding, for example) is to influence us to perform that act, it has 
to be held that we ought to behavein ways that are intellectually perceived 
to be of a certain kind. 
In the above types of theory, there is a, general distrust of the emot-
ions. A distinction is usually made between Reason and Desire, the reason 
being the impartial faculty of moral judgement and the desires the cause 
of egocentric and immoral behaviour. The desires, it is held ; are blind 
and a-moral, and areibcalable of deliberating and deciding what is good. 
And since there is a conflict between reason and desire, the 'will' is 
usually introduced as a. mediating faculty whose function is to suppress or 
direct the desires and compel them to follow "'here the reason leads. Good 
conduct results when the wii succeeds in making the desires obey the reason. 
This, broadly, is the position of those theories which maintain that the 
kind of knowledge that has a place in morality is a function of the intell-
ect. 
There are other theories which bold that moral goodness cannot be 
known by intellectual apprehension. Ror y it is held, can the intellect 
perceive moral criteria. This type of theory holds that moral distinctions 
are emotionally discerned, or discerned'by a special moral sense. The 
'moral sense' school argues that good is sensorily perceived in the same 
way as we perceive; for example, 'yellow'. 'Good' is a simple quality of 
certain kinds of behaviour in the same way as 'yellow' is a simple quality 
of certain objects; and 'good' is as readily recognised as is 'yellow'. 
The nature of the knowledge that has a place in this type of theory, then, 
is a 'sense' or a 'taste'. And if it is held that 'good' is as immediately 
perceived as is 'yellow', the concept of titute is likely to arise. - For 
it is clear that if knowledge of the good ilia function of a 'moral sense', 
there must be a distinction between knowing good and deciding how to act. 
However, if it is held that moral goodness is not known by a specific 
'sense', but that it is emotionally perceived, the concept of duty need not 
arise. For it may be held tAreis an object of desire such that if it were 
• 
4. 
known it would be pursued. On such a theory, the good is that which is 
worth doing rather than that which ought to be done. It is Mood to show 
that the most significant . thought of .the Cambridge Platonists maintains a 
theory , such as this. 
It will be the contention of this thesis that Whichcote, the first of 
the Cambridge Platonists, belongs properly to a rationalist tradition, since 
he argues that the 'reason' , or intellect, is capable of judging which 
of a set of possible acts in a concrete situation is the good one. As we 
shall see, he maintains also that knowledge of the good does not, of itself, 
ensure that the good will be done. In Whichcote's view, the decision to 
act in a certain way is independent of the knowledge of the good; knowing 
what is good and deciding whether or not to do it are separate activities 
of discreet faculties. The fandamental ethical term, then, in Whichcote's 
view, is "duty' rather than 'good'. But it is hoped to show that the lat-
er members of the school, for various reasons, Maintain that knowledge which 
is a function of the intellect can have no more than a secondary place in 
morality. They contend that behaviour is emotionally determined and that 
moral distinctions are emotionally discerned. And they argue that our 
moral judgements are part of our manner of life; they not only determine 
the,. way we behave, but they are determined by our manner of life. Knowing 
what is good and behaving well are identical, or at least, inseparable 
activities. It is only the good man who can know the good. The ethical 
term 'good' refers to a certain kind of life which is worth living and 
which can be known only by living it; there is no sense in which one may 
know the good independently of being good, and therefore the concept of 
'duty' does not arise. This, it is hoped to show, is the most mature 
thought of the Cambridge Platonists; but it will also become evident that 
they are not always consistent in maintaining this view. 
• 
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6. 
distinguishes him from each of the conflicting parties. 
Whichcote was a teacher and a preacher rather than a thinker, and 
for this reason much of what he has to say about the place of knowledge in 
morality is in the form of bald statements rather than well-developed argu-
ments. He WAS not strictly an original thinker and it cannot properly be 
said that he established a new school of thought at Cambridge; what he did • 
do was to revive the teachings of the early,Platonists, and his chief value 
lies in the influence he had on those who studied, under him. As Barnet 
says: I "lie was mach for the liberty of conscience; and being disgusted with 
the dry systematical way of those times, he studied to raise those who con-
versed with him to a nobler set of thoughts, and to consider religion as 
a seed of_deiform nature (to use one of his own phrases). In order to this, 
he set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers, chiefly 
Plato,. Tully, and Plotin, and on considering the Christian religion as a 
doctrine sent from God, both to elevate and sweeten human nature, in which 
he was a great example, as well as a wise and kind instructer". But al- 
. though be was a teacher rather than a critical thinker, it will be conven-
ient to eansiderWhichcote's thought in detail, both for its own sake and 
also to provide an intellectual background against which we may consider 
the thought of the more significant thinkers of the school. 
Whichcote, like the Puritans, discards the authority of the Church 
in the field of morality and religion, maintaining that the function of 
organised religious bodies is to "prevent violence" rather than to dictate 
what is to be believed; their purpose is regulative rather than dogmatic. 2 
But in order to prevent falling into a subjectivist position, he has to 
replace the authority of the church with another. authority. And since he 
is opposed  to legalism, he makes the new authority, not the ruler of the 
state or the commands of Cod, but the human 'reason.' From the Proverbs he 
quotes scriptural support in the text: "The spirit of man is the candle of 
the Lord".3 And by the bpiritl of man,he means the 'reason' of man. 
Whichcote maintains that there are three essentials of the good life: 4 
"The sense of the soul must have a divine impression upon it which will 
1. History of Hy Own Times, p.127. 
2. Whichcote's Discourses (1702 edition), VOl.1, pp.269-9. 3. ibid., 4'01.2, p.170. 
4. p.296. 
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carry a man toward God; the reason of the mind in reconciliation with the 
reason of things; and severe and impartial reason govern and rule in life". 
As to the first condition of the good life, the *divine impression' upon 
the soul, Whichcote does not have a great deal to say., Re frequently refers 
to the soul by using the phrase *deiform nature' which presumably means 
that there is something 'god-like' - about the soul. . But he does not make 
it clear whether he means that the soul as such has a "deiform nature' or 
whether he considers that this is a condition of the soul of the good man. 
He says, for example, that "if . we be in the regenerate state, there is the 
seed of God is us". i And this kind of language seems to imply that, in 
Whichcote's view, some form of *spiritual regeneration' is a necessary 
condition of the , good life. However, we shall consider this aspect of his 
thought later in the 'chapter; for our present purpose* the second and third 
Conditions Whichcote 'lays demi are the important ones. 
In his view, the good man will have 'the reason of the mind in recon-
ciliation with the reason of things* and *severe and impartial reason' 
will 'govern and rule in life*. The significant phrase here is 'the 
reason of things*. It appears frequently in his published works - perhaps 
more frequently than any other phrase - and upon our interpretation of its 
-meaning will depend our interpretation of Whichcote's ethical thought. 
The distinction between good and evil,. Whichcote maintains, is a real one, 
as objective as mathematical distinctions, "It is a demonstration in morals, 
that is as clear and as satisfactory as any demonstration in the mathematics; 
a full and self-sufficient good cannot consist with any true evil, because 
good and *All are extremely opposite".2 
There is an objective distinction between the good life and the evil life, 
and the good life consists in doing what is according to the 'reason of 
things'.3 So an understanding of Whichcote's view of the good life dep-
ends upon an understanding of the phrase 'the reason of things'. Its mean- 
ing is explained in the following passage: "And now, that I may lead 
you to understand the notion,. I will lay before you the rule whereby you 
are to estimate f 4nd judge of this decency, comeliness and order: and to , 
this rule you are to comply. The rule is in things. There is the reason 
of things; and this is an undoubted, infallible, unquestionable rule ... 
1. Discourses, Vol.2, p.149 (All references to this work are to the 
2. ibid., Vol.4, p.325. 	 1702 edition). 
3. ibid., Vol.3, pp.36 & 296. 
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For you are to understand that the reason of things is a law to the reason 
• of the mind. Truth and goodness are first in things, and then in the mind 
•and understanding. My mind is true when I do understand as the truth of 
things is: my mind is good, when I do comply with things that are-good, and 
abhor thine-6 that are evil... New by the help of their reason and understand-
ing, men have power to judge; and by their freedom have liberty to do accord-
ing to their judgement. Therefore man alone is able to do that is moral; 
•the understanding doth judge and discern what it might to do (according as 
things are:) and then the will should follow".1 
He says further that evil "is against the reason of our mind, and against 
the reason of the thing. It is a contradiction to the reason of our mind, 
which is our governor; that which guides the actions of our will: and to the 
reason of things, which gives law, and is the rule of action: and wickedness 
is a great contradiction to both".? 
•The first of these two passages seems to suggest a correspondence theory of 
truth, for it is held that one's knowledge is "true' when it conforms to 
vrhat exists outside the mind. One knows the truth when the 'reason of the 
mind' corresponds with the *reason of things'. Such a correspondence theory 
• of truth is unsatisfactory because it is not explained how one can 'get 
outside' the mind and, as it were, compare one's own ideas with what exists 
outside the mind. Whichcote's, however, is not a strict correspondence theory; 
his view rather is that the reason ('of the mind') is so constituted that its 
judgements, as it were, *reflect' the nature of what exists outside the mind. 
This is evident from thesecond passage quoted above. Whatever is contrad-
ictory to the .eeson of the mind* is also contradictory to the 'reason of 
things'. The 'reason of things' is the external order of things and is 
reflected in the judgements of the *reason of the mind'. In other. words, 
Whichcote is simply arguing that truth and goodness are objective - that is, 
they are not creations of the mind - and are known by the activity of reason-
ing. Knowledge of both truth and goodness is ,a function of the 'reason'. 
That is why Whichcote says that to obey the reason is to obey God.' The 
good act is the one that is according to the reason of things, and the'fac-
ulty of moral judgement, that is, the faculty which is capable of jud• ng 
what is good and what is evil, is the reason. One behaves well when one's 
'will' obeys the dictates of the *reason'._,. *The reason of things' is some-
what similar to 'the law of nature' in natural law theories, and in Whichcote's 
the rod.aet view, is tne.one judged to be according to the *reason of things'. He expresses 
• 1. Discourses, Vol.3,pp.169-170. 2.ibid.,7o1.1,pp.323-4. 3. ibid.. Vol.4. un.80 it 416. 
this as follows: or the notion and account of morality, you must know it 
iv:waists in this: the congruity and proportion between the action of an 
agent and his object. Re acts morally that doth observe the proportion ce 
arriaction -to its (*debt; that is, he doth terminate a due action upon its 
iroper object... To instance, hatred and disrespect towards that Being 
we depend upon for all we have, is an ivraoral thing; that is, it is an 
eneqwal and preposterous thing; it is an action dieproportionable, *nevel t 
unfit."1 
Whichcotels position seems to be this: given a concrete situation 
and a set of possible ways in which one may behave, morally good conduct 
Le the kind of conduct which rilasion sea to be 'fitting'; that is, the 
kind of conduct that is congruous with, or appropriate to, the situation. 
To behave disrespectfully towards one's creator, he thinks, is immoral be. 
cause the kind of behaviour that is logically consistent with the .definit- 
• ions of *creator and creature is resPeota ln other words, what be is say- " 
ing is that there is a certain relationship between creator and ,creature - 
implied in these two terms such that the existence of any Contrary relat. 
LW:whip contradicti the meaning of the terms. Likewise, if by *wife' we 
mean, in part at least, a person to whom a husband shows love s then a 
certain kind of behaviour of husband towards wife is logically contained 
in the meaning of the tee terms husband and wife. This appears to be the 
•sort of thing that Thichcote wants to say, and is in fact the position 
•Moped by a late:r and comparatively insignificant Cambridge Platonist, 
• Winston in his 'Religion' of Rature Delineated'. As Leslie Stephen has 
said: "Thirty years of profound meditation had -convinced Wollaston that 
the reason why a man should abstain from breaking his Wife's head was that 
it wqs a way of deiwing that she Was his sife.°2 In other words, the term 
*wife° has a definite meaning, and for a husband to *break his wife et's head' 
is to behave in a way that is logically inconsistent with the meaning of . 
•the term; that is to say, it is to deny that she is his wife. According to 
Whichcote and Wollaston, the moral way for A to behave in relation to D 
implied in the meaning of A and 11; to behave in a" vey which is logically 
inconsistent with the meaning of these two terms is to behave immorally. 
Thus„ if the meaning of the terms A and logically imply that A should - 
I. Discourses, To1.3, p.29. 
2. Quoted by Rogers: Morals in Review, p.197. 
10. 
obey B„ then it is morally good for A to *bay 14 and morally evil. for A 
to disobey B. Thus is A. is defined as a servant and B as a master, the 
- geod life for A ConaiSts in willing obedience to B. 
• That 	is the sort of thing lekichcate is saying, is made clear 
from one further feferencer "If be trodos creature, stand in relation 
to bit* am capable of him; I am natdrally and unavoidably wider an oblig4- 
atiOri of duty and affection to him; and I am bound to serve him, honour, 
and live in regard to him.. Here is the reason of the thing.n1 . 
The behaviour one owes to Hod, inkichcote•thin!, is logically, contained in 
the definition of Cod as creator; if Cod is my creator, then I owe a duty 
to him. This is so whether I realise it or net; the obligation exists 
independently of rqf knowledge of it and is contained in what be calls 
, !the reason of things!* And the 'reason of the mind! . is the faculty * 
which we are able to become aware of our obligation; its function is to 
-intellectually apprehend what is the reason of the thing* that is* what 
„lfzi.nd of conduct is logically appropriate to the situation. The knowledge 
that has a place in the good life,for - Hhichoote„. is t4e inte13.ectual act-
Iiity :of apprehending logically consisivnt- ways of heaving.: Moreover, it. 
:Should be noted that Whichcote maintains that logically appropriate con-
duct is morally obligatory conduct. This is one of the difficulties of 
his theory andis a problem to which we .shall return later in the chapter. 
Rhichcote°8 view, than, as we have Interpreted it, is that morally 
gtiod conduct consists in behaving in a way which is seen to be logically 
appropriate; an act is morally good if it is consistent with the meaning 
of the agent and the acted-upon. Now if this is really his position-- 
:avid it seam fairly evident that it is - then it involves a number of : 
; 'difficulties which make- it untenable. Whicheote thinks that certain kinds?, 
sr behaviour are appropriate in certain situations if, they are logically 
consistent with the meaning of the person aCtincend,the;,person being acted 
, upon.- In other words,, servant acts well, ,wheri;he does -.1,ihat which it is 
:appropriate for -a :Servant to do; that is* when he is obedient. - 
husband acts well when he does that which..„it..* appropriate for a hue- , 
band to do; that is, when he shows love towerils:biS•wife. But this kind of 
theory is ,unsatisfactory OrAlie...ptarpose ithichaote. wanted it to serve., 
1. D1seour-sTsii*:.-To.t.4;.1-.PP■256-7. 
le wanted to maintain that moral distinctions are objective and °absolute', 
8i1100 he contends that God is the chief good1  and also that God commands • 
what is antecedently good* that is, what is according th the reason of 
things. Mho reason of thinge• Whichcote argues, "are eternal; they are 
not subject to any payee...2 In other Wordis, he wants to maintain that • 
if a 'certain kind of o3 Must is good, that is, according to the °reason 
•of things.* then it is *really* good; it is not merely good within: a 
particular frame of reference. It is not just good for this or that 
society; it is good in itself. *at, in spite of this, his theory may : 
interpreted in relativistic terms. For it is clear that terms like 
'wife and 'servant' have no absolute meaning; they acquire meaning only 
. by. virthe of their use in a society of people. And the meaning of these !- 
may be Vastly different for two different societies. Sere is no 
logical contradiction* for example, in :defining *wife' as a slave or as • 
a -tool ter man's corayenierice* and it would then follow on iihichcote's 
argument that a husband behaves well when he treats his wife as a slave 
and immorally• when he treats her as an equal and a person to whom love 
is due. &tie terms have -meaning only within a given frame of reference * 
an that is pOssible on Whichttote's them, is to deeide, on the basis of 
_ibe'ineaning of the tares in that .frame of reference* what is considered te; 
• be good conduet within a ptirticular society; it provides no means of 
deciding on moral grounds between the ethical none of one society and 
another. Xt is true that some ethical theorists would maintain this 
very position* namely that it is not passible to -talk in ethical terms 
outside particular concrete societies and that ethical questions arise 
only within the franewOrk of particular societies. it it is clear that 
this is not the position Whichcote sought to adopt; and, moreover * it 
appears quite unsatisfactory to stay that there are no moral grounds for 
•prefetring„. for example* a society in which each individual has the right 
to life and one in which cannibalism is the norm. But unless there is 
•another interpretation of Whichcotes position* he is committed to the 
•View that it is possible to decide within a gitten monogamous satiety that 
a, man,who has two wives is behaving itztorally and that a man whe does 
Discourges* Vol.4* P.325. 
2. Cattegnaci . p.%. 
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that - :act. wn towarcls ·Cod wbeD - lalo'il1 his' real uature aDd expl-esS. 
such ~ bJ" aeti~JB m a ·liJIV' that is eoniiisteJlt with t.t. J,ikewisej 
lie ·tioald hold that 1re _,· taJov· the- nature ~ puSonality anti that we act > ; 
. . . . . -
wen· Wtrards .. other pusons. vheil our oon4uot is consistent witb our laJ.ow.;. 
. -led&e·- 'that· the7· are. perscma.. cGdod ~ is what is seen to be spprop-
. rla,te and is t.m;l:ied in the nature ot the being who is being acted upon. 
· · · Row· it·mq be a perfectq l'eSpectable tb.eoz'.Y of ethica to mailitain 
that good conduCt iS appropria• or ~itting·coDd.uct. .It~ be he~, f'Or·· 
· · •· eumpl.e• that good· col'lllUOt is not ~tric but. -CODSists in -being-_ impan.i. · 
' ia1 aild in bebav1Dg in tems o£ the real at.tua'tion aDd DOt in tezma of OUl" 
·deSireS; lt llla\Y consist ill.~ one~s 'nei&bboV as oneself. tbat u... in r 
·. ~UDg Pe%'SOil8 .aa .ends in themselves an4 ·DeVer as meaoa. · :ta other 1i'01"dl3~ 
·.it mat ·be•h&ld that moraiity is a C1emaDd tr# o})Jecti'ri.f¥ in bebaviour. $J1d · 
.:·~that aooct· COD4uct eonsiats m cl01iia what ts appropriate to _th6 situation. 
. . . ' 
: m -WhiCh cme filda Oneself aD1 DOt -~ doi»B What cme subject1Ye]3r wants to'• 
-~ 4o.- .. .6Bl this la the son of' tbiD4 that lfhicl1cote is Bl"glling. But ~ · 
; ~- with lhichcote'e peSi~on ~ .that he con814ei'B tbat the reas~ ·-
. -, . ' '·. . . -· 
·.~-~.the-~- or~. ·1s ~-w judge what kind of' conduot 1s 
.· :: aj,pwpriate~ ·._ fie 'k1Jafl8d&e tbat ®&.a -plaae ·inmozali\T 1a ·1mpa:rtial· ·._·t 
: im~ ~1 it 1a 'not' a :hllotioa ot the 4es1res. \'he purpose ~ ', 
::.the .J:e8801\ la tll ~ wbat act i1J apprbpria•; t12e funotioa ot the desires 
J.' . . . - ·. 
'•iS te·foUO. vheft tb8 reason leadS•. tb.ie 1s eviteDt. from a paf38age 
alread,t. quotecl: .e ~ dotll. o'JD4&e and ~what it OUght 
·. to do (accoitin& aa WD8s azet) an4 then, the ·wUl should follow. •.). 
•· the· same idea is exjnsaed 1n the folloWiilg ~: liThe· Q;fectiolls and· 
--~ ])asa.tone .~. are to b9 still and quiet~ till_ ai'ter ju(J.pnent ·81'14 choice. / 
. ,' for their· PlSce is ODl.7 ill prii'SaatJCel DO place in 4etezim1Dation. .,. ~ 
::J:lieR ve f1Dd out our 1fli\V• 8Dil by our Pa'lfdODS .we are apedited in it •.•.•• 
::.Stfecticms_are b11Dd -thiDgs thamsel.ves• am: they mast follow.".~ . 'c . 
'fhe •BQC)4 act•, in lbicbcot8'a -View._ is the act tbat is fittiug; am!- it is· ::) 
'--~ b.t ~ r8ason. Whe kDolrlectce tat a certtlin.kind of oon4uct: __ · 
'·-t:tf,ap~ is a f'ullCtion of oDI!t faeulty. the reason. ·11ldepen4entq ot:'· 
: ai\t·::~~ t'acalQ'. And ·this card.ts lfhichcote to au the ditficultles ot) 
.· ~ tacult7 the0%7 of the m1r4 whiCh ve aba1l eundDS later in the cba~ 
..... .' · .. :~- : . . . . . ·~~:~~-: 
1. ~- ¥01.3.- p.l70. 
2• Quoted b7 Passmozet llalph -~ p.S3, f1oan Vhichcote~s 
. sermo ••.. , 
;_ '·-- -~ 
but for the present, it. is sufficient to note that, the knowledge that:;-, 
Whichcete =C0i11440113 to have a, :place. in morality is a function of the 
sreasenirg independently of. the -emotions. 
The function that this kind.of . biowledge serves in morality, in 
Whichoote's -View., is made clear in his statement *att... 	aunie, , 
:doth not amount to virtue; but certainly there is no virtue without 
ledge. Knowledge is the first step to virtue sal goodness: but goodness: 
is not iiithent•delight and 	• 	' 
Intellectual: knowledge' of the -kind - Of conduct that:is 'fitting - is not it- 
self iirtue,-- but is the first step to virtue.- We need to -know first 
what Sort: of conduct is appropriate in order that we might do it. But 
the possession of the 	what Constitutes fitting conduct is 
not sufficient -tO:eninne that good -conduct will follow. We axe free, 
Whielicate Maintains,' to abide: by or reject the .knowledge We have: This 
- .Vielie.,is'expreased in whicbeetess 'frequent use of the Pauline phrase,. 
iholding the truth in turrigh• teoUsnesee7t. -which he interprets to 
although. we know What kind: of behaviour is geed, we frequentiy.tehses- - 
otherwise.; we know' what we ought to do but we ore strealuoUilled! and reject 
the -knoti/edge:ive•have. 	he eipresies it himself: we 
lip to our knowledge as we ought but have in some degree held . the truth 
in unisighteowntess,. Which in a high degree is the 'practice of the worst of 
-.Men, - and of persons self-candeened.: 41-2- , 	. . , 
Knowledge of What kind of behaviour is fitting is a necessary but not . 	. . 	 . 	. 
sufficient condition the good 	it is merely . the first step in a 
chain of egoism - that lead to virtue.;: . .ind it is clear, that if Whieheete 
maintains that the knowledge that is relevant to morality is intellectual 
knowledge, or knowledge that arises from .reasening.. -he . ie consistent in 
maintr!i. nine also that„ . :elthough it is the flint step' to :ir4rpte.4. it is no 
• more than the first step. For it is empirical:4 evident that the - kmuwledge 
that a Certain kind 	is iciOnaliy cenaiettent . does - net compel 
us . to behave in that way; : there is no : reason w4 we litilSt ad:we i#,:a .. 14?y'. 
that is logically  fitting; 'ever if it is true that we ought. . The fact that 
we know intellectually that a Certain .n&  of condot. is fitting does not 
mean that we therefore eet in that way, as We shall -.argue later, we do 
what in some sense la seen to be of most value. The mere knowledge that 
14--.PainPa0Pars, P.65. 
2, Discourses, To1.4. p.310. 
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a certain act if rating may or may not influence our behaviour; we do not 
'necessarily act in a way that we bum to be fitting. Thus, Whichcote's 
view of the function of knowledge in morality is consistent with his vies 
of the nature of knowledge that is relevantltir morality. Knowledge of the 
•reasoning faculty is, for Inds:hoote r 'the;determinant of appropriateness, 
and therefore of what. kind of condue:lis:goot,. but. it •commit be the deter-
minant of behaviour. It is true that Whichcote says in a passage already 
quoted that the affection tare to be still and quiet, till after judge- 
•vent and choice' and that they havOno place in determination*, implying 
that it is the function Of the underStanding to 'determine".. But it vill• 
•become clear that 'determination' refers to judging what is good and not 
to deciding how to act.. He cannot paints* consietently with his view that 
it is possible to hold the truth *in =righteousness*, that the understand 
•ing both determines what is good and the way in which we behave, for this 
.would Commit his to the view that we 40 necessarily what we know to be 
••good. And this is a position he is careful to avoid* : for varlets reasons, 
. as we. shall see later. 
Althoughl. Vhieheote maintains that knowledge is no more than the first 
Step to virtue, he does maintain that it is a necessary step; that virtae 
is not possible without know/edge. He Says, for instance, in a passage
already referred to,that *there is no virtue without knowledge*. Iloreaver,  
he says that virtue consists in heiring *a reason for action"./ In other 
words, the good sot is never done from chance or unconscious desire; it 
•results from a conscious deliberation by the -treason of the mind* and from 
a decision to obey the reason and do what is known to be good. The first 
step to Virtue consists in judging ihat kind of behaviour is fitting; the 
. second step consists im choosing to behave in .a war that is seen to be 
fitting. And both these steps are necessary conditions of the good life. 
•Hot only must *the reason of the mind (be) in reconciliation with the 
reason -of things', but 'severe and *partial reason (must) govern and rule 
, in life'. As we saw at the begintdig of the chapter, these are) two of the' 
conditions he lays down as being necessary to the good life. In two pass-
ages already quoted he says tint the ftmetion of the understanding is to 
1. Discourses 1101.4, pp.414-424 437, 448. 
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judge what is good, or rather, what is fitting, and then "the will Should 
follown1  ; and "the reason of the mind 	is our governor; that which 
guides the actions of our will". 2 
It has been maintained that 'reason', for Whichcote, is not what we 
have described as a faculty that is capable of the knowledge of the kind 
of behaviour that is logically consistent with the natures of the agent and 
the acted-upon, but rather "the ethical, principle enabling ... (one) to 
perceive the unity of God's law in nature, the scriptures and institutions". 3 
•But it is not explained what is meant by an 'ethical principle'. The only 
.possible meaning that such a phrase can have in relation to *reason', is 
that 'reason' is the ability to see what is morally obligatory; that is to 
say, the ability to recognise certain kinds of conduct as being the kinds 
that one ought to do. And it is true that this idea is suggested in some 
•of Whichcote's thought; for example in the following; passage: 
"If I be God's creature, stand in relation to him, am capable of him; I am 
naturally and unavoidably under an obligation of duty and affection to him; 
and I am bound to serve him ... Here is the reason of the thine.4 
The idea• expressed in this passage is that the knowledge of the 'reason 
of things' includes the knowledge of moral obligation. But if we examine 
Whichcote's view of the nature of the knowledge that has a place in morality, 
it becomes clear that it is such that it is not capable of knowing moral ob-
ligation. As we have seen, Whichcote holds that the 'reason of the mind' 
•or the 'understanding' is something other than, and opposed to, the emot-
ions; emotion has no place in the knowledge that has a place in morality. 
He describes the 'desires' as being 'blind' and as having a place only 
in 'pursuance'. Be is' 	definite on this point. In other words, reas- 
on or understanding, that whose function it is to 'judge', is disinterested, 
impartial and impersonal; for only desire can be interested, partial and 
personal. And the knowledge that an act is obligatory is interested. The 
reason, as Whichcote conceives it, cannot judge that an act is obligatory 
or good, but only that it is an act of a certain kind; for example, that it 
is a law-abiding act. The reason, conceived as a faculty independent of 
desire, is capable only of judging that a certain kind of behaviour 
comes under a law or some other criterion of goodness or obligatoriness. 
1. Discourses, Vol.3, p.170. 
2. ibid., Vela, p.323. 
4. ibid., Vol.4, PP.256-7. 
3. BUllough: Introduction to 
henry- Hore's Poems, p.xx. 
e 
~-
e 
17. 
A faculty like Whichcote' s 'reason• , if it fUnctions . independently of one's 
. of ' emotio~ life,. oan be capable only of .knowledge/facts and logical ~ess-
ity •. It can give us knowledge of the. facts about dii'ferent kinds of con-
duct; it can ttell us,. for example, that. a particular kind .of conduct 
involves treating a person as a means and not as an end, or -that another 
kind of behaviour involves del\Yin8 the existeilce of God; but such knowledge 
. cannot tell us .that one kiDd of behaviour· is more preferable .than another, 
or even that certain kinds of conduct are .obligatory. Queations of 
preferance and obligation can arise only in our emotional life; ;that is 
what ·is m~t when it·ie said that one feels obliged - feeli1J8S arise from 
our emotional, not from our intellectual, life. Thus, the kind of knowledge 
that has a place in moral.i ty, for Whichcote, can dete:mi:ne that certSi.n 
acts are obligatory only if they are first defined as obligatory; that is 
• .to say, ·only ·tf certain facts are regarded as criteria of obligatorinese. 
Whichcote's •reason' can have knowledge only of facts; and the knowledge 
of facts, in i tsett., cannot be knowledge of obligatoriness. Nor can the 
knowledge at facts give rise to a feeling of moral obligation. Hence,. if 
the 're8801l' dec1des that a certain kind ~f behaviour is, for example, log-
ically conSistent with the Datures of· the 889nt and the acted-upon, it is 
. still. meani~ul to aSk: ·'Why ought one behave in such a way?' 'l'here can be 
no s~i~icall7 ethical q~ties about •reason• as Whichcote conceives it. 
The icJea of moral obligation i~ essential to the ethical . theory of. 
Whichcote. For it is clear that the knowledge :that certain acts are • fit-
ting' ·does not, of itself, amount to~; it is merel3 th~ 'first. step 
to. virtue':.· Since the knowledge tbat is relevant to morality is independ-
. ent of our. emotional life1 it cannot compel, or even move, us to behave in 
a certain WSIY• All activity 1s interested, and is directed towards ends 
which are perceived as· desirable •. Behaviour alve_,vs has a motive, and motives 
· arise from our emotional life. ·Therefore. since Whichcote•e •reason' is 
disinte~ted and independent of desire, it cannot move us to act; _at the 
· most it can discover ~acts about certain k:i.nd.e of behaviour. And the knowledge 
. . . . . . 
of facts, if it is disinterested, cannot be a motive for action. Thus it 
~ 
has to be held that we are inorally obliged to choose to do acts jud&e4 to be of 
a certain kind; the idea of moral obligation has to be int~uced to provide j 
18. 
the motive: There can be nothing desirable about the facts that are known 
by the ?MEM, sinee it is independent of desire; and therefore this know, 
ledge of itself cannot provide the motive. Consequently, it has to be 'held 
that there are certain ways in 'which one out to behave. But WhiWbcote 
never really justifies the moral ought; he rimier really says why one Ought 
to behave in waits that the reason sees, to be of a certain kind. Be assume 
that the reason is capable of knowing not only the facts about different 
kinds of conduct but also that certain Idnds of behaviour are morally 
. obligatory. 
' 	To some extent he reelises the difficulties of his view when be erg.. 
ues that it is *natural* for the reason to be *in the throne* and for the , 
will to obey the dictates of the reason. It is most natural, he thinkS„ 7 
for a man to obey the dictates of his reason, that is to be directed by 
his reason, rather than to InOmmb to his passions. 1 Nan is to to do- 	= 
tinguished from animals by his ability to use reason, and it is for this 
. 	 . 	 2 -reason that *men alone CliZt to moral*. But the assumption is that reason,' 
: as Whichcate cones/Vas it, is capable of directing behaviour; and this 	• 
Cannot: really be maintained. For all behaviour is directed towards ends 
that are an in some sense to be desirable; we do what we *ought* only • 
i.f we believe that dutiful conduct _is most desirable. When we are present-
ed with a number of possible ways in which we may behave, we determine 
which of these was is the most *valuable.; that is to say, we evaluate 
:the various possible courses open to us and choose the one that is felt 
to be of most value. We need not labour this point here because it will 
be more fully considered when we come to consider the later Cambridge Plat
• on 	it is sufficient for our present purpose to note that no activity.' : 
Joan be carried out without an adequate motive and that motives arise from 
our emotional life. And if Whichcote is to exclude emotion from the knoti.:' , 
ledge that is relevant to morality, then he must exclude motives, and 
without motives activity is not Possible. Be maintains that it is natural - 
: for man to obey his reason, but his viHew of reason excludes the possibliti 
at its giVing rise to action. 
- But even if his *reason* is capable of giving rise to action, that is-, 
I. Discatuses, Vol.3, pp.132, 400; CaraPagnaop w.24-5. 
2. Discourses. Yo1.1, pp.194. 206, 304; To3..3, p.170. 
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of being the first step to virtue, to argue that it is natural to obey 
the reason does not justify the moral , ought. For it may still meaningfully 
be asked:. °Why ought one de what is natural'? Whicheete would still haV'e 
, to argue that we ought to ,do what , is natural, and this 'ought' is not 
justified. And if he does attempt to justify such an 'ought', he would
appear to be launched into an infinite regress. In order to maintain hia ,, 
position, 111th:heats Would have to maintain that we do in fact behave in 
weyzAhet is , seen by the reason to be Of a certain kind* for example, 
in .a way that the reason sees to be logically consistent with the natures 
Of the agent and the acted-upon: But this is inconsistent with his Vial 
that it is possible to . * .hold the truth in unrighteousness*. It would 
make virtue identical with,: or at least . necessarily connected to, the 
knowledge that he considers to have ‘a Place in morality; but he holds that 
this is not so: "Goodness is really. knowledge digested, concocted, enter- 
, tained, enbaitted to, ,consented to". 1 Knowledge is the first step to virtue, 
but it has to be submitted to in order that the good apt may be done. 
"Knowledge is imprisoned if it do' es not produce geodneeto for this is 
natural to itn,2 he says; but he does not attemit, to maintain that knowledge 
necessarily produces goodness. And :Inch C view would be inconsistent With 
the empirical facts; we are not necessarily rational. 
Alternatively, ti4Ohcate could hold that the sense of moral obligat-
ion is innate; that we all feel morally obliged; and that the function of 
the "reason* is to discover where that obligation lies.. But as we have seen, 
', - ithiChcote's reason cannot discover moral obligation; it is capable only 
of knowing facts and logical seceseitq. :  He could hole, however, that we 
du: gaol .obliged to bah)* in certain ways; that is to sect, that there are 
certain facts. about the kind of conduct that we feel obligatory, and that 
the function of the reason is to discover these facts: Hut he would have 
to maintain that the feeling of .obligation is independent of the reason, 
and this Would commit him to the difficulties Of the faculty theory of 
the Soul,: which we shall mains Preeenibr. 161cheCte sp.lakee a sharp . 
distinction between the reason and the emotions and ties attempts to argue- . 
that the Teases so conceived is capable both of knowing what As morally 
obligatory, and also of giving rise to action. And At is the sharp dist; 
1.biscouraess, TOI.:04, :p.92. 
24 ibid.., ifol.2, p.2613. 
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motion between reason and desire that is e source of most of the diff-
. /Cuities involved in thichoote 'a theory. 
But the particular problem of moral obligation can be reduced to this: 
whether or not Whichcote*s treason* is capable of knoting that certain 
kinds of baba- view are obligatory, such disini;erested knoirledge ,cannot of 
itself influence behaviour unless there is a feeling of' obligation, unless , 
we feel that there are certain ends which we are obliged to pursues and 
reason, as tibial:cote conceives it, cannot give rise to the feeling of 
obligation even if it can Judge that certain ways of behaving are oblig-
atory and certain other Ways of behaving are not, The knowledge that it 
is rity duty to do A cannot influence me to do A unless I deeire in some 
- sense to do my duty; and mere knowledge in . Thichcote's use of the term, 
cannot give rise to the desire to do ay duty. In other words, if litdchcote 
113 to make his position tenable, he must maintain that the feeling of 
obligation is inherent in man," that is, that there are certain ends which - 
. we inherently feel to he obligatory; and the function of the reason is to 
discover these ends, or rather to judge what kind of behaviour leads to 
-their attainment. The feeling of obligation, which, if it exists at all, 
must arise from our emotional life and not from intellectual calculation, 
must therefore be prior to the treason* if Whichootess theory is to be 
at all tenable. Itat.Whicheote argues" contillovally that the treason' is 
- capable of judging what is good or obligatory and of beckoning the will 
= and affections to follow. He Seems to think that the reason, as he con-
ceives it, is capable of not merely knowing facts)3nd logical necessity, 
buVokeiving rise to action. Re says, for instance, that; 
.ultis the work and business of religion, and of our lives, to reconcile 
; the temper of our spirits to the rule of righteousness; and to incorpor-; 
ate the principles of our religion, into the complexion of our minds. Tido 
- is done,I. ay searching into the nature of things, and the reason of our 
duty; that our judgement macs be each, as to approve the laws of our rel-
igion; 2. rty practising according to our riga apprehensions of things; 
till it become easy and delig;htni1.". 1 
thichcote is position consists in this: there are two (perhaps three) 
faculties in the mind, the reason, the affections or desires, and (perhape) 
the will. The desires and affections we not to be trusted; they are 
1. CamPagnao. P.65. 
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subjective, selfish and irrational; they have no place in the determinat-
ion of what constitutes pod behaviour. The reason, on the other hand, 
is objective, impartial and disinterested. it is the faculty by whit% 
truth and goodness are known and is therefore that which is able to judge 
what idad of behaviour is good or obligatory. Not only is it capable of 
knowing the kind of conduct that is good, but it is able to direct us to 
act in the way that it judges to be good. But the reason is not complete 
master of the soul; there are conflicts between the reason and the desires, 
between what we ought to do and what we want to do. Thus knowledge of 
goodness is only the first step to virtue; the second step consists in 
doing what is seen to be good. Tato be accomplished not by the supp-
ression of the desires, but rather by the reason directing the desires in 
the way that it wee to be obligatoxy. There is a sugenetion, too, in 
Whichcotets writings that there is a third faculty, the will, whose 
function is to follow where the reason leads; but this faculty is not 
discussed at length and is not really 4istinguiE3hed from the desires. 
For Whichcote, the reason is the all-important faculty, and anything elge 
that may have a place in the soul, the will, the affeotiong, the passions, 
and the desirea, are all considered as having no place in morality except 
to 'fellow where the reason leads. The (thief flirtation of the desires seems 
• to he to cause evil. The function of the reason is to Judge what is good 
and to beckon to the will to follow; and we have seen some of the problems 
of this position.- 
Bow it is not difficult to sae why Whichoot,e adopted a theory such 
as this. The reason seemed to him to be eatable of certainty and there-
fore that which should decide on the kind of behaviour that is goal. But 
Whichcote could not maintain that We necessarily do what the reason judges 
to be good, for this would destroy the traditional doctrine of 'free-will* 
as the cause of evil. Thus he maintains that we ought to do what the 
reason judges; failure to obey the reason is to abuee 'free-will' and to 
give rise to evil. This will become clear if we consider* briefly, 
Whichcote's theory of f'reeArill and of the cause of evil or 'sin'. 
Sint* knowledge, on Whichcoteis theory, is the first step to virtue, 
• 
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and:nouore than the first step, it follows,: As we have seen, that some-
thing more than knowledge is. necessaryto give rise to good conduct; it 
is necessary to choose to do what is known to be good. In other words, 
there are.at.least two conditions of good conducts in the first place. it 
is necessary to have the requisite knowledge that certain kinds of conduct 
are good; and secondly, it is necessary to choose to behave in a way that 
is known to be good. Consequently, evil Can arise at two levels; it may 
be due to lack of the requisite knowledge, that is, to ignorance; or it 
may arise from a deliberate choice of what is known, to be evil.. This was • 
the strictly orthodox view Of Whichcote's time; goodness is known indepen& 
ently of being goOd and may be chosen or rejected; the faculty which makes' 
it possible to choose to do what is known to be virtuous - or what is known ... 
to be vicious, is the 'free-will'. And this is Whichcote's view. In this' s ' 
part of his theory, be is strictly orthodox; his unorthodoxy lay chiefly 
in his rejection of the view that goodness is whatever God arbitrarily 
•cOmmends and in his liberal outlook. 
Keil,: onWhichcots's view may arise at two levels, at the level of 
:kneiledge or at the level of 'free-will'; but he thinkS that the thief 
'cause of eVil is the abuse of free-will. Infect, be maintains that All 
:except idiots are capable of knowing what kind of behaviour is good, and 
that therefore a person behaving in an evil way from lack of knowledge 
of goodness is not strictly 'in sin' and may be excused; the chief cause of 
-evil is wilful rejection of what is known tote goo). 
Kou Cannot say more or worse of-any men, than that be doth evil knowingly, 
;:-And against his conscience. It is universally acknowledged, that. ignor-.AnCe doth greatly excuse, and therefore we have charity for idiots; and 
:where men have newer heard, and are Withoutthepale-of -the 'church, we leave them to God's mercy, and exclude them not. Bata is. quite. other-- 
.vittise where men area law to themselvep."1 
This is perfectly consistent with the position that Whichcote continually 
seeks to maintain. Knowledge of the kind of behaviour that is good is 
quite independent of being virtuous, and couplets in inteLleatually 
' 
	learn- 
lug propositions of the form 'A is good' or is obligatory'. This kind 
Of knowledge is no more than the 'first step to virtue*; the second step 
1. Discourses MA, p.58. 
consists in choosing to do what is known to be good or obligatory. Thus 
the first step consists is knowing that, for example, A is good; the second 
step is to choose to do A. And this choice is the function of the 'will'. 
"We are very apt to all ley the fault upon our natures; but really , our wills 
are rather to be blamed. That that undoes us, is our perverse wills, cor-
rupt affections, stubborn hearts: and these do more harm in the world than 
weak heads: it is not so much want of knowledge as goodness. God is a 
great deal more known in the world, than he is either observed or loved. 01 
Vice, Whichcote is saying, is due not so much to failure to use the 'reason' 
• but to a failure of the will to follow where the reason leads. The: will is 
'free' either to follow the reason or to disobey it; and to disobey the 
reason is to abuse the power of freewill. "Men themselves abuse that 
arty and power they hold of God and enjoy under him: for although all pow-
er be explicable for the better, yet it is an abuse of power to do that 
that is not fit to be done: it is no more than it is in a, paralytic agility 
of motion, when the man trembles every joint, not from nimbleness of spirit, 
but want of strength. "2 ' 
Although Whichcote argues in favour of the existence of free-will, he 
does not consider that it ought to be used arbitrarily; it is an abuse of 
free-will to use it to Choose what is known to be evil. This is the most 
reprehensible state in which it is possible to be. at the doctrine of 
free-will has to be introduced into his theory in order to account for 
the empirical fact of evil. De cannatzudsaaist,on his theory that know-
ledge is the first step to virtue, that evil is due wholly to igaorance, 
for he thinks this is a form of determinism; and, Moreover, it is empir-
ically evident that if the knowledge that is relevaat_to morality is 
independent of emotion and consists in impartial, disinterested 'reason' s 
mere knowledge that a certain kind of conduct is good does not compel us 
to do it. We feel that we are able to know (inWhichcote's sense of 'know-
ledge') that one kind of behaviour is obligatory and at the sane time bah,. 
ma Ina, way that is known not to 'be obligatory. Furthermore,Whichcote 
maintains that evil is due to abuse of freewill in order to make man, and 
not Ood,responsiblefor It. He thinks that if 'sin' is not the result of 
free-will, then it must be necessary; that is to say, it must be God's 
fault. "If ain were necessary, it could not be avoided; and if a man's duty were impossible, it could not be done; this mould be an anewer to God him. 
1. Discourses, Vol.3, p.265. 
2. ibid., Vol.3, P377. 
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self. But... there is no necessity of evil or a. 	of do- 
ing good, and becoming virtuous. 01 
• Whichcote wants to maintain the traditional Vdoatrine. of 'sin*, and therefore 
is compelled to support also its inseparable companion, the doctrine of 
• arbitrary free-will. 
But he is to some extent aware of the problems of a theory of arbit- , 
rex* freewill. • We have seen, for instance, that he has to maintain alao 
that it is an abuse of one's freewill to choose evil knowingly. lie contends, 
• Another, that the possession of free-will is not in itself a virtue, for 
•it is not a characteristic of God; it is merely a power which may be used 
for. good or mil. °It is not V  the highest excellency in God to do because 
he wills, and what he wills: but there is that is God himself, which is 
transcendently above will and pleasure; that is, his holiness, goodness, 
and rieAteousness°1 2 
• "Free-win, as it includes a power to do wrong, as well as right, is not to 
• be found in God himself; and therefore it is no perfection in us .  For this 
is true of Cad, that all his ways are way-s of righteousness, goodness, and 
. truth; and there is not in him a power to do otherwise than is just and 
right. And if we itieTe Cod,-like, as we should be, the fruit of the spirit 
in us would be in all righteousness, goodness and truth... And as God 
doth that in all cases, which is just, fit, right and good, so doth he 
require:-of us• 03 
Whichcote argues that we are free arbitrarily to chocitie either what is 
known to be good or what is known to be evil; but he has th add that there 
is a right VBfld wrong use of free-will. It is right to use free-will to 
choose what is known to be good; it is wrong to use it to choose what is 
known to be evil. And it is necessary that he should toaintain that we 
Ought to use our free-will to choose what the reason sees to be good, for 
otherwise knowledge conld have no relevancy to Morality. If we are able 
•to know by using the reasoning faculty that A is good andB is evil, and • 
U we have the power to arbitrarily choose whatever we please, then knowledge 
_ can have no influence upon our behaviour unless it is said that the 'right' 
use of our free-will is to choose what the reason judges to be good. This 
just another aspect of the whole problem of moral obligation in Which-
cote's . ethics. If the possession of arbitrary free-gill is a fact, then it 
= is not explained lift one use of free-will is right or good and another 
- bad or evil. If Whichcote holds that what makes conduct good is that it 
I. Discourses, Vol.I, p.336 
2. ibid., Vo1,4, p.I27. 
5. ibid., Vol.1, p.381. 
• 
is Consistent with the 'reason of things** he is forced into the view that 
.good Weans consistent with the reason of tillage, and he cannot then answer 
the-gesstian Nby ought one do what is consistent with the reason of things?' 
hY essartim that it is good to do what is consistent with the reason of 
:things.. For Such an assertion would involve him in the tautology:. one . 
ght•to do what is consistent with the reason ofrIthings becauee it is con-
. -sistent with the reason of thingo. As we Shall see later * this is a point . 
on which Cudworth insisted in nitaidng against those oho hold_ that good means 
. _companded. Alternatively if he contends that knowledge of the 'reason 
`of things' is knowledge that one ought to behave in a certain wey• then,. .  
• as we have seen.-Whitheotets 'reason of the mind' is not capable of lkamw=' 
ieg 'the season of things'. 
But there is a further diffidalty with vtio0cotoos theery of 'free- 
10111'. Since• he apparently considers that there are only the two .alternat-
-4064* deterniften and arbitrariness and sines he maintains that determin -
1.tem-18-matenable* he is forced to say that -one is being free when one is 
fAehavingarbitrarily. This involves him ifl the paradoxical position that- 
the viciOns.man* the mambo has no regard for right and wrong or good . and . 
evil and who therefore behaves arbitrarily, is the really free man * the 
'4enceho is using his power of behaving arbitrarily to its fullest eztent. 
Ala the other hand1 the good man. on Whichcotets theory, is he who curtaild 
his arbitrary free-will and submits to what he he to he good. In other 
words* the good MEM is be who fella to USO his free-will and whoise will 
fellows where the reason leads. The function of free-will is to oive rise' 
. to 'sin'; the good man does not use his free-will but submits to the 
dictates of the reason.. The vicious man, then, is the free Inall; the geed'- 
man is the slave. Ibis paradox is Al:ether emphasised when We remember 
Thichnoteis view that it is natural for man to submit to his reason; the 
will is free to do arbitrarily whatever it pleases, but it is .nmostural* . 
to allow it to be free. Whichcote does not appear tohave an alternative' . 
theory of freedom which would enable him th say that the good mania the 
really free man. Sddh a theory does not appear it the thought of the 
eambridgenatonists until much later in the works Of Smith and the Cudworth 
e 
e 
e 
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maJiuee11.pts. lit be-lODgi!J to a much. mo~ mature })rand of thought than that. 
,I ' .• • ·,- · ·•. ' : •• ' • ' ' , ' • .- ! ' ' ·• .·. .' .. !; · .• • "';'''• 
to which Whichc:O!;e attained. 
. :~-o ~i~n :~·~ledge 1D ~ity •. theU. :for lhicl1cc.te• i~ to ... · 
·~j~•. ~t kl~ ~-btlba~ ~ -~-~uP~~- the ·~i~n of th~ .. 
l4ii.: uM(sb. as we -~.·1s· ~ ~-,the--~-~t b.~-~~ ~eh ... ·. 
- • • • ••• ·-. : ~ ~ • • • : '·- • • • • t • ' • • ; : • • • • .- • . •• : ' • • • • • • • ' • • • • • -. • • ~ 
• 1~. behf:1VeS. is quite arbi~ •. is to move us to-~ in ~hicb ~- ~ it 
.:~·' ~1- 1s b fmicttora ~ one tacalty •. the~;· ~~isi~~.~r.· 
.. , .. , . .. • • ' ~ ' • • ' . ' ' • . • : ' ' . ; ' ' . •' • ' •· . • ._r : •• 
cho~ce l:B the. ttmetioll~~ am;~ •.. the will. . . And these tow<? f'aculties. IIIWJt, 
.on.m.ncheo~ts th~017, be. eaparau; and au~.-. tor the. reason is.~ 
· ial.an4 -~ted:81Jd.is independent of~.· wbile the win, since. 
i~ £aucti~ is tc>' follow rather. than ~- de-~-. ~ ~ ~t~oo or -~ 
. . . - ... - ' . . .. ·.' :. . . . . ' . ,: ·. . . . . ... 
emotion ar_ a:t least a ~on ot -~ emQtions. lt is neyer clear,. f1rom :: 
Wbichcote•a writiJ:Jes, how he eonsidere tbe will to diff'er.trom the .aft~ 
. . . : . . : . ' . ' :' . : .. ·. 
-ions; but at leas't this IDI1Ch is clear, there is a~ distirlction bet1Jeen 
'·J ·-·· • : • • ·- • • - • • • 
· bo:th the function and the nature of the :reason· 8Dd those of ·the will and 
.. . . . . : . . . . . ··. . .. ' _:· .... 
atfect:f.;ons •. tf4i®cote•.s psy~los.v, ~:~M. theftfore ·b:is ethical theory. is·. 
. . . . ' . , . . ' . . . . . ' ~ . . . . . . '. -.. . 
·based u~ the view that the soul is cli~ into separate and autonomous· 
· t~u-. .. :It -~ ePtnst -~ \Vpe of .theory tt.at. ~~- -~·.argue _ 
so ~.: ani it wW ~ comtenient it we ·-.er·~ some .ot the .. · ... 
' . . . . . . . - . . . . . ' . . ~ . 
d~ti- ~ such a ~· 
. 
the ~-probl~ 111th the f~ty psycbology is .that it _diVides.-~ .... 
' ·- . ' . . . . . ... ' . . . . . ' . . . :_:··· 
· soul: into dlttezent parte with clift'el'e!1t f'lmo:\icms in a W!\V that makes it: 
· im~biS·-~~- cme tacmv to ba'Ve·81W·.~~· on- other; ·tmeed, ~~ . 
: ·.1aecom8s iiDpOssible~ ~ this ~ev of the.-· f~ OilS faculty to be aware··:· 
' . . . .. . ; . . .. 
of the ~- fd arw other. -~ if ~ ~~~n is that faculty which 
· argues. judges and apprehends logical ~tions• while .tl'Je· affections or 
' . . ,. ... . . . 
· desires comprise that t~t.v which pereej,ves :certain ends as desirable. 
' . 
then it is impossible for these two faculties to· be' ll1faN of each other. : . 
-. . . -- . . ( .. : .. _' ' ··. : . . _-··. ' ..... . 
-~speak different ]enguages,. as ~t ~- ~-reason tmderstaDds only. 
· lo~ arguDients and can baVe no know~ or what is meant by desire or 
desirable ends~ liikeTiise, the atf~ can perceive certain concrete 
ends as desirable but cannot understand what is. ~t by logical coJJSist- ·. 
eJ10y; wbat iS seen· to be logically conai~t. in so. far~ it_ is merely_ .. _·. 
. . -
1 
'<; 
·.·.· ~-
-·: 
'' 
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lOgiCaijy Conbistent,. can be no more attractive to this faculty than 
logical nonsense. lAgidal relations are meaningless to the desiring fac-
ulty just as desirability, attractiveness, value, and similar questions, 
are meaningless to the reasoning faculty. Once a distinction is made 
between the nature and fanatical of reason and desire it necessarily follows 
that these are made into two distinct faculties concerned with totally 
•different objects and therefore incapable of influencing each other. The 
reasoning faculty beCOM813 that which is capable of knowing only universals 
and it becomes impossible for it to know particulars; the desiring faculty, 
on the other hand, becomes that which is capable only of knowing, or rather 
•desiring, particulars. Thus, if Whichcotets 'reason of the mind' appreh-
ends certain logical relationships between certain kinds of acts and their 
environment, this knowledge cannot possibly influence the affections for 
the affections are not capable of understanding logical relationships; the 
-reason might just as well square the circle. A reason that emu:only 
-calculate cannot -Influence the affections. Moreover, since all activity 
•must have a motive to carry it through, and since motives arise only from 
•the 'affectionse„ a knowledge which cannot influence the affections cannot 
influence action. Action is directed towards ends that are perceived as, 
• In some sense, desirable. 	on the faculty theory this is a function of 
the affections. 
This problem, however, has been generally realised, and attempts have 
been made to resolve it without discarding the faculty theory of the soul 
by introducing the concept of the will as a third faculty and mediator 
• between reason and desire. This *will*, it is held is capable of carrying 
• knowledge from the reason so that it may influence the desires. In order 
to do this, the wi is considered to comprise characteristics of both 
the reason and the desires. But such a combination of such totally 'diff7 
•erent characteristics is quite impossible, and even it the will did Combine 
the characteristics of reason and desire, it would< still have to be explain-
ed how the 'rational* and k'emotional' aspects of the will could understand-
each other. On the strict faculty theory of the soul,, not only do the 
reason and the desires* , as it were, Spe* different languages - if this- 
were '804 it Would •bei quite sensible te-introduee the will liv.the role of 
•an. 'interpreter' who Understands 'both •languaged - but they speak different 
• it:managed. about different Object‘zuch that it . is impossible to :translate 
•-•ene language into the other.. • caide...a sharp dietinetion isArtmm between 
'. -;reascin anti detaire,- it is itaPoseible to reconcile them. Doan if the.'trill.‘•, 
introdUced as .a tertiui quid, .ar attempt to :reconcile 'the rational . 
:and ,emotional 'aspects - of it must of necessity be futile; since-resale:U. and 
• desire are defined as separate 'and :as different• in both nature. and-Timetion. 
Wliichcotels faculty 'theory of the soul cannot be maintained; either be 
is forded to. admitthat the 'reason' cannot influence the deeires;--•in:Which 
case his 'Iltuctiledge° can have no place in morality, or he needs to vastly 
modify' his -view of the nature of reason.- all action is direotod towards 
ands which. are thought; or rather' felt, to be Worth pursuing ; and •any 
knowledge' whiChl'is to lurki;aimi influence on the way in which we behave' 
1.1.•aust be knowledge of •ends which •ate capable of being:pursued;-:and. if it is 
•"..to•-direct:•action,it must :knew certain: ends as worth. gaming. WhiChicote 
'••-seams to realiee that • action. directed towards the attainment of ends: . 
'When _he sayn that . the end is the _main cause of :action",4 but:he does not 
*: -realise that his *realm of the •mindt _is incapable of .discerning ends • 
towards :which action may 'he 'directed . - ‘..411 -action is interested • acticm; " 
but ifhicheoteis 'reason' is divorced from all desire and is therefore did-
- interested. , It can 'only 'understand logical relations and these cannot be 
an end towards -which: action may be :directed. nicht:tote's *.reasont may •_: 
argue- - that' coarse A is- logically eentitatent with its :environment 'and: that-
:•-courde Lis -.inconsistent, but it vannet disoern•A as the -desirable -Course. 
•, -It may even present A and -B to the- desired as alternative courses • of act-
-.ion, but I it' cannot indicate any Preference for : A or a; • it 	•merelY - indio» 
ate . -that A ant B- hate vertain different': logical.relations to , their entir-
4:anent, but this Can hate tat meaning: to the desires.. 	-reason, 50 Which" 
-cote Conceives it; • is •capeb*Taf discovering characteristics pertaining..": ; 
to •A and B whioh-the desires are not capable of taking. into , account -in-: 
deciding between :the twiyalternatiVes.- • • .Once a clear : distinction is made 
?latest:a the _reason.'and, the' desires suchthat.the reason can only argue 
thedesires' only perceive Certain ends as desirable, there is no- peas- 
Discourses; 1101.2, p.309. 
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ible:way in.whicb:they'can.be:reconciled...When the mind is :divided into 
-separate - and autonomous departments,. 't can never , be :integrated again.. 
1..WhichCote"a view of the nature and fUnctionr. -.of: knowledge in morality* 
as we have , interpreted it,- may be summarised- 'briefly , 813 follows:- :Moral 
virtne is not possible -.without knowledge,: and '.the 'knowledge that Makes 
virtue possible is the -intellectual apprehension , of the , kinds of behaviour 
that . are fitting with , their environment.: Thie knowledge 'is an:activity - 
of 'the :reasoning faculty end•as Such is independent :Of'. will: and- desire. 
The object:3. ot its•activitf* ."the reason of things"*.- ere eternal and. accist-
independently- of the activity of knowing.' In fact, the term "reason of 
;things" Might almost be interpreted to mean 'law. of nature". Without 
IcnoWIedge it is impossible to behave virintously, tilt 'the possession-of 
knowledget fs , not .the only condition of .the good:lifet. the will, which is 
- :free, -must also cheese to. do what- the-reason judges to, be- according to the 
'reason Of. things". It is the "duty". of the will to "freely.' reject its 
arbittary .freedom end. obey the-reap= . bere are - e number of problems which 
•- make:-Whielcotess position, quite untenable,, as we.have seen,. and these 4ff-
', iculties*, almost 'without - exception,' misy: be reduced. to_ the inadequate, 
'.,psyc.hology, the view..that the soul is•divided into separete...faculties, 
on."-whioh. Whiehcoteis theory 'rests., • 
:Whichcoted theont of ethics, as we have considered 'it, involves the ,: 
view that. knowledge is prior to virtuet that is to say, that one cannot 
- -be virtuous' without first having 'knowledge. There are tuftestioits„ however, 
'of:a rather different theory in some' of WhichcotePs works - and this side'. 
:''of-.him Should be doneidered, not 'so much;for its can sake, but because :it': 
is doubtless one of the sources of some of the most..mature th.ought of:the. 
later Cambridge. Platonists... .Throughiaat - the works of Whichcote, there 
•are -isolated references which involve the View that the highest kind cif..- 
. knowledge La attainable only' by the virtuous man; that is, that virtue.  
:prier to knowledge. it 'is evident from .passages. ,such. ae. the: followings-.. 
"The eye couldnever behold the sun if it were not like it. The mind of man 
Could never Contemplate Cod, if it be not God-like: for (as in nature) .there 
mast be a :einitable disposition of the faculty to the object. Every faculty 
..'bath in itself a disposition, connatural to its proper object: and no fad-
ulty extends itself beyond its proper object 	The understanding takes 
e 
e 
e 
:so. 
'·. 
'• , .. •• 
. . ";' 
i·.: 
-:·. : . ,'' , Cognizance· 'of things. as they are ~teP.±gible;_ ~ ~il mov~ -~ th.inp 
· <'. ·.'aa'they are -deSi.mble;'·the-Sisht loOks atter tbings a8 ibe.V :are visible; 
. ; - . . -;:the: hearing' receives 'that iS 8U4iblei· every' facuitY. imth' a-'t~ to its 
: PI"Q~J". ,~b.1ectt~ 'lllld,er, ~t: ~se, f~. nQtion, whe~by, .1 t · approPli;ates 
t~t object. to tbat facult,v •.••••. 'lhe ~ tbat' is :sensual •. worlclly, brutiSh, 
;~oo~~t b8ve p&rcepuon•ot 'tilingsth8t are'h$aVerl1Y•-,u~ a si>iri'tua.l - -
.. ;;;{lO(!o.ui;it_;.~·but ~$lf',~- be -~ a spiritual _temper·~ disposi~9n; o~ 
'·. WisS_--119 ismt citJaW'ie,d ~be s_piritual.ly~~ __ fherefOl'e _w9.&19.-~-
: a.tem·otqth&,divi:Jle Datura* OtbEU'Id.Be 1fe shall.: DOt :relish tleav~,;.y·thi ... Pl 
- ' . . .  . 
, ___ ,-whiclleote:tear~·ibat·iii'cmter to ~-~·we-must ~-like it;_--
.. ~::,,~ton tc·kriow-:GOd.'w$ mU8t b8 p,-:we~. · ··u.eavenli thin68•· are on]y 
; ·:··bwwn 'b7 be1Dg ·•he&Veilly•· 'lidndea. _ TbiS: make8 -~-what iS-~t--by 
·.:, ·_ ;,Whi.Chcote•s firSt ~tion ot ·t11e :goo(i ille ... -nti SeiJSe ot 'tire'·aoUi muSt 
··:haVe ·a'diVirl& Lii~n -Upo!l it_.VbiCh ~ic.arry a man towal-d •God'na_ to 
.;;' -. whicll-·ve ~at the begiliiiin& Ot~'the cma:Pter~ 'Rhe ·8004 'life. he coot-
~ . . . . 
. -'-:bmally maintaiDs; is 'the 'Bucl~like ~e<wbi.Ch he consi~ to be identical 
-:nth lite .. coriSistent---with. :•th& ·re&s0n1 O£ wn4s''•·'alul ill ~:r,::w --l)e :god..; 
: like·'it· iS~~-·to~'icrioW cod; -ana: tbiS-.-is-'made- :PO&Sibie onlY' by:'bei!Jg 
·· ··. ~- :•aPfri~.:.mnded,·•,.' ··'WbicbCOte'•s··comD.Stent VieW: ·iS ·tb&~'the ~·'life 
.: •. ·. ,':i's·tru3-lite:wbiCli is~· tO the'~~· or tlir•·~'fmi;,ruj:eoiltends. 
::~paEfwe;:hEiVe'-seen• ·that·,_te;:Otie:v'the·reason! 1s: to ·obei-,QOd.~:····This·'iS :his ·gen.· 
, : :::,~~~f.ll :Vi~;.-, ·:sut ,~, is aido• me~ 'in his WoiiaJ ·th8 VieW 'tliat ·kf-mt-
·.· ·of:_Q;d·iS:aometbiDg"ciifrewrit ·trom''tlie ::~or' th8 reasori-'or things; 
' . . ~ . 
-·mid • tliie ·ld:Dd :ot- k:DOwieage is · pos§Jibre: :oDJ.y tor: ·tbc)se •· ·~ ··•s:Pirl tUal.l.y -
' iniilded'~: . ; : -~ - '' 
.. _, ; ,: ~ ht not orilN ·cioes 'wbichCcjt&-- lliaintain 'th6t''kn0tiiaige .. ·or· ·-<bl involves 
· . ··soiae tcmn· 0t ·•spirt~ '~tion•; · ·ile 8rgues 'alsO ·~t ·rice :~ . 
: ~_-,.-tlw' -understanding. · "~Itiis · ~~ .l,y ·-Per!~~ · ~~~ thB. ~-tgr;ai t\v o~ ·the 
.: ,,::-~ ·doth blii!d 'the liDdersta»dingi' Sad trUe Wisdom Will never 'abide in a 
, ·.:·JJ18lici.~- B!ld wic;ked soul!'•' . , .. _ ·, -_ :, ':: :: , . :. 
_.; 'J.Ih~ view·:~~~~. is that virtue._ is prior .t~, the .knawle~ _ .~- the 
,~ J.r.eaa~ ,of .-~hings~',_::sU1ce it::is -held ·that vi~ -b]J,nds the. understanding. 
': ,·: ·~· ~,_a~:v;~w :.i.s. in .dil"eet .contrast ·to -the _geueral vi~~~ we have 
· :·:~een_co:ns.!~~., tor,, -as: we .. ha.v:e ·seen, :Whichcote maintains -that Ja.lowled&e 
.-.-.'":i_s:nece.~ •. prior t~ -vi$e, bei.ne;:i~ .. :fact •. the :f'~~step. to :virtue·· 
. . . . . . . 
"It is iDcUl!lbent upon us to look . after infomatiOD• 1D order to ref9DDStion 
.--aild ~t: because without knowl~ the he$rt• ·~t be good..:_, ~t then 
1. Discourses• Vo1 •. 2. pp.34o-1 •. 
2 •• ibid .... Yol.3 •. p.296. 
3., Cammumse •. '0 .. ,41. ~ 
e 
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the ~-iS· D'Ot· SaiiCtift~ 'trem knowledge alOIIe; for there mu8t be f'irst. 
~~l...A..,.;,.; ·:..-.a• --- __ ......_ ___ 8 1 AILV'!I .. """"6""·• ouu.· , ~ Y~' ttW::• . . . . 
. _It is. qui~.~· frOm this• and =trom simUar pa$3age8 whiCh we hEive cOn-
. ~dereci .. that ~~ _is Whicbcote·•s -view· that knowledge is prior to Virtue. 
But he :maintains, also •. that .vi~ impairs the un4erstandi IJ8; .. ·that -is to·· 
. :.~~ •. -that .. o~:the man tree. from vice can have a good understmuiing. In· 
other words~ virtue. is· pri.or to ~ledge'. ··ADd in both. cases• ·he is rot-
· .. erri.ng to•' the same kind .. cif' kzimrledse. ,the knoWl~ bt iS .a hnetion of 
'·:~he clnlders~ndi~ or the ':reason.·. Here ... then. is. a ~ar ~o~trad.iction.;, 
'WhichCOte wantS tO mainta.in.·at- that~ is :~r to.'kncnilectge arid. 
that lmowl- is ~or to ~e. ·~s view .tbat ~we have held ·the truth 
in unrigh~': is_ d.earlt eonvatiotol'y with. the following ~~ 
· 
8 I acMse purity ot ••. . W mep.puiojh the~ ~nds. ·.J'or.wic~· doth 
· : · · <U,sable the intellectuale: the nausht..v maltgnaDt E~piritsd. man bath ilo right 
judgi!Hmt nor undemtandi.ngt but the.~ will he guide in the wi;w: 9lJd if . 
you do thee&- things,. then SbS.ll you 1moV. the ~~~2 . · 
. It is ·being·~ ·here· that.it is. DOt. ~l)d.~ to. hOld .. th9. truth .. in ~ . 
e ... ,tsnts~~- f.~'t.be ~tEJous~~·baa -·4J~pt·~· .am-tbSref<we 
e 
CBtm:Ot . 'hold b tl"Uth•. . . . 
Whi~te,·::~ .~-.have seen •. maintdns also the exiStence of a knowledge 
: of •GOd Which is: CU,r~ tJ.om· ~ ~~ ot ·~,reason of t~· and. 
which is '(it~ -~·only -~ the virtUous~ !his can. be main.udned. consist-
. : · entli with lliS' ~-that the Jmoirlet~SS of t.be :,~:or tbi~~ by the . 
· ·: •-•reason or the· mild• is priof. to arui miep9ndent ~ ~i pt.o,i~ it · 
. is. held tbat it. i& a. different kind of lmowled&9 f'i'Om that -.bleb is a 
... ·" ···tuOOtion>of tbe·:reSso:ll or ~~;,g.·· '.md Wbi~ 4~ ~-tO sug- . 
. geat ·that lalowled88 of {lodc;is cW'ferent. tram. ~.: · ·FV example, he 
· · · ::, argues:- ··oOod pve ·mm mind .fmd lm!erstaDding,. to ~ :enqub.y -~- God,,: U 
· · · possibly ·he miSbt feel himi feel. bim, tbat iS ·l6' a spiritual tOuch.- when ·. ·' 
. , ~e miDd·. is clear. and tree. aDd un41stUrbed•. ·Clod 414 never .. intend that . · .
. . :reason 8114 understarnti ng iD lll8D ah()U).d ever .be.~· to be a hewer ot 
. wOod, or a driiler ot wten but f'or obserVanCe Of w.· attendance upon him, 
• ';. ~ -~ance ·ot: him ••• ·the spirit .Of man is the ca'DUe of ·the Lord."3 
. It would seem tbat b3 'spirltual touch' Whichcote ~- sorrieth1n8 different 
· f'rotn his •reason• whi.Cb ·iS indepelldent ot teeli.lig. But he DSVer makes 
· clear .~· what he .meams it. ADd :IDOl'6CJI'W• ·he ·SBlS prac~:cy tha 
1. ~ Vo1.1 .. p.236 • 
. 2 .. ibid.,Jol.'* p.201. 
'~ i~~·ol·'· ~29P· 
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~ 
32. 
same sort of thing in reference to 'our intellectual faciaties*.. „ It ja 
•the proper emp.loyment of our intellectual faculties, be conversant - 
about *xi, to conceive a,right of him; and, then to ilitate.. 111 . 	. 
Whichcote can maintain consistently both that knowledge is prior - to virtue 
• and that virtue is prior.to knowledge, only if in each case , he is refer-
-ring : to two different kind:: of knewledge4 . He may maintain, for example, 
that ,knowledge by the 'reason of the mina' is prior, to and independent of 
' Virtue; and that knowledge of Cod, in the sense of *epirittial torch°, 
is dependent upon virtue Caid attainable only by the 	man. • 'But it 
is, not clear that his 'Spiritual touch' is really a different kind of 
knowledge from his ' 11-reapoim of the mind'. Ands, in any case„ we have seen 
that in several of the passages where Whichcote argues that virtue is 
,prior to knowledge, be is referring to the same kind of knowledge as that - - - 
to -which he refers when he argues that 'knowledge is the first 'step to 
virtue*, namely, the knowledge that is 'n function of the reason and under-
standing. 
It is .e4ident,tben,{that: there are two incompatible theories of the 
nature and function of knowledge in morality :.contained in the works of 
Ithichcote. One of these, his naive rationalism, we have considered in 
. both because it is the .view more generally held by him and because 
it is his pecirliar contribution to the thoUght of the Cambridge Plato:1/8 .W. 
.• ,it would be out of place to consider in detail the other view which appears 
in Whichcotere worte s because he does5not develop it in any detail himself. 
But as we shall see in the chapters that follow * it is the embryonic font 
• - Of the most mature thought of the later Cartridge Platoniets. 
2. Cmapagnac: The Cambridge Platonists, p.43. 
- 
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Cudworth describes his :tbre~fold aim in writing :the 'True Intellectual 
' . . ~ 
Sy~ .. to ~ the following: "First, thB.t al~.tbings in. the World do 
not f!Loat without a head and governor; but .that there is a God •• presid-
.ing over an •.. $eeondly •• 'that .this God being essential.JY. good and just, ... 
·there is •••. something in its mm nature immutably: and etemal.ly just and . 
UDjust; and not by arbitrary will,. l&v, and CODIID8Jld only.. And lastly, 
., that •·• . we are sofar ·forth principles or masters of our om actions.,. as 
to be accountable, to justice for. them"·.l ... . . 
In other vords:, he sets out to prove three things:., that Qod exists, that 
there. is a natural. justice ~ that .moral distincti<ms are objective and 
riot depelldent upon the C()lDII!ands of ·human or divine sovereigns, and that 
. . . . . . 
~· is such a thing as ~uman freedom which makes man responsible f~r his 
conduct. We are chie~ ·concerned bl;tre with his attempts to prove the sec-
ond and. third .of these objects. And for tllis purpose ve shall need to 
refer to -his 'Treatise Concerning. Eternal and .Immutable Morality' and to 
. . . ' . ' 
.his unpublished manuscripts rather than to .his 'Tru.e .Intellectual System•. 
. . . . ' ' .·· . · . 
. ·Cudwortb's ·~ and lllmu'table llorality' is an epistemological, 
. . . . ' . •, 
rather thaD an ethical• treatise,. a1ld in it he sets out to prove t)lat there 
. ' 
. is a •na.~, justice'. JIC)Wever, he gives li"le indication in this work 
of.what• in his .opinion, constitutes the good life; he aims to sb.9w that 
' ' 
there .is a real distinction 'i~ nature• between the good life and the evil 
lite, and in doing .so he shows quite clearly what the good life ~ not; but 
·in order· t() discover his views .on the nature of the good Uf'e, we shall 
. . have to ·.eD!fti ~ some of his othe~ works., But it is importan:t to consider 
.first the validity of his argmnent tbat moral distinctions are objective, 
. and with it the view that the good life does no~ consist. in .law-abi~. 
. . 
The · argumeJ;tt that moral distinctions are objective and prior to 
' ' . •' . 
commands is pioobably the best known passage from the works of the Cambridge 
. . ' . . . 
Plato~ •.. and is contained in Cudworth's ·'Eternal and Immutable Morality'~ 
~ . . ' 
ttin t!:le first place, it is a thing which we shall very easily demonstrate, 
that mOral goOd and evil • • • (if they be not mere mimes· vi thout ~ sisni£-
icat:i:o~ or names for nothing else, but 1filled and commanded:, but have. a 
.:reality in respect of the persons obliged to do and avoid them),. cannot 
pOssi.bly be arbitrary thirigs. made by will withoUt nature; because it is 
universallY true_- that thi.ngs are what they are, net by will;. bu.t by nature. 
As for example• .things are white by whiteness, and black by blackness ... 
like by likemss, and equal by equality, that is by such certain natures 
1. Preface to the 'l'rue Intellectual System of the Universe. p.:ccdv. 
(All references to this work and. to the • 8temal and Immutable 
Mor8lity' are to the 1845 edition). ~ 
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of their own. Neither:um:Omnipotence itself .. bynpre will make a 
•thing white or black without whiteness or blackness .. Omnipotence itself cannot by mere will make a WO triangular, without having the nature and 
properties of a triangle in it ... Or lastly, to instance in things relative man omnipotent will cannot make things like or equal to one another, with-
out the natures of likeness and equality. The reason whereof is plain, because all these things imply a manifest contriediction; that things should 
be what they are not .. Nov all that we have hitherto said amounts to no more than this that it is impossible anything should be be will only, that 
is without nature or entity, or 'that the nature and essence of anything 
should be arbitrary. AM since a thing cannot be made anything by mere will without a being or a, nature,. everything must be necessarily and immut-
ably determined by its own nature, and the nature of things be that which 
•it is, and nothing else ... There is no such thing as an arbitrariams ess-ence, mode or relation, that nay be made indifferently anything at pleasure; 
• for an arbitrarious essence is a, being without a nature, a contradiction, and therefore a nonentity. Whereas the natures of justice and injustice cannot be arbitrarious things, that may be applicable by will indifferently 
to any actions or dispositions whatevern,1 
It is important to mottos that Cudworth considers that this argument 
is valid, if it is valid at all, only if good and evil 'be not mere names 
without any signification, or names for nothing:else, but willed and comm-
anded% If it is argued that , good and evil are meaningless terms, Cudworth's 
•argument can have no forme. But there in much in the argument that is int-
eresting and important, and it has been the subject of a good deal of con-
troversy between various commentators. 2 It would be outside our appoint-
ed scope to consider this argument in detail, however; we shall consider 
it only in so far as it makes clearer the views which will be considered 
•later in the chapter._ Cudworth is arguing,- then, that there is a necessary 
Connection between things and their characteristics or properties: triangles 
•must necessarily have the properties of triangles; things that are good are 
do by virtue of the presence in them of the properties of goodness, and are 
not made good or bad by the arbitrary will of Cod or a sovereign. Certain 
kinds of conduct are good 'not by will, but by nature'.. The purpose in form-
ulating this argument was to refute those who, like Hobbes and Descartes, 
maintained that good and evil are dependent upon the arbitrary will of a 
sovereign (for Descartes, God; for Hobbes, the ruler of the state). Theor- 
1.Eternal and Immutable Morality,.p.531. 
2. cp. Talloch: Rational Theology and Christian PhilosopAy,lrol.1, p.235. Prior: Logic and the Basis of Ethics, p.25. Muirbeadi The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy, p.59. 
pessmore: art..' 	Moral Philosophy of Cudworth (AJPP.Vol.20,p.172). Passmore: Ralph Cudworth, pp.42-3. ' 
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ies such SS. these. CUdworth mainta:.lnS. at"e fallacious because they attempt 
, ·,·tt)-~ at,.ODce ~-go(;d ~ ~ ~·inerin3f'ui:·_m~:tb&t.'tbey aze 
· :larbibsriou&. -~ •• · -ror ·u -~ 1s· 4~petuteM •: ~-~ or 
the sorkre~- tia a ~ ld.Da. o,· ~~ ~- b8 ·both -mo~~f anc1 1nmora1. 
• ' \ ' ' '; ~ • ' ' ~· • ' ' ' ' •, • ' ~ ! ' • ' ' ' ( ' • • • r ' • ' .; ' : ' I ' • • • . ' ' 
. . . . ... EVen it it' is CO~ that. the sOle: cbaract9riStie of good. eO~~~ is that 
.; ... , 'it:·~- 'c)baa:teiit t(,·'a·c~ .. ~ th8;{1s ~ -'v. tbat ~-'is 'a relation . 
:· 
. ; ot''aets and 'laoi ·.t~qu&ut,V'• :.· it still ~ ~ ~ th~ -~~=tion 
• .:.t»t.&tm Sood. ~-~ ~~·is & ·distinouon -~ ·the·daaracter ot 
:··thli·r·iatiODa.:·~~ it· i~ 1s· held that goOd. eo~ ·is obedi~t collduct 
•· .; ,; 'aild eVil ;c~' is· 41Sob8tiea~ ~$•s ar~t·· I!J8.ihtabs that goo4 
·.· ··::_oOinnict mu8t:·altnw8 b&''obedient ~t; it Can~ be mad9 another kind 
· · -~-~--c<lriduet:b.v·~-~· ot'Goci m. tbe ~~ , ,._. 
. · · It -tS u$ :~ ~ .that ·~ts ~-t :is·~~ stating the 
.. ·.taUtoio§: ·.~.'is g..~· . :tat' 'ev~· if ibis' is 80, it is-. still': si&nificant 
'• '' • •, - • :. . '! ' - ' . : ' : : • , ' 0 • • ,. • ' ~ ·, • •• : • • , • : I • I • ': , , 
· . ·to State it• tor ;it is the vert t.biJlg 4enied by some ot the theories be 
· ~o~;;.A ·What CUdwo:rth•s• · · · Dt ~ u tO · ·that· Whatever is taken 
.t'l_ ... ..,.,.. . ~ - pJ"'Ve 
· .. tO·b&·a·~te~·c,,·-~t-~.81···be·~·~teristioof · 
-·goOd .cODduct, -~ -~t -tn'bi~ be cllan&ed ·bY ····'tdll•l · ~- &ood behaViour 
~ eKbil.ttit ·-the ~ties of iiood. bebimaul-~ ana if it is· · 
~- .to. talk .• t.. •iiood I ''tJelia.ri:~~ -~·it.-~ :l;e '4~pendent upon 
:._·~bitrar.,.w;;:U~· .~.,·if ~-is a certain quality-of c~ kinds ot 
. · -~cui. :J;t ~~- 'b9 i:so .~epefld~tly ·Of ~tevm,. ·the ~- wills; it• 
· .. : "·:on the..:otheJ.·:·,. 'soodneSs is a rel.f.itiol'i (for· ~ple obildience to a cam-
;_ . ,·, .. . . . . . .. · ... ' . . ' ' ' .. : . . ' .. .· 
. ' . Jiland) it must' be a pa:rtiCnalar k1D4 fit relation' which c8miot be ccmstituted 
. . . ,' .. , ·-..... ' .. : ' ' . : . '. . . '·': . : ... : . -: 
·:bY its· ~Uon to· the'will··a~ ·the sove1'6~ "In other words•· provi.diDg 
.:-,'lt:.iS'-~·~.tO.~~--tel'm$··~· .and •Gril• the:vmu&~·s~ the 
~--~en~er~:--···quaUties.or nit;.ticms in behaviour \fbich·are nOt ' 
-~ constttuted:bY· .tbEdZ..:Niatic)n to; an:arbi~ wi~. It is oDJY it good 
; . . · .. ' ... _ . . . ' ·- . - ' . . . . . . ' . . .· . .. 
. : · . · . ' and· evil·· are names for 'villect' or· ·•CCJm~DArute4 •: that· they caJi be· held to be 
. · . .-:·. _.: d~pen&mt·· .. UJK;n:arbi~ wi1i •. ·.·thuS it it i~ :iielcl that SoOa-~ evil are 
. . : • • ' , - • . ·• , • . ~, • . •, : , , • . • .; . • ' I -·· ' • ' , ' • : ' ' ' . . , • , . .,. ' '• 
· :· ·:dependent ~upon arbitr~r~i vUl; ~t is to-~~- if' the the distinction ·be-
. · tWee"~· ~-- ~-~ ·b -an. aititrar, one diCta:~ • ·the Viu of C:od· or the· 
sovereisll.. it must 8J.so be hel4 that goo4 meaaa -tdlled or .OOJI!ftlal!ded. It is 
· apinst ~ea ·which attempt to Ju:¥· both that good Slid evU si8rdf.v the · 
~ 
presence of certain qualities or relations and also that moral distinctions 
are dependent upon arbitrary will, that Cudworth's argument has force. It 
may be expressed simply thusm there is sa necessary connection between good-
ness and its properties sudh that if what makes things good or evil is their 
being willed, then good and evil can have no meaning other than 'willed'. 
If the characteristic of good conduct is that it is edlled, then good must' 
•msan willed. It cannot be held that good signifies the presence of a cert-
ain definite quality or relation and also that it is dependent upon th e 
will of Cod or the sovereign. In other wards, whit Cudworth ,aaiitioal 
, weapon serves to detect is the presence in certain ethical theories of 
what C.R. Moore has more.reommtly called_the 'naturalistic falser; that 
is, the fabler cd'attempting to hold both that, feresample, 'geoid is 
always allied by Cod' or 'Cod always wills what is antecedently good' end 
also that *good =ens willed by 
' 	It is true that Cudworth's argument. as he himself admits, will not 
_ apply against theories which maintain simply that good means willed or 
=emended, but it makes clear that those who hold this kind of theory can-
not also hold that the proposition It is good -to do ghat is commanded' is 
non-,tautological. Thus if it is asked 'Why'out one do , what is commanded?' 
it cannot be retorted that it is good to do what is comeanded. This is 
What Cudworth WSW when referring to Robbes, be says: "Our atheistic . 
politicians plainly dance round inearcle". / 
Cudworth's argument for eternal and_immutable =salty, then, does not
establish the existence of *natural justice' or prove that moral distinctions 
are independent of will; it merely shows that if moral distinctions are 
dependent upon *will', then good must mean *willed', and such a view cannot 
give enY sees= why one ought to do what is willed. Hence Cudworth argues 
that if there is =obligation to obey rulers, then tbe obligation is prior 
to the commands of the rulers in other words, if rulers ought to be obeyed, 
tboa this 'ought' is part of natural justice. "The obligation to obey all 
•bositive laws is older than all laws, and previous =antecedent to them". 2 
What his argument amounts to is this: if there is anr meaning in moral oblig-
ation, then there is a *natural justice.' Andhra thinks that this is assum- 
I. True Intellectual System, Vol.3, p.50I. •2. Sternal and Immutable :morality, p.533. • 
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ed in the ordinary view that if a soVereign issued a Oxman& that his 
maim" ebeeld be obeyed  aeversrons would think such a law ridiculous 
:and absurdt for if:they were obliged . before,: then . thifdloar ineuld',be in - 
,vain, and to no ptirpose; and if they . were not before . Obligad, , then they 
Could not be Obliged by any positive law, because they were net Previously 
bound to obey such a person's -commands 	not the mere will or 
.pleasure of him that 'coMMandeth, that obligeth to do Positive things cook-
"mended, 'but'the intellectual nature Of him that is cormanded.0 1 
.Thus alien' if the good life consists in the obedience to positive laws, 
the's:04Am= of natural justice is presupposed in the idea Of Obligation 
' to obey dad& laws. 	is a difficulty in this Position; however, as 
kassmore points out 2, for not only does Cudworth want to maintain that . 	. ' there is an obligation to obey 'just' lame,' but also that in is a part of 
natural Suratio6 that rulers, as such, should be obeyed' simply because they ,,,• 	- 
are rulers. A law becomes 'obligatory by the "right or authority of the 
.commander, which is founded in natural *tics and equity, and an antecedr-
-.• ent, obligation to' obedience' i31 the subjects".3 	- 
"Tondcience. and religion oblige . subjects:actively : to obey all the lawful 
oath/sands of civil sovereigns, ax legislative powers, though contrary to 
*At own titlivato* appetite,, interest, 'end utility; but, When *heed sate 
dovereigd--legiblatiVe Powers Command unlawful things*, though it here obliges 
to 'obey God rather than man*, yet does it notwithstanding, oblige not to 
reeist."4 
It is Clear 'from this that 'Cudworth realised that theca is boOnit to be a 
':-conflict between what Is positively **ended and idLiit is eternally and 
lnititabiy just, especially when the sovereigna LS unjust; but he Maintains 
nevertheless there is a natural obligation to obey ,sovereigns what-
ever they'OomMarid. * But he does not realise that if it is part of natural 
justice to obey rulers whatever they . (*nand,. thie Con be the only natural 
juatiCe. il'Or if • it LS good to Obey a zanier then this din' be the onky kind . 	 . 
of behaviour that is good; it cannot be held that, for example, it is good 
for some reason other than it is Commanded, for A way be forbidden by the 
ruler and Would then:hem:Me.' bad. ' If it is part of natural justice to obey 
rulers as such, then it can be the only Part of main:eel justice. And it 
: is clear that this is int what CUditorth Mania to maintain; he does not want . 	. 	. 	, 
to 84 that : the giod 	/6 that which' id obettiolii 	the ruler 
- ---commands. Me tries, in the 'Eternal and Immutable morality' to escape this 
1.Eternal and Immutable Morality, p.5334 3,Eternal and Immutable MOwslity 
-2.Ralph ttultiorth, PP.45-90. 	 (P.533. 
' 	4. True Intellectual Eystem. To1.3, p.514. 
• 
'difficulty by introducing the concept of two levels of goodness. But this 
does not solVe the prOblem‘ it: it is geod e in am sense, to Obey a ruler 
•inst . because he :is ruler Or to obey Positive laws lost because they are 
•positive. inwei, then there is no Other kind of behaviour that can be good. 
'But the' feet that'eadweith introdinies two levels of goodness is evidence of 
•the fact that he does not Want' to 'maintain that the whole of eternal and 
intiitable goodnese consiste in obedience to abraniands just because' they are 
commends... tonettenentlyi his' view that it is part of natural justice that 
a ruler Should be, _obeYed; .bóó 	'itt would involve the view' that no other 
kind' a behaviour . can 'be.included in 'natural justice•:i.moist be taken as 
' an inconsistenay in: his thought. 
•This tether' knIgthY. diecussion -Cuibrorth*s eminent in which he seeks 
to eatixbliah:the erlatenctr of natural justice has been. necessary in order 
..to'shot •mhat hie argament prates and what it does:not prove and to avoid 
thii.tre. 	Viet, that he was a ratiorelist in the same 
H eense --ae- WhicheOte:- 'Bach. a view has arisen from considerationa of his 
1 Eternal 'and Immutable itorality" itv whichi as we have seen*, he manes that 
moral stth'iona if theY. are'. to 5y  any meaning at all. are as eternal 
and 	geometrical* dietinctiOne. Ira argues, for example, that 
ing milt. necessarily -haVe the proPartiee, of triangle's and likewise 
that good: cendnot 'Must-haVii the Preparties of good 'conduct,: and: not what 
le - arbitrarLiy willed to be .their:protertiea. 'But it' would - be false to 
:conClude that he therefore maintains `that moral: distinctions a:re of the 
.eme kind as 'geometridel distinctionet that is 'to 'ey t. that moral 'distinct
go 	are:intellectually discerned .niS 
argument 	SW43 that if good end :0141 'are .1:0 bays any .mm3:fling at all, 
they -mat &OW, the *redo:bite -of- certain definitw.ouslities: or 'relations 
•..Whicbeentt be'donatitated by their :relation to *arbitrary till". But he . 
dette. nat eirt, in the 'Eternal and Immittable :Boralite r what' is the nature 
the/ dii3tincition . between good .and: evil, Or what: it it that constitutes 
the good': life. And it* is' not pp:be:111e 'from.this work :alone. , to ascertain 
7 ClidVH)A11 10 Via :or the' nature of' the good life or of the' kind  of knowledge 
:/t:hat is relevant to it. It is not - possible without reference to other works • 
e 
,. 
e 
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to dec1de_ whether or 110t he was a ratioJialist of the same kind as lbichcote • 
.,. have seen that ·it is c:udworth's view tbat there is a ·rea1 disti.ne't-
ia betwecm virtue aDd. "'ice. •. between the good life and the eri.1 lite. and 
tba~ this dis~on le ~tituted by •aature~ and aot by 'vUl•. we 
.haVe to consider now. ~what ·1~ is in Cudlrorth's view that constitutes 
.the good lite. ID examining this qUestion in the '!fme Intellectual $.vsteni'• 
Cudworth argues tbat e;oo4tJass 4oes not conais~ in knowledge. 
·D'fo the vul&ar.. pleasure seems to be the bighest good; but to t;hose who are 
more elegant and· 1Dgenu.ous• knowletts~u but they 1lho entertain this latter 
opinion. can none of them declal'e what ·Jd.nll of knowl~ it is• which is 
·that highest and ~est good.. 'but ·81"8 necessitated at last to 8!18. that 
it is the tmowled&e: ot 8004• very. riti~ foraemncb as: herein they' 
do bu'h'tm IWDd. 1n a c1i'cle•. atd ~ us for being tgno:rant of this · 
. bigbest good. tbe.V· talk t()/u at_ the-~ time• as knowiJJ6Wbat it is.• 1 
·. !his is eudwortb's tnnsla~on of a pae8&ge fl'ODl Plato, an4 the point of it 
1s clears to· argue that. the bigbest &OQfl' is knoWledge ot the Mghest good 
. . 
· is to beg the questlcm of what it is ~t is the higbest good. Be goes on 
·to. sa.v tbat ~ ~~ aDd tn.~ &1.'9 ffboth of them acellet things"• 
.good is sometbiitg whiCh tJ:aDsceDds them both. 'JfDowlecl&e aDd truth are of . 
. . . . 
. fttdJa,i'to the cbte1" good0 but IJeitber Of tltem is the chief 1004• Jlld he 
. . 
. ·acmoludeat u1a all' vbieh ot )'lato's the:N· seems to .be little lllOl"e• ~ 
What aw be -~ tOUD&l wi~ ouwelves; J181191.7 .• that there is 
a ~-Jd.al -lite. or vital dis~tion- o£ swl•: which is much more 
·  8114 thol'o~ saUstactOr.r. ·DOt oD.ly ·tha seliBUBl pleasure. but ·· 
:·also ·than all lmowledge 8114 speaulatton .. •· 2 
· .A -liumber of po~ .,nee out of this. .· In the first place it is clear that 
the kiDd ot Jmowleqe tbat Cud1rorth is c0ns14eri.Dg. &Dd 1lbicb be regards as 
• a good but not tbe good. is speculative Jmolrledse; tbat a.. the kind of 
knowledge that is a fUnction of tb8· intellec:t. Seco1Jdl¥ •. he seems to 
coilsider that goodness applies to •a certfa1n kind at lite, or Vital dis-
. position of the soul•; it does not consist in the ·aeculllllation of a great_ 
. . . . 
store of tactual or speculative tmowleclge. or in •sensual pleasure',,. but 
in- liViD« a oerta1D · kiJid of lite. In other wol'ds, g~ess -::applies to a 
kind of lite nther than to :lntellectual attai.llments or acts of self-gratif-
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -
icattcm. ~.the-~ lite is •imraz'dl3 81'14 thorougbly satisf'actory; 
the criteri.:OD ot ~ ts imrar4 :aatistact1on. ~s is a doctrine which, 
1. ~ Ilitellectual ~ 'loLl.. p.;J3 .. 
2. ~bid. • :101.1• p.,U. 
··:· 
·; 
;1 
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as wee, shall see in the nisi chapter* had particular significance for lore. . 	. 	, 
...Cmhratk* argueia* fOrthei* in this section of the 'True- Intellectual ••..•., . 	.• 	. 	. 	.• 	, 	• 	• . 	• 	. 
74P-A•14 , "Whatettr this thiefest •good be* which is aperfe tion 
	
ng 	
• 
. superior to knowledge and understandi . Must needs be grit and 
taóipaliy sin 	 .wha is thatvii'ore Caned hi him.. (Plato)... ithe very 
•-idies:or l'essence.:of •good'". I. 
m-identifies the Ilatonio. :Iidea of the-:Coodf.:with the Christian !Cod'. and 
argues..that , •whatever-kind of life is ,the•ipood-life it must be most fully 
Amcpreesed.-in:the: life:of 4,0d... In this sense * then, the good life a for 
tudworth.„ is the godraike life.. -. Thus he argues further*, .aceepting the 
,Christian view that., Cad-,ie-luve* that !the -soul of all maraaityn is love,. 
hut finds it necessary ta . osuperadd alo, that. .0 is no soft, nor fond and 
partial  love, but t4int: 3n-OinO. in an essential branch of .thia:' divine good-
:near.? • ..Moreseer*.-hes,Contends : thst: .Viitme consists in .!.•an assimilation 
to the paity0* aSe emPieinies.the 'eagle *den alseihere as ; follews:::nTxue 
-,human.fellaily:,.....• Come:Late in a p44144pat404 of the first .a.pod*., or of the 
divine nourtr.4. 	-• • • 	: 
The Vid97: that knowledge of systoles of ,propositions, like precepts and, 
-creeds : not the good and is inifabat irrelevant to the good life, is 
.eitprensed vory..derivii* terms. in gaIwarthes . 4ardon preached. :to: the 
-titonno., of •,COrisemns. : '/Ise -sari* : for example; • :auk .and papaw. • an. never mice us  
Christians, can never beget a new .nature*, a. living principle, in 1.18 4'; I or 
asy,:true ..notions of Spiritual things in our hearts.. The gospel .... is not 
— Alt !a,. leter Without us*, but L a quickening . spirit within us. ,•Cold theorems 
and maxims, dry 11334 jejune disPutes* lean, eyLlogistical reaeoninge * could 
never yet of themselves beget the least glimpse of true heavenly:light *. • 
the least 'asp of .aavitIg knowledge : in any-hearte.5 - 	 ..,'1,. 
the'kind • af korowlediga that -aril:ten:from 	eativitY*.. in• fact 'cm 
knowledge., 
 
that tawbe empraseed as 'a  'set of propositiOns*. Oudiroith is Contenik- , 
an have no place-in the good-life•- There is :la Sugge'stice •of
•ts ides*: thitedch knowledge' is the first step to viitite;' . 111 -Cudworthts 
view it has no place in morality. - This in fnitfiei eqipirillinit in the folly- 
"Suns philosophers have determined that ... virtue cannot be taught 
any certain isles or precepts. 'Men and 'books May propound •sons direction 
to us that May set us in 'such ..a way of life andpractice as in which we 
•shall &Cleat find it within Ourselves * , and be eneriMentally acquainted ,: . • 
1. True Intellectual System* Vol.l. p.313. 
2. ibid., ‘01.1. p.316. 
3. ibid., Vol.l. p.315., 
. 41 IOU.. V01.2. p.59. 
5. Sermon to the House'of .  
Consmons, P.5.(All refer-
ences to this are to the 
lam adi t4.tw_ 
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with . it; but . they. carelo. 	t teach it to us like 'a mechanic 'art or trade". - I- 
In other words,' the geed life cannot be tin4hti - it is not the 'result of 
learning :precepts. The most that precepts . can de is to 'gads us in the 
direction in which we may bernse 'experimentally with -gbasnOte. • - 	- 
This does not .mean that the knowledge Of pled/Oil is the 'first stet , Al" . 
virtuc*., in Whichco. WS sense. For Whichcete maintained that it 11 'neceitis;.: 
ary to have knowledge in order to be virtuous and that 'virtue consists in 
obeying' the . knowledge we have.. But Cudworth, On the Other hard, is 
merely :saying that the knowledge of 'precepts May be a guide to Virtue' 
but not ., that it is nettessarY to Virtue. Moreover, there is the Suggestion 
• in Cudworth's phrase 'experimentally acquainted' that goodness can only 
be 1140/172 by being good; that is to say* that it is not possible to know 
„what goodness is indeperdently of being good. This same phrase, as we have 
*seen, occurs in the True Intellectual System as well as in the Sermon._ There 
Cudworth contends that goodness consists in a 'certain kind of life' which 
•*may be experimentally. found within onrse.bress, end the term 'experimentally' 
suggeists 'activity' or 'practiee'; that la, Cudworth seems to be suggesting 
that goOdness cannot be expressed- in a set of precepts, but only in a 
'certain kind of life' and may be known only by living that kind of life.. 
. This aspect of Cildworth's thought will become Clearer later in the chapter. 
Cudworth's view of the insignificant place precepts and creeds should 
"mire -MOtalitir-en44 re1igL04,113_ further evident-,from the following: 
fl 	sort think that they. know Christ enough, out of their creeds 
and catechisms, and confessions of faith; and if they have but allitt.le 
acquainteddthemsetives with these, and like parrots - conned the words of 
them, they doubt not but that they are sufficiently instructed in all the 
stratertes of the kingdom of heaven". 2 
He is arguing, in other words,, that there is no virtue in merely-learning 
, precepts and Creeds or nrles of behaviour. Ard he sae further: 
"It is a piece of that corruption that =meth throw* taroan nature, that 
we naturally prize truth, more than goodness; knowledge more that holiness. 
We think -it a gallant thing to be fluttering up to heaven with out wings 
of knowledge and speculation: whereas the highest thyetery - of a divine 'life 
here, and of perfect happiness hereafter, consisteth in nothing but mere 
obedience to the divine willn.3 
The same idea is sacpressed in his view that ono man truly knows Christ, 
I. Sermon to the Nouse of Commons, p.6. 
2. ibid., p.3. 
3. ibid., p.19. 
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but he that keepeth his conmandmenten. I 
Now it must be admitted that Cudworth's Sermon does not necessarily 
Contain his mature thought. That it does not is quite evident, infect, 
in the view that it expresses of the good life, namely, that it consists 
in obeying the divine aill; this is inconsistent with his argument for 
'natural justice'. And since the Sermon was preached in 1647 — thirty one 
years before the publication of the True Intellectual System it could , 
not be expected to express Cudwarth's mature thought. Mbreover, it was 
preached with a singular purpose, that of couvindiagthe conflicting . 
parties of the time (it was preached in the period between the executions 
of Laud and Charles I) that they were pre-occupied. 11th, and divided ca w 
natters whieh•were not essential to religion, and that virtue consisted in 
living a certain kind of life and not in learning, or ,even in talieftage 
rules and dogmas. For , this reason, Cudworth makes e.distinction between 
'knowledge' and 'holiness', maintaining that the two parties should be 
concerned not with knowledge but with holiness. Thus the view expressel 
throegbout the Sermon is that knowledge has no place in morality. But 
it is important to realise that the knowledge to which Cudworth is referring 
:ha the Sermon is intellectual knowledge; that is, knowledge that in' 
expresso:tin propositions or precepts and stored up in dogmas. And his 
view that this kind of knowledge has no place in morality is supported, 
as we have seen, in the True Intellectual System, when he maintains that ' 
, goodness transcends both 'truth' and 'knowledge'. This aspect of the 
Sermon, at least, may be taken as expressive of Cudworth's mature views: 
intellectual knowledge, or speculation, has no place in morality. But the 
question still remains: is there any kind of knowledge, in Cudworth's 
view, that is in any :my related to the good 1110 
That he might maintain such a view is saggestedin his published 
worke in such expressions as 'participation of the first Good, or divine 
nature' and 'assimilation to the Deity'. It is Anther suggested in his 
remarks in the Sermon that tewllogistical reasonings' are not capable of 
*the least glimpse of true heavenly light' and that Christ is 'known' hy 
those who *keep his commandments'. All these expressions seem to suggest 
e 
e 
e 
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a belief' iD a certain kind of lmowl.ecJ&e• or 'spiritual 1ns1sbt' • ·to vhich 
the intellect is incapable of attaining aDd wbich 1a inti:mate.ly associated 
with living the good lite. lilt this idea is no more tban sugeste4; it is 
not ·developed 1B Cudworth' s published worka. Bor is the nature of tbe 
good lite adequately treated in the published works. love· is stated to 
be 'the soul of morality', 8Dd this is supported in the Sel'lllOD in the view 
that the good lite is . the life lived accordiDg to the n1aw of 1ove..l, which, 
tmUke positive iaw, is intemal 8Dd creative rather than exterDal. and 
·. · imposed. Bllt ·ume is said about the uature ot 'love' or v1w it should 
·haft a mdque relation to morality. -l.;,ittle more is said. about the na~_ 
ot the~- life in the publicatioDS ~ that it is a •certain kind of : 
li.fe, or vi tal disposition of the soul, vbich 1& • • • imra:rdly and tbo~ 
': satisfactory.' It. is .little wonder that traditiona.ll1 Cwbrorth has be8n ... 
. assumed to . be a rationalist like Whiqhcote. 
Bad it not bean for the research carried out on the-unpublished~,_ .. · 
uscripts in the British laseum by .1-~A. Passmore in 1948, it would have been 
impossible to sa.y more tban this abolit Cwiworth's vien on.the nature and· 
function of knowledge in ID01'6lity. Br,i~ Paasmore di~ a geat deal \· 
·; .... 
. . 
in the 11181DlBC1"ipts which is relevant to this question and wbich.refuteS : 
' the traditional view. Sufficient extract$ are published dur1Dg the course 
Ot Passmore's book2 to enable~ to ~rtain with some d~e of certainty 
Cudworth's mature. views. oa .. the problem which is the concern of this thes:ts. 
Necessaril,y, however •. much of what is saicl here will depend to some exten~ 
·. 
upcm Passmore's interpretation of the mtmUScripts. 
As f~ as we are concei"'Jed. two very significant points arise out 
ot Passmore 's wor)t. In the first place, it becomes evideD.t that Cudworth 
. ' 
ma1ntsins: that bebariour is detel'lllined b.r desi:re, aDd not by the intellect 
·as ibichcote thousbt; secondly, he maintains that there is notdistillction 
between kllmri.Dg how to act anr1· deciding what to do. We shall consider 
·.these two~ separately. 
Cudworth real.i~s •. as VhiChcote failed to realise, that reason conceived-
~- intellectual ~on, is incapable of s:LviD£ rise to action. I'Or' .· 
Vhichcote and the later :rationalists, :reason meant a moral end intellectual 
1. Se:rmon to the the Rouse ~ Commons, p. 76. 
2. Ralph Cudworth (London, 1948). 
-.., 
~ 
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, ·--·-faculty wbich·-.appnhends necessit7 aDd--which is-: impartial and -disinte:rren-
:: . :.1 -- .. e4.- In tact• .it Vas~ impart1alit;y, universality 8114 disiDterestedness 
ot reason which, led Vhichcote to ~ 1t ~ the- DIINUlS of· 'dmceming 
. , , -·: :: _ ..-moral-disti.Dctions. -But ~ t :is clear· :that· even if'~ reason -.o~- conceived is 
:·_--' .. , __ .. _capa!)le.·of:diseerniJig·_~ral cUst1Dcticms ami~ ~t A is good and 
-- .. B. lJ8d1, 1 t can' have: no ·1Dfll.19nce~ on tile ._ ·in '-tucb -,re -WtaVe~: lW- all 
. . . . . . - .,· . . . 
-·- . ~~--is interestecl;:unleas-~ is~~ in~~-- desire to 
:, . . -- do 4• ~n: 119 _sball not 4o.~t. _ All action_,~_ fwma",; clesire for specif'-
.-,. 
• .. , 
,. 
ic ends, SDi--~ ends Vbichcote'&~ :reascm is i!Jcapable Of cl18cem:iDg. 
·We~ this i,n ~last -~pter. 'fttat.-C:u..ortb ~~-a fUll well that 
reason.canaot.gt~ n.s. to action is'-~eal" .t:rom-th9 f~: 
l1lfhe first ~p~:of:iiDtioa iD the -~·ts· ~t •• or·coorse,-'reason B!ld_ 
UIJderstAI!di.ng ·•· _tlifm,t ~Dgst be -~ .othe:r epri~ and· motion. . _or first . 
iloYer ~n the I!IOul~ ~t 8ets the ~)a -at -;ortt aild 'eJJi.plOJS the thillkiDgl 
consultiJJg eaiJd specUlative power. ••. ;~· tbat radicB.l vital; temper or state 
. ·which 1s predcm,rJDBDt ill everJ,OJJ8e 0 .1- "- . 
Actt~ ~~- •t 1n., ~~~ .t~v-1RR.~ ~ •vttal temper•. 
. . . . ·- .. ···. . . . .. . 
We desire .oertala 811ds. &:m.. we ~· t)le ~D« .or •speeul_~~ve power' 
-or tbe .soul tO ctete:rm1De, the .,.De .;; -~~ they .mq .be -at+ahaect. But ua- · 
. -l~ ·there is ~irst ~ -- f~ ~-~~- 81Jd. ~-··Ct:Pl be no activity. 
1iJw activity, it it.~ to be_ caJ'li,~ ~. ~t- :hf8.fl motive. 1'his 
,. . ' ' . . . . . . ' ' ' . . . . ~> . .· . ; ' . . . . . . -
applies even to intellec~ activiU~; .-.e do Dot .eJI&EIP -~ .,the intellect.-
~ .. ! . . . . . ~ ' . . ~ - .. ' . . . ' . ' ' . . " . ,. . . ,.. . 
ua1 activiQ- of_ .findiDg ~ ~l,utiol\ to a mat)semati~ FQbl• unless, 
. . . . . ' . . . . ' •' .· . . . . . ' . . .. . ' . - . ~ . . ' 
ei_ther we fiild the acti~ty ~le.~~~~ or. ~;d~ to a:rrive 
at the solution; :la either ~-~ activi\v :~ ~ a,_mo~ve. It· 
. '. . . ~ . ,: . . : . : ' . . . 
. :is. impossible to·. enga&e ~ e:oa ~_of. activity vi~~ ~-moH.ve; 8IJd 
I; . '• • •' ' '• • ' ' ·.·,. • ' • ,, '' • . •' 
motives arise _f)-am ()Qr emottOJUil. m:t tram~ in~~.ure. A being 
' _: -who was~ tntellect-~ be condemned~ ete~_inactt:n.\v. It follows. 
• ' • •I ' ' ' • ' 
• then• tbat ~cmi!Jg C8Jl have- only-~ instrGIDent$1.. mid pever a dete:rmining• 
. plaCe-~- ~--- . X.Ja: o~ ~M.&." urteUec~ acti.~V-~ be employed 
. ' ... ; ···. .. . . . '. . ' . . . ·. . . 
by' a d~ ~_is Prior to it; it can ~.de~. the ~i:re. Even 
·' . . . . . '. . ..... : . . . . . . : .. : '. 
~~.-~.~~-~ve-~ch ~,tram;~ .,otl~. ~.the . 
. --,lo'fe fd. .. ~ _f!!l4 it.~ tbisaoti~~ ~t ~ ~,~ent1st to be~ 
: ·· ~· · .,. , , : , : :· . : . , ~ , . · • • . · I : ' •· • • ' · • ' 1 • ' • . 
•sctentitio'• that is. to be eOJlC81"DSd with facts and not with lllusions. 
·This is the point that Cudworth realises iD the above pumaaei tbat 1 t is 
1. Quoted trom the wss b.Y Passmore: Balph Cudworth •. p.52. 
- . 
45. 
intellect and not desire that is 'blind'. Whichcote, as we have seen, 
considered the desires to be 'blind', but if by 'blind' is meant 'incap-
able of seeing ends towards which action may be directed', it is the 
intellect to which he should be referring rather than the desires. 
The intellect may influence behaviour only to this extent: it may 
discover, by a process of reasoning, that the performance of certain acts 
will give rise to certain consequences which the desires find, in turn, 
unattractive. Thus, if it is desired to do A rather than B because A 
is itself appears more desirable than B in itself, the knowledge that A 
would give rise to consequences which are less desirable than the consequ-
ences of B, may be instrumental inBrather thankbeing chosen. But in 
discovering; certain facts that are relevant to deciding how to act, the 
intellect is not determining behaviour; it is merely, As Cudworth would 
a4Y, being 'employed' by the desires in order to discerner all relevant 
facts in the situation. But the mere knowledge of all the facts about 
a certain kind of behaviour, cannot, of itself, determine the :my in 
which we behave. Facts in themselves have no value for us, they are 
neither desirable nor undesirable. Once the facts are known, they thee 
have to be evaluated on the basis of a principle of valuation; and it is 
this evaluation, or determination of stet is really desirable, that deter-
mines the way in which we behave. And oar principle &valuation, if it 
is to have my influence on behaviour, must be, at bettem, emotional. 
The intellect can only be 'employed' to discover what the facts are; it 
Cannot determine how they will influence behaviour. Behaviour is emot-
ionally determined. 
All action, as Cudworth realises 4 involves ends. The inclinations 
suggest the ends and employ the intellect to assist in attaining them. 
"Mere speculative intellection without any inclination to one thing more 
than another, without anything of appetite or volition, is not the first gate or entry, the first original and beginning of all actions in the soul, but ... instincts and inclinations are the spring and source of life 
and activity whence ends are suggested to us that provoke and incite end-eavours and awaken consultation towards the attainment of themm1 1 
Intellection cannot determine ends, it can only see necessities; ends are 
objects of desire. 
1. Quoted from the MSS by ParmomorevRaiph Cudworth,. i4.53. 
." 
46. 
low there is a significant point to notice here. Whichcote es theory 
of ethics, as we have seen, was based upon a faculty theory of the soul; 
that is* on- the view that the different -activities of the mind are the 
functions of discreet faculties. And the problem with such a theory is 
•that it constructs the faculties so different in nature and functiOn 
that there is no means by which one can become aware of the others. 
• Row CudwOrth, as we hwie just seen, maintains._ contrary to nicht:tote's 
view, that. action begins not in the intellect or 'reason' brit in the 
emotion which °maw the intellect to assist in the attainment of 
desired ends, But it is clear that if the intellect and the emotions 
•belong to different faculties, this is impossible; Cudworth would be 
committing the same fallacy as ifhichcote. But Cudworth in the manoscripts 
is fully aware of the difficulti:es of the faculty pakohology which he 
refers to as the *vulgar 'physiolegy of the sonle!'ind argues that 
-"there is a complication both of appetite will and vellei* and also 
light, and anderstanding and perception in, the :same act'. 2 
Reasoning and desiring are not functioas ,of 'separate faculties; ."it is • 
.Xer0:17 	1,81, k:or Beta that nrderstands...and the man or soul , that. vili8".3 
' noteover.`„ the Vreatiiieofrzee4f11:1,. be argues, tiRlOrdillg to 'Passmore, 
that 444i, attribute' the act of intellect and perception to the faculty of 
-understanding, and ante Of volition to the faculty of will, or to say that 
.it is the _waderstanding that undarstandeth * , or the wiU that ,willeth 
is all one as if one should eaq, that it is the facility of wailing walketh, 
and :the fatillty: Of Speaking sPeakiethuA 	 . • • 
-And perhaps .the :most 'aignificent, otaii. the' passagee`to which litsszeore 
referis: is -that in . which: Cudworth: argue* that if the'soill is divided into 
faculties— such that'the. rearion jUdges and the:will Aeteisibiee'actioa, 
there. id no Way: in'whirdi . these two fanultiee can' inflUence eacb'ether. 
-"-:"'"fbere Ciainiot be one Ithing that judgeth, 'another 'thug determining the 
,..aotion, for then that, Which ,deternineth woulri not ,know what, -it ,detersinecr.5 
,gudwarth,..thez4 deem not coscat4t te!'yof , ,bapinchis :ethics on - 
•an,Anadequate paya#0.egy. For him* the dffferent activities of the soul 
are activities of the whole 130a. different *vs in which the soul functions. 
and not the activities of separate and autonomous faculties. Cudworth, as 
1, Quoted from the RSR by Passmoret Ralph Cudworth.- p.53. 
	
ihicl,* pg54. 	4. ibid. 0.54 (Quoted from Treatise of 
3. ibid., p.544,. 5. ibid...p.55, 	1'Se—will) 
-; 
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Passmore points out. righ~ :ruiW8 to bia theoJ7 ·of the soul as the •new 
ps,ychology'• lt is his aboli t10n .ot the facalty theoly ~t makes it 
me8l'd.lldul for him to 8Bl8 tbat the 'vital. temper• employs the •thinld'D8• 
.:.~tiD8 BD4 speculaUw povezos' .. 
. Cudworib's view that it is the wh~e 111811 or S01Jl that both ~s and 
wills is turther -~ ill .tbe view that lt is ·ttone 8114 the same ·thing· 
·· ~~· both jw.lgetb _Slid ~u~ wbiel1 mates· J. t mSaDiJiglesa to ask ttvhether 
~ ..uJ. ~- tonon the laat practical judgement ••• it reaUY ·beillg ea 
it the¥ should dispaw whether the ~ follon its,elfD. 2· ludgl~ and -· . -
. . 
williD,g are not separate ectiriUes o'f saparate faculties., but the 'last 
praCt1Cal 3~t• is the same as ~ .~·. to act in a certain ·ws;y• 
' '. . . - . 
· . 'fb.!s -iS the seccmd ot the tn hi~ ~t points far our purpose 
·which·~ out of Paa,mme'a vom Cudlrortb maintaiJJa •. in the first. place•-
. : ~ '.. ,. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 
that all activity originates iD the emO.t1cms• and secomlli. that judgi»g .· 
. how. to aCt aJJd ~ .t to dO 01' 1rilUD& to ad in a ·oer1:ain wa.Y . ' ·· ·. 
·are the S8DI8"tbi».a• . And tb1s is whl<\t ~ shoul4--axpeut him to aw .. tor it 
is the lo8ic81 outcome iJf Jds •mnr psyobolo§'• ODly it the reason 3w1ges 
and the wtn 11111s iea it necesstu7 to maintain that jMg;i ng 8114 willlDg 
are se~te activiUI!s• 
·-the relaticmsblp of the •last practical ju4aement• to the decision 
•" .. ·' . ' - . . . 
to act ill a .certaiB V8l ,. is a problei!l which has siven rise to much argumeil~. 
S8auel 01arle •.. tar. exsmple41• who Vl'O~ .his ma1Ji works.;, almost titt;v yeam 
~--CUdWorth (he was ~ iD 1675 - · tbree years before the publication 
of ·the flu 'lDtellectual s.Ystem) sholrs himseU to .be a raUOilal.ist' of 
. tbe most· extnme 1d.rJd by his l)IJADdiDg iBsistear:e that there is al~ a · 
· dtstincttoa 'between the •last practical Judgemeut' 8lld the deciaioa to 
act. An .~· discussion of. this problem is contained in his 
CO'I'TeSpoDdence with ''a gentleman ~ the lJnivei'sit;y of Cambri.d&e •. All · 
· · extract b'om his zeply to the thi1'4 Letter, 1s typical of his thougbtt 
· ~-perception or last practical judgement of the ~tanding, is as 
distinct fzom the actulll exertion of self-motive power. as .see!DB the 
va:i is from wal.khte iD itf!. } · 
This is language which is .quite charactexietic of rationalist ~. 
Wbichcote•s ~that 'knowledge 1s the firs' step to vJ.rtue' ex~. 
1.· ep,ted, by'.Passmoft:. lalph Cudwortb, p.54.. . J 
2. i)dd.,p•54· 3. Collection of Papers etc.. pp.412-3. ...... 
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the sante ides: judging what to do* or what ought to be done, .is the funct-
ion of the reason; deciding hoe to act is the function of the will which 
is , free to ober or reject the judgementE3 of the reason. This is the rat-
ionalist view of Whicheote and Clarke* and it presupposes a fadulty'theory 
of the soul With its insurmountable difficulties. The-resison is the fac- 
ia* of moral Judgement the will is the faculty which gives rise to .action; 
and there is a distinction between judging and Willing, between the 'last 
practical Judgement" and the decision to act. lktt the difficulty, which: 
is recognised by :Cudworth but not by Clarke and Whichcote* is that if 
Judging and Willing:are the functions of separate faculties, the 'last 
practical Judgment*, if if is to influence the will, 1 must somehow perform 
the impossible task of bridging the gap between two discreet faculties. 
The Measure Of the value Of Passmore's work on the manuscripts is that 
Cudworth was traditiOnally regarded . as 'one, of Clarke's predecessors'. 
The assumption on which theories Iirre those of Whichcote and Clarke 
rest is that the *reason*, conceived as a moral and intellectual faculty 
independent of desire,. is capable of discerning ends towards which action 
may be directed. 	do not maintain that reason moves us to act - that _ 	 . 
is a function of the will - but that it is capable of perceiving ends 
which may be pursued;; in particular* they want to maintain that the 
_ maecoxt caPable of perceiving ends of action which are good, or which 
Tight to be pursued. The idea of moral obligation is essential to such - • 
theories, for, since it cannetbe held that the reason perceives ends that . 	, 
are desirable, it has to be held that it discerns ends which the will 
ought to Pursue.. low apart from the feet that it is not explained how 
. the reason and the will can influence each other, the fella** that these 
theories commit is that of assuming tht ‘it ieaf3011, conceived' as independent 
of emotion, is able to perceive ends which may be pursued. This 'assumption 
is an unsatisfactory one, for, as we have seen, reason so conceived can 
apprehend only necessity; and this cannot be an end towards which action 
may be directed. it follows, then, that if reason cannot perceive pursuable , 
ends* it cannot perceive good ends - unless it is ridiculously maintained 
that 'good' has no relation to action, and therefore to behaviour. It is 
e 
e 
e 
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;_. 
ut .~ tor the IJW"PP*S8 of this argument ~. goodness is taken 
to be that vhich ought w be clone 0r ~t which is worth doing; if. it is 
. a -~ that lllfq' -be applied to certain kinds of behaviour. 8114 1n particular 
· ·if it ms..v be applied to: certain pursuable ends, then -it camot be said to 
. be that which is: perceivable by the· reason iB the sense in which Clarke 
and Whichcote use the term • 
. Since Cud¥orth maintains ~nst the raticmali.sts that '1 t is one 
. aDd the same thing that both judse:th and willeth', we should expeCt him 
to· maintam ~ that _good and• evil . CaJlJ10t }le lalo1in or 3ud&ed. by the 're&-
. son• or bJ' intellect1on.. ADd tibis is in tact wha~ Passmore discovered 
•· f'1tom the IDaDUSCripts.. "As the first .spring of' vital SCtiOD is DOt from 
the S~'te Understanding, SO neither is dry 8Dd 1Dsipid ratiocinat-
. icm :tb,e ~- measure and r.iile of good and. evil • • • It is not sapless spec-
ulative laiowl&dge that is the proper rule or judge of gooct and eri.l but 
vital toucbn. •tastes -mid savo-urs ~•·· 'lhe· tirs't ~pl.e by which gt)OCl a· 
and evil 8ft distingg1shecl is vi tal, mt nottonsl•.l · · 
· ... ~ .. JIIU$t· ~1.1 agree· with Passmore that ~orth anticipates Sbaf'tesbury 
n~ thaD Clarks. Good aDd evU are emotionally. not intellectually. 
~s~. Although Passmore •oes not make the point,. there appears 
to be CO!l8iderable si gni fieance in the last sentence in the above pass&&e: 
. . . . . -
. the •nrst principle• b.Y which good and evil are judgecl is emotional, not 
intellectual. '.ftlis voulcl appear to mean tbat goocl_ 8134 evil. must in the 
first place ·be emotionally 41scemed; .they are not intellectual concepts 
·aDd. ·therefore. 08Dnot be dis~ by ·intellection. But once it bas 
··.been .discaverecl. emot10Dally wb:at kinds of ~our are good, Cudvorth's 
. e:rgument seems to SUggeSt, we JD8l' then f~te tm intellectual criterion 
of goodness. i'or aumple • once ce~ kinds of behaviour are emotionally 
discerDed as good, it JBq then be possible to fOI'BIUlate lmrs which, if 
obeyed, give rise to good behaviour. But- and ~is the significant 
point - the intellect can have knowledge only of moral criteria, and such . 
criteria can be formulated only it good and evil are first emotionally_ 
distinguished •.. Moral sood 8Dd evil, as distinct ~moral criteri~, 
are objects ot emotional, not intellectual, perception. 
Knowledge of good and ev11, for Cudworth, then, is not intellectual 
apprehension of the kind of bebaviour that is 'appropriate' or •congruous•, 
1. Quoted from the JJSs by PasSmore: Ralph Cudworth, p.66. 
_...... 
as it is in Whichcote's view, but rather a *taste'. However, as Passmore 
points out, Cudworth does not mean by this a 'moral sense' which is unique 
and whose sole function is to perceive moral distinctions. He simply 
means that moral judgements are value judgements which are a function of 
the whole soul. They are not the function of either an impartial, imper-
sonal Reason, or of a spec:Wan art Sense; they are our judgements and are 
•dependent upon the sort of people we are. %cooriing as everyman's 
vital disposition is, so is aman's judgement diversified concerning ends 
and goods". 1 
It is impossible, Cudworth is arguing, to divorce our judgments from the 
manner of our life. Re does not seen, of coursepthat the distinction 
between good and evil is constituted by its relation to us; such a. view 
would be just as contrary to his *natural Justice' argument as the view 
that moral distinctions are constituted by their relation to *arbitrary 
•will'. The distinction between good and evil is still 'eternal and immut-
able'. BOt. what Cudworth does want to say is that the sort of things, or 
the kinds of conduct, that we judge to be good, simply because it is we 
who judge, are dependent upon the sort of person we are. That we judge 
A to be good does not mean that A is really good; if we are able to recog-
nise the real distinctions beteemmgood and evil, that is, if we are cap-
able of objectivity im our judgements, then what we judge to be good will, 
in feet, be good. As Passmore puts it/ 6It is only our capacity for 
recognisiog the distinctionushich varies with our !vital dispositions*: 2 
•The degree of objectivity we achieve in our moral judgements is dependent 
upon our 'vital dispositions'. Mere is no impartial, infallible moral 
faculty. either Reason or/brat Sense, in Cudworth's theory. Our judge-
ments of the kinds of behaviour that are good, are just as fallible as 
Whichcote's 'lee-will'. We do not, as Whichcote thought, know what is 
good by the reason such that it becomes the 'duty' of the will to follow 
where the reason leads; for Cudworth, there is no distinction between 
•judging and willing. To judge that A is better than B is to decide to do 
A rather than B; whether or not we behave well will depend upon the degree 
of objectivity of which our judgements are capable. 
Now if judging and willing are the same activity, it must be maintained 
1.Quoted by Etasmore: Ralph Cudworth, p.66. 2.Passmorel Ralph Cudworth, p.66. 
• 
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• also that there is no swill to evir; that is, that there is no possibil-
ity A:if doing °evil knowingly', as Whichcote argued. For if, for example, 
it is judged that A is worth .doing and B is not worth doing, then it cannot 
be decided to do B rather them A, because to judge that A is worth doing 
is to, decide to do it. Only if judging and willing are different activities, 
is it meaningful to say that one may know that A is good .and B evil and 
decide to do B. On Cudworthss theory, to judge that a certain kind of 
behaviour_ is good, that is, worth doing or ought to be done, is to decide 
to do it. We camiot vrill to do anything that we judge to be evil; the will 
can pursue only that which is judged to be good. This does not mean, of 
course, that the will can pursue only that which is really good; what is 
meant LS that the will pursues what it judges to be good, and this ma 
be really good or evil or partially good and partially evil depending on 
the objectivity of which the will is capable. The important point is that 
the will cannot pursue what it knows to be evil; it pursues what it judges 
to be good. That this is Cudwarth°8 view is clear from the following: 
tat cannot possibly. .pursue after any evil as such 	but only as taking 
notice of something as good in it*. 
What Cudworth's view amounb3 to is this: the manner of one's life determines 
the sort of ends one judges, or wills, to he worth pursuing. Likewise, 
the ends that one judges to be worth pursuing, that is, the ends which one 
does in fact pursue, determine the manner of one's life. Whether or not 
the ends that are pursued are really worth pursuing depends on our ca.pacity 
to judge what is really worth doing* which both determines, and is determ-
ined by, the manner of our life. If the ends that are judged worth pursuing 
•are really, voith pursuing, then the life that results is really worth 
living. In other words, if one judges and pursues ends that are really 
gook one is living the good life; and if one is living the good life, one 
judges as worth pursuing ends which ars really worth pursuing. that is, 
which are really good. mats, only the good man can know the good, and 
if one knowmithe good one lives. the good life. To say that one knows what 
is worth doing and fails to do it is nonsense. This appears to be the 
logical outcome of Cudworth's views. However, as we shall see presently, 
1. Quoted from the MSS by Passmore: Ralph Cudworth, p•64• 
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he is not always conedsterds. in maintaining this position. He seems to 
think sometimes that such a position is too deterministic. 
Cudworth's liatIZES view, as we have just Interpreted it makes clear 
what he means in the. Suwon when, he saye s !nos man -truly knows. lariat * but 
he that keepeth us commandments'll and Itegalogistical reagonings, could 
never yet of themselves" beget the least glimpse of true heavenly light+ 
He is referring to the kind of knowledge that is part of, and inseparable 
from, the good.l.ife; If we interpret 'keepeth his cormandments° not in 
its literal meaning (since that would be inconsistent with Cudworth's 
mature Views) but as meaning *Jiving the religious life', which for Cud-
worth, and Indeed all the Cambridge Platnrists, is identical with the 
'good life., hie meaning becomes clear. Knowing good and being good are 
inseparable. Likewise,: *syllogistical reasonings' cannot attain to the 
knowledge of goodneas, for the knowledge of goodness la a function of the 
emotions. 
Now Can •of the reaeons why rationalists like Clarke and Ilhichcote 
maintain that juligThe, what is 'good and wi1ng tdo°/i.t are two separate 
activities seems to be to account for what they take to be an empirical 
fact that we izequently Imow What we ought to do and yet fail to do it. 
•But Cudworth might well reply that we do what we judge, or feel, to be 
,worth doing; if we judge to be worth doing what is in fact really worth 
doing, then we do it. Sven on the view that good is what 'ought to be 
dorms , not what tie worth doing', he could maintain, with same validity, 
that if we really feel that a certain -act ought to be done, then we shall 
do it. and as we have peen, knowledge that is wholly independent of feel- 
•ing cannot influence behaviour. Where Whichcote and Clarke make the mistake, 
Cudworth might contend, is In assuming that impartial reason can perceive 
ends which are able to be pursued. If it is admitted, as indeed it must,-! 
that the - knowledge that 'A ought to be done in preference to R must inclOde 
the - feeling that A, ought to be done in preference to B if it is to have 
any practical meaning, it might also be argued that unless one pita% that 
A ought to be done one does not Usg that it ought. To know by precept 
or rule thai a certain kind of conduct ought to be purenzed or rejected,: 
1.3ereon before the Rouse of Canons, p.2. 
2. -Ibid., 
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... loved. or bated.·~ to.~:.~·•l:d.c:Jl cannot~ a·motive· tor 
... . . ... , . . . ' . . . . . 
· .-- .. ~our.:a.Dd wbicJl• ~~; .. iJ;I ~to~-·· It is ~ 
.. · .. ··:·:tide·:~ ·ot.knm!l--.~~ .-. ~ ~~-or reJ-': ,bt -IJliehcPte•s .·. 
·:~-. __ ·-~~~-~ :ma.v. .• ~t .. a .rtde .·or -p:r-;:88NS tbat :w -t ·.to-~-~ · 
. . . : ' ; . . - . . •. ' . : . ~ . ~ . . . . ·. . -. . . . . "' . . . . 
.· .. a:~.Wl:\V•· . .sat~ same .~.~e in a:<Dntrary.va;y; _but strictly 
. . . .. . · it·.-- ~ :~~ u.at we. t.mm ~~, ·t.he ~a~ow __ ·• ~· tQr it 1s the 
. -: '.:. ·~ <»f:-1~ .~t ~- 47e1~ to~- -.~t-the·mostt;:this kin4 
.. · .: .. . ·.,, ·- . . . . . . . . 
. . :of)mow~ .~ a ~~.-t.hat .mst •be ·~· ll:lto ~-m ~ri:ring at 
..... · .. · .. ·-,·~ ~-Prac~-~·.-.~t is•-1D:8ft'i~.at the_· knowledge o£ 
. . . · ..· ... ~: .. ~~~ -~:-~· ~ ,or.::.~t is~~··.·~ bu~ it .c:azmot: be the lmmJ-
' ... ··~ ~t-~a~t.tve·r.·.:~o~:a· .·'ele kilow~.t!latis amoti"fo tor 
'-··~ :'·'~--~-~t which• ~-elri~ ~t ~the ·~ Pl"$Ct1cal .3Udgement'; ' 
... · .. ·.·.·:· ~~-;==~~~.:;::.-~:t~iDg:-
....... ~· .~~ ~t.J:l deci~:-.-~.~ .-t .~:rtb-teel.i~s tbat know-
: ::', ·.~;·~ ~;-l ~~ta•cQJ' ·~-. .V kind ot. ~te1lec~ .appreheDaion, 
·:·· ·. eaftllOt b& .a ·motive. tor act1oa :1s encteDt. trom ·the· 1"~ - · 
: : ·. :;~t>is: . .;. ·~: the -·power,·of ~. ~· to ha~ ·~ but ·:SS it: feels it. 
· w .. :l.ts ~~- .8114 ·~ i.t.b,y its·.~ to be en evil ..... to talk· of hat-
. · · :~:;~ee-tn·.itsett' ~ U14eecl. tO hate :~t the n&me.- bllt it 1~ ·haS not sc:me 
. . . , .··~ibl~ ~~ :Ot. *~ cJetOZti~U~y ~i~ • hare :but :little ilr1'1.uence upon 
... ' . t)le: J.!lild~•-' 1' . ' .· ' :·:'. ' 
..• ,:~:.~ ~ haUDg tvi:ee ill 'ttseif• ~t ta' to bte viCe in tbe 'abstuict 
'.: ... :.· ... : ·,,: :.-.· : '" ..... ' '., ,' ' : : ·~·."' ,• ·.·' . ·.;. ·'' ':· ......... ' . 
· · · · is Dcmsenee:; ·tt ._ ~ ba ·uta\ ·u it is foUDd in a ~-·~~ 
... · .. ;:'=:_~~::~-::: :k.:....~-
. ··· ··-~,::~··*~~.*'beet coDcep• -t -~obJects. et t~~-
-:.-· .-: .... :::· · ftom···~·we ~- au •. w8 Should cri8ct to'tind~· ariJUiD8 that·· 
.· -:· . .-. ·; :•tit'·~ .. lite dGEia ·~ ~~ f.a- cme•s· t~ty!J.;. tbt ·iS.-~-~ 
. ·. : · :·, ~-··~· tO ;1$ ~~·~- :"bQt, n~ m· dOing :Gat ~~·Worih :~: ID other 
·: : '' :~ •.•. ~· ~: ~ 1'~ that. *aooci •• · . d JlO- ~clu-· 'is :the· 1\mdament-
.-. :.~ .. d ·~th~ :~,t :t~ ·~ ···.Aaa· ~-is· 'iD·~~ wdmt -~ has 
~--~·~~pts,: . _· .. ' . · .. ·.· : .. · .. · ·. . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1t woul4 be one t4 the -surest meaDS to 
.-3~ withOut ird.Statte ot our-~· 1n goodnfsss it men 414 jUdge of their 
i.mpr09ement by the love of virtue ratber tbat by ~ their duty. For 
to be virtuous is to bave the temper of one•s_mill(i· -tmuafo:nned into a 
l. Qloted f'rom tbe JSS by ~~ -ttalph CUtbturtb.- p.67. ~ 
• 
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heavenly love..., but doing one's duty is doing it indeed as an act of 
submission and obedience, but with restraint and indifference of will, the 
will not being moved to it from the excellency of the act itself....Love 
would make the obedience more lasting and more willing and to become the 
natural disposition and temper of the mind: this is freedom and liberty; 
the other le the tiresome taetk and slavish imposition of religion". I 
behave in a certain wey because it * our duty to do so is necessarily 
to act udder constraint; the motive for such behaviour does not arise from 
'the excellency of the act itself' but from a fear of the consequences of 
non...dutiful behaviour, or from some other' source outside the nature of 
•the behaviour itself. Cudworth is fully mare of the importance of motives 
in morality. This good life, for him,. does not consists in a certain 
pattern of behaviour; it is a certain kind of life lived for the love of 
it. It is °a certain Idnd of life.., uhich is •••• inwardly and thoroughly 
statisfactory".2 It is, in fact,- the life of -'freedotm and liberty: But an 
understanding of this whole position is not possible without a considerat-
ion of Oudworth's theory of freedom; and it is this to which we shall now 
direct our attention, 
It should be noted that Whichcote and the rationalists maintain that 
it is the will that is free. The 'will is that faculty which moves us to " 
act, and in doing so it is tree to choose to do what the reason has judged 
to be good, or to reject this knowledge. New, since Cudworth has abolish-
ed the concept of the will, he obviously cannot maintain that it is free. 
Nevertheless, he cannot maintain, on the other hand, that there is no such 
thing as choice. Although he abolishes the faculties, be still has to . 
account for the empirical fact of conflict in the Soul; it would be a reject-
. ion of empirical fact to maintain that the soul is a complete unity. Of 
this, :Cudworth is well aware, and he maintains that the conflict in the • 
soul is due to different desires, or different theories of life, rather than 
to separate faculties. rThe soul might be considered : as..double or as 
having two theories of life°. 3 
*we are, Cudworth contends,: bagged0118 in the soul for two distinct ways 
of life, On tfiell7hond there is what he calls ,  according to Passmore, 
*animal appetite, and on the other,. "love" Or nspirito.4 Two distinct 
:kin dS of life, the 'divine" and the 'animal' are passionately desired, and 
•1. Quoted by Passmore: Ralph Cudworth, p.68. 
2. True Intellectual System, Vol./. p.313. 
3. Quoted by Passmoret Ralph Cudworth, p.55. 	4. ibid.„p.56. 
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the conflict in the soul is between these two desires, not between two 
faculties. -For Whichcote and the_ rationalists, the conflict is between 
the reason and the desires; the reasonicnows that ought to be done and is 
•capable of deliberating, while the desires are blind and need to be direct-
ed by the 'will' to follow the reason. But for Cudworth, the 'passions' 
are capable of deliberating; they comprise the "inferior reason,  which 
comparing the future with the present dictates more truly and impartially 
our own private utility".. 1 
The passions are 'selfish' or °egocentric', but are not blind; they are 
able to 'employ. ' our calculating ability to determine what is *our own 
private utility'. This is one of the two dominant theories of life in 
, the soul - °animal appetite' or the egoistic theory. The other theory of 
life is that which is motivated by the 'reason' or ."the higher intellect- - 
ual instinct" which is a "certain kind of love". And "both these dictates 
are instincts, appetites or inclinations". 	In other words, the *divine' 
life is no less motivated by a passion_ than the 'animal*. The distinction 
between the 'divine' and the *animal' life is a distinction in the kinds of 
life they are •and not, as in Whichcote's view, in that one arises from 
obedience to impartialireason and the other from succumbing to the desires. 
Both are motivated by passions or desires, though different kinds of de:Are, 
because motives must arise from our emotional life. The desire that givei 
rise to the 'animal' life is selfAnterested; that that gives rise to the 
'di.irims! life is altruistic. This is why Cudworth maintains in the True 
•I Intellectual System_ that love (and not impartial reason) is the soul of 
morality° and in the Sermon that the good life is that which is lived 
according to the "law of love"4; motives arise from the emotions, 	lcrve 
is that emotion which is not self-interested. 
Now the problem that wises for him is; Are we free to choose between 
the desires that give rise to two different kinds of life? Obviously, 
since he has abolished the will, he cannot maintain that the will is free 
to choose between 'the higher intellectual instinct' and the 'animal appet-
ite' as Whichcote maintained that it was free to choose between reason and 
desire. 	But is there any sense in which we are free to choose between 
I. Quoted by Passmore: Ralph Cudworth, p.56. 
• 2. ibid., p.56. 
3. Vo1.1, p316. 	 4. pp.75-6.- 
• 
the two different kinde of desire which give wipe to **different kinds . 	. 	. 	• 	• 	• 	. - 	. 	. of life? In the first place* Cudworth admits that we do not choose to 
have certain- kinds'of*eiret *00 . . ° Pvadel ,ne :from outside. Of the 
animal_paeaions&he ear". vVe 
 
are not -commonly thought to be so .umwal the , cause of *mai as Baturvin 	' 
And of the -*higher intellectual instinct* or'love': ..alt is  a thing which must invade us and as it were 'seise upon those 'lifters possessed hUit". 2 
In'ethet:words, we do not create either . Ioveor'theenimal passions;. they 
are in the soul* and life consists ins conflict between them. Yet Cud-
worth does not want to Maintain that we have no control. .or!: the kind of 
lifeee.liv‘"that is, that our behaviour is totally determined. ..ThUs he 
argues that we have the power to throw our individual force on either the 
.side of the *higher intellectual instinct' or the *animal passions*; and this 
is a power* not of the will, but of the "Soul reduplicated u'pon-itielf by meams of whit* it maieither promote itself something towards the high.. 
er- goOd or honesty and -read= or else: sluggishly succumb under the lover-inclinations.** - 3 
Cudworth does not maintain that we have an arbitratylfree-Willi which is 
Able to choose either the !higher , or !lower* inetimets. But on the other 
hand, he does not want to may that We ere, as it were * at the mercyof 
whatever -instinct possesses us. ge attempts to steer a middle position 
:between- arbitrarines. s, and determination. 
Be is fully aware of the difficulties of an indifference theory Of 
freedom, referring, to it as -"the vulgar doctrine of free-will which makes 
the essence of It to consist in nothing but indifferency to act Or not to : act". 4 
-: : - Rurther„ he maintains that those who hold a theory of arbitrary -freedom, 
'want sheathing which **cannot - possibly be In nature"-, for if such naked 
..chcide ditlexist **the mihkedeet person, might in'aehient by his free will 
eake.himself.astolyhma the seraphim". 5 
• Cudworth rightly sees that froodOlo of indifference is inconsistent with the 
empirical facts.  BO realises * also, that such theories are involved in the 
paradox that the nearer one approaches to the good life* the less free one 
becomes. - .**irom this docitrlea it follows that it is-meither possible for 
I. Quoted by Passmoreirlalph Cudworth *. p.57. 	4. ibid., p.59.. 5. ibid.. p.60. 2. ibid., p.98. 
3. ibid• • p.59. 
the will Of gall Tir.Or to be determined to good only or to be fixed in a state of holiness Or righteousness, nor if it could, would (if) be a desirable perfection, for it would be a most unnaturalViolence and essent-
ially 
 contradictions tO his 'liberty'''. 1  
OncetVed as the power to be arb*traWY, PP.0,14.1" is cootrary to 
the , emrdrioal,facts, i but . it also, inVOles . the parsdox . that40.t4e: evil, 
and not the man who is free. Alorverr, the doctrine of freewill does 
oppfar_in.qudworth!a.thought ae.the. : 0aPs4tVfor preferring the good life 
to au 1 life. The faculty of,freeldwill isnothing_but a. self-active 
Power in order to gird,  towards the keeping or recovering a dominion Owe our lpio,  appetites and.biolinattons. which is the only perfect liberty or freedom*'whemee;„ that is our better - parti . rUles aver our worse,:for:eVery-thing properly is the best thing it ir, 2 ' 
PA, as Passmpre points out, this is not entirely satisfactory, for if 
to exercise onges.frow-will,is to choose the good,Xife t, there.must.also 
be the,Power of 40-0Zercising 	that.ie, there xpst also.be a freedom 
not. to exerCise,one's . free..will. 
;Weever*: it is clear wiw. CUdworth•does not want to discard the doctrine 
of freewill altogether. Is wants to be able to account for the empirical 
fact that the man dominated by his lanimpI passions. maybecome, gradually 
and not as the result of naked choice, :dominated by his ohigWmr intellect 
Cal instinct'. In other words, he realises both that 'wicked men' do 
not arbitrarily become good by naked choice,  and also that 'wicked men' 
do not necessarily remain wicked. *u dive even goes to the extent of 
saying that: "All the contingency that is essential to a, free-Willed being is only this .0. that it is not absolutely necessary for them always in:like qa#08 When the outward circumstances are the same to act alike"• 3 
In other words,, it is empirically evident that given like circumstances - 
on two different occasions, we do not necessarily arrive at the same 'last 
practical judgement', and therefore do not necessarily behave in the same. 
way in two like situations. And this has to be accounted for. But Cud- 
worth' never arrives at a really satisfactory position; he .wants neither 
determinism nor arbitrariness, but does not satisfactorily establish a 
position between the two. 
" _But Cudworth does have a theory of freedom, as distinct from his 
theory-of free-will, which is .both satisfectory and essential to his whole 
1. Quoted by Passmore s Ralph Cudworth, 
?. ibid.., p.62. 	. 3. ibid., p.65. 
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position; freedom, he maintains, is identical with gaminess; the free 
life is the good life; it is only the virtuous man Idle can be free. This 
•view is expressed in several passages which have been quoted already. For 
COtamplei he sayia that the life motivated by love is the life of 
and liberty; the other (doing one's duty) is the tiresome task and slavish 
imposition of religion".: 1 
And, in maintaining that free-will is the capacitr for preferring the good 
life to the animal life, he says that okeeping or recaverirg dominton  
over our lower appetites and inolinations, ... is the only perfect liberty 4.2 
• Rat it is 'best expressed in the following two passages: no 	is 
free, but he that bath his will enlarged to the extent of God's own will, 
•by loving whatsoever Cod loves, and nothing else. Such a one, doth not 
fondly hug this and that particular created good thing, and mammal him-
self unto it, but he loVeth everything that is lovely, beginning at God, 
and descending down to all his creatures, according to the several degrees 
of perfection in them. Re enjoys a boundless liberty, and a boundless 
sweetnessmccording_ to his boundless love*. 3 
• ,And. love °is at once a freedom from all lait. a state of purest liberty, 
and yet a law too„ of the most constraining and indispansable vacessitr.4 
Goodness and freedom are identical, and we are free' according to the measure 
a our love leve„ or *the higher intellectual instinct*, is the condition 
of both freedom and goodness. To behave freely is to behave without const-
raint; and this is possible neither by obedience to external imposed laws 
nor by succumbing to the animal appetite. To obey laws is not to do what 
one wants to do but what one feels ow on to do. But the *animal' life 
cannot be the free life, for the 'animal appetite' is egoistic; and to 
behave egoistically is to behave with special preference for oneself. Such 
conduct is bound to be frustrated by the facts, for reality is such that 
all our selfish desires cannot be satisfied. The only kind of life that 
can be free is the life which is harmonious with reality; that is, the 
life which is in terms of reality rather than illusion. To behave in terms 
•of an Illusion, for example, the illusion that oneself is more to be 
preferred than any other self, cannot be to behave freely. For arty behav-
iour that is not in terms of what is real is bound to be frustrated by the 
real facts; and such behaviour therefore cannot be free and spontaneous. 
z Different kinds of life stem from different kinds of desire, and the only 
L Quoted by Pasmuores Ralph Cudworth p.69. 	3. Segmon, p.76. 
2. ibid., p.62. 	 4. ibid., p.76. 
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kind of life which Can be freais that whieh - arises..f*rom a motive which is 
not egocentric. Such anon-egocentric motive is love. Just as it is love 
(the' love ,of truth) that gives rise to the objectivity and impartiality of 
•poienge, compelling it to deal with facts as they are and not as one might 
like them to be* e0 it is love thatis the motive that gives rise to the 
•Objeetivity and.imPartiality of the good life. it is that which releases 
Us from the bondage of egoism. This is why Cudworth refers to love as *the 
• soul Of all morality". 2 
The good life, or the free life, consists for Cudworth in "being 
.,expanded from the narrow particularity of itself to the universality of all* 
and delighting in the good . of 011,... it is an impartial nature, not fond- . 
-1Y. tied to this or that, not captivated to itself as inch, but loving good 
y as:goOd".2 
- It is the life that is made possible only by getting beyond the limits of 
:egoism, or self-love, and 'loving - whatsoever God loves'. The nearer we 
attain , " this kind of objectivity:4p emotion and behaviour, that is, 
the More ogrwills are 'enlarged. to the extent of God's own will', the - 
larger becomes our freedom.- The good 'life is the life that is according to 
the slaw Of loves; it is the -spontapeowlins'of-loVe and not the life of 
Obedience to external lava. This does not aaap4 of coarse, that the good 
life is lawless', that:is, arbitrary and Irresponsible, for love has its 
own obligations: *Love is at once a freedom from all law 	and yet a law 
. too., of the most constraining and indispensable necessity".3 
In short, Cudworth's position approaches very close to the Augustinian 
view that the good life consists in 'loving God and doing what one pleases'. 
It tedomes clear, now, what Cudworth means in the *True Intellectual 
Systems, when he defines virtue as "an assimilation to the Ileity° 4 and as 
"a participation of the first good, or of the divine nature*. 5 The good 
life is not the life of obedience to the commands of God; it consists rath-
er in becoming like God. To live the 'good lire is to live the god-like . 
life and to be free; that is, to:  behave without constraint or frustration. 
of 'desireby desiring what God desires. Passmore interprets Cudworth's 
theory of , participation of God asfollows: "There are not, then, two 
thingS, God's will and our W111, God's will demanding obedience Of ours: 
1.True Intellectual System, Ve1.1, P.315. 4.True Intellectual System', 
.2.Quoted by Passmore: R. Cudworth, p.71. 	Vol.1 ., p.315. 
3.Sermon, p.76. 	 5.ibid.,'Vol.2, p.59. 
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there is just Cod's will displaying itself within us, so tbat all heter-
OJlOII\f in the relation between God and man quite disappears". 1 As we shall 
see in a later chapter, Cudworth • s epistemology 1s desisnect to show that 
all knowledge is a •participation• of God. 'l'he essential difference between 
Cudworth's and Whichcote's views of the good life is that while Wbichcote 
main~na that it consists in obedience to God, Cudworth holds that it con- . 
sists in 'participation• of God. 
The ethical term 'good', in Cudvorth's view, refers, not to a certain 
kind of extel"'l81 conduct which i caght' to be done, but to a certain ld.lld of 
life, or rather to. a certain kind of activity - "the active exertion of lwe 
itself•.2 It is the activity of loving, ·Cudlrorth maintains~ that is the 
~od. The good lite, then, is the fi'ee life, the spontaDeous life of love. 
Such a life is 'divine', as opposed to 'animal', and is objective or impart;:. 
'ial, l'lOt in the Whichcotean sense of beiJ:IB the life t!Jat is obedient to 
•severe and impartial reason•, but in the sense that it is not self-intereiit-
ed. It is no less passionate than the 'animal life', but, nnUkB the •aninial 
life', is not motivated by self-interested passions but by a passion for 
universality or objectivity. Now it is clear that if the aood is the act-
ivity of loving,. there can be no sense in which one JD1V be said to 'freely 
choose' the good as 811 alternative to the evil. For in no sense may one 
be said to choose to love. Nor can it be said tbat one 'o\llht' to be good, 
or that it is one's 'duty•· to love, for the terms 'duty• and 'ought' imply 
a freedom of will to knowingly choose or reject the good. Of the fact that 
one may not be said to choose to love Cudvorth is fully conscious and argues 
that nThe divine life is not formed by us but in us • • • it is a thing which 
must invade and as it were seize upon those who are possessed of it •• ~ This 
(love) will invade and seize upon all those that are prepared for it and have 
the obstacles removed".' 
The good is the activity of loving, and is, therefore• not an end which ma.v 
be ·knowingly chosen or rejected. One camJO~ choose to love but has to be 
'invaded' by it. The good life camwt be chosen as an alternative to the 
evil life; the most one can do is to • remove obstacles,•; to love. And if it 
is the ~tivity of loving that is the good, one ~·not properly be said to 
• commit sin' by knowingly rejecting the aood· For the sood. is not an end 
1. Ralph Cudworth, p.86. . 
2. Quoted by Passmore: Ralph Cadworth, p. 75. 
3. ibid., p.76. 
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which may be either chosen Or rejected. Thus it follows that 'sin' is not
•due to el wilfhl disobedience but rather to a failure to 'be invaded' by lave. 
It is, as Cudworth' puts it, "a priVation". 1 It is "not the wilful opposing 
of the arbitrary command Of another perSon.... but it is a falling short 
• from natural perfection". 2 
Now we may briefly summarise Cudworth's theory of the nature and 
function of knowledge in morality. It would be false to argue, :of course, 
that he preseuti -One coherent theory and is never inconsistent - we have 
seen that there are a number of inconsistencies in his thought, as, for 
example, 'his view, that it is part of natural justice that a ruler should 
be obeyed just because he is a ruler: and his various UNKM1413 of 'free- 
- will' - but there is every clear tendency in.Cudworth's thought, and it is 
With this that we shall concern ourselves.. In the first place, Cudworth 
makss it quite clear, that the knowledge that has a place in morality is not 
the knowledge of rules and precepts. Nor is it a function of the reason 
conceived as an intellectual faculty which is independent of desire. For 
the knowledge whose objects cannot be objects of desire cannot be a motive 
for. behaviour. All behaviour involves ends which are pursued because they 
are desirable; behaviour can arise only from motives, and these originate 
in our emotional life. Thus, the only kind of knowledge that can give rise 
to behaviour, and in particular, good behaviour, is that which is a fuhction 
of our emotional life. Action originates in our:svital disposition', which 
perceives ends that are desirable and 'employs' our calculating or intell-
ectual power to assist in their attainment; This is the way in which Cud- 
. worth expresses it, but his real position .is that the knowledge that gives 
rise to behaviour is a function of neither the intellect nor the emotions,' 
, but rather of the 'whole soul' or,the'swhole man'. The judgement that, for 
example,... A is better than B is a judgement of the whole personality and is 
the same as deciding to do A rather than B. Judgements are not a function 
e'en impartial, infallible 'roman', or own of a 'moral sense', but of 
the whole personality. The kind of moral judgements we make, therefore, 
both depend. upon, and determine, our manner of life. The degree of goodness 
of our life depends upon the degree of objectivity of our moral judgements; 
1. Quoted from the MSS by Passmores Ralph Cudworth, p.62. 
2. ibid., pp.62-3. 
e 
e 
e 
. .... .. 62. 
.:, . . ; ' .. l; • - • . . --:: .. :·: 1 .. . .. . . . :- ·• • : .. : .· ,• ... 
~.~t .. ~ •. ~,~~ the .. d~. ~n ~~-~'D." .. .1,nd~J1~ of'.~t. ~s ~or:·. 
worthwhile coincide vi th what is il'l t~t good or wbrtlDrhile. J'or • although · 
'' • ::'; ; , ',:, ~, , J ,. 
1 
," ' :' ,' ', ' ' '. ', ':: \ ~ ' ', • • • •: ' ; : ,' ' ' '. , • • ' ' I ~ • 1 ', ' 
1 
, ·.: : ' •• : •••• • • : ·: • ; : • , ' ; , • •. ) ' ' ; , ~ • , i • • • 
, .... ~ .. ~. of: ~- BDd ~1 are .co!l&tituted by .o~ '~tal.dia~i~~JJ8', 
· ~ .th~·is ~ ~b~ti.,~ di~Unctton·~~~- ~· ~.eril-~ch· ~ iete~ ... 
-·~.:;.·:.~·-~:·.!·-: :-.-:·.;·.·! -~-.. ;''.,I''' . :\ :_:·.: ~. ~-, :, ;::•l_:i ·_\. :-. ·' -··.;.·~- .. ~_ ,L •• • • ··:· ••• :·: :.:: • 
and.-1mlllutablet~ Behaviour. in Cwlvorth'a view; ·is determiDed by the value:: 
,.·· .~:3~~~·.~~~~~ ... ~: ~-~t'~'is·be~~·~:JJ·.~-.to'~~.~-'.~~ 
... ·~ B, ~ ~- .. ~· ~ .o~ .o~e .o~ our behav~()\11" .i~ d~~~:nt upc:m. ... · 
·-~~;.~,j~~~~.~<~~~ . .1~~·~·-~~:~1n.~~-.~~~~-
-· .. ··'~ .~hfit -~· ()f ,o~ :U,te; objecti~ v.U~ Jud&ements ~ -~~l»l.e. ~D]y (o_r 
.... ~~:~··umt'_ .. the_:~.~~:~~a·th& .,~~ l,~e ~.i~~ ~~.~~ .. 
.. ~qft81 thc;). o~j~~vity ,o, our value J~~ and _the obJecti~· af.~·. 
. . \ ~ . ' . . '• . . . ' . . . . : . . ' . . ~ . . . ,' . ,. . - . . ' . . ' ' ' . . . . ' 
.lives eaJIDOt be. separated f:rGm f)8Cb other;, it -is only the . sood man who ~ . 
. . ~ th~ ~- . we" alva.va do: ~t we j-' to be -- ~: ~~~Ml.e ~ :~ 
• ' ' • , : • •• •:' ··: , .' ~I : , . '• . ' ,, , ' : . • . , ' • ~- ' : • · . ' , ; , '• .. ' , ' • : • o ' ' ', : ; •• , , • • : ' t ' • : ' : , , 1. : '' . ~ ' , · ' t , l' 
. . is. no will. to evil - and if what we judse to be, 8004 is not in fact good, .. 
,.:-.. ~bu~·~~~ess.:~-~-~--o~:~o~1Qll,~·~~~l~~.~ 
... ~· ... ..,_t ~:~our •. or ~~in• .•. ~ d~ no,t to a. wil.tul ;rre~~OD: of .· 
.... what.·~~· knam tobe •• but.to a fail~ to~ ihe good.~~.-~·· th~ 
..... ··',·: ... ;-.. ·~:_·· .'-:··.1 ,· .. ··. ·,·: ·.· ....... •"J ';. ~~- •• ·.~ • ':.·· :· ··:_.·._·: •• •• •• •••• ···~-
·. ~~V .. ~:.~Ori.ZJB ~·• ~ C:.ud!ort!J.'~ vi~. the good, ~a_ faill_D'e to be.· 
. . -.~:urflid8d ~ by ~~ . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . : . . 
:: i'·:·:· , .. 'i~ thfl··~t t.ro chapters ~e ~1· ~de~'the vi~ of ·Jior8 '&nd 
' . '· .. ··.:';. ,·; ,·,_ . ·-:: ·:·.>· ,·· :· '.: .. ·:.• 'I , •,' .· · .. ··.' .· .. , . , : •· ·.· '. '· .. '·· ...... ·. ': .. 
_ .. ~th .. iJl ~~~on .to, ~se C!f.9.t*orth. 
.. 
,•)' :-' ··: .. : ; . 
· .. \ 
.... 
,I\• • .: • 
. . \ .' ·. 
',( :. "I' -,I • •'(. 
,. .••': 
1 '·:,. \·, 
,,;.·: ·-!:: 
'' 
..... , 
,, 
r.· ; ·.'· ·\.' ~ ·. ' . ·: ,. 
,. I ,· \ •, • .··- • 
···:. • ! -.... ~' : •. 
., ; 
~ 
~ 
BISILIAggUngat . jialja§aikEngifi jai% 
63. 
More was themost -voluminous. 	writer of the Cambridge 'Satanists, but 
practically the whole of his ethical thought is contained in his Latin 
publication, larldarldiongthicuml, which appears in English translation 
as 'An Account of Virtue'. It was over the original publication of this 
cork - that More was involved in an argonaut with Cudworthj Cudworth had 
been contemplating publishing= ethical treatise (which never appeared) 
when he heard that More was about to publish his work. Cudworth became 
indignant, maintaining that Nore's work would anticipate much of what he 
himself intended to put in print. More was apologetic and said that he 
was prepared to wait till after Cudsorth published his work. However, 
eventually it was Nore's work that appeared in print, while Cudworth's 
ethical writings remained in manuscript form. It has been rightly ammo-
ed that Note owed mudh of his thought to the influence of Cudworth; unless 
such as assumption is valid, the above conflict is unintelligible. How-
ever, since Cudworth has been traditionally regarded as a, rationalist or 
the Whichcote-Clarke variety, the influence which he had upon More has been 
assumed to have been arationalistie one. In other words, Note, like 
Cudworth, has been traditionally regarded as a rationalist, although some 
commentators, for example, %Mach, have noticed that there is an aspect 
Of Norees thought which is distincitly non-rationalistic. Nore'e thought 
• centres round his two main doctrines of 'right reason' and 	 tellectual 
lore' or the "baniform faculty", and traditional interpretation has tended 
to concentrate on his 'right reason!. It is hoped to dhow that the ass-
umption that Mores thought °mei:much, to the influence of Cudworth is 
justified from the vritinge of Note, but that his likeness to Cudworth 
lies chiefly in his doctrine of *intellectual love". However, we'shall 
find, also, that)Nore is less of a, systematic thinker and more superficial 
in his treatmntof - pwoblems than is Cudworth. 
Bible doctrine of 'right reason', More tends to say much that is 
apparently: reminiscent of Whichcote. He argues, for example, that there 
are three essentials of the good life: *mum to judge by; vigour to 
resist and overcome; and appetite for love and enjoymeatit,2 
1. See. cOrrespondence in 	's Mary and Correspondence, Ohethima Society edition, 1847), Vel. 2,..part 2, pp.1634, 172.3. 
2.- decoUnt of Virtue,. p.93 (al references to this are to 1690 edit.) 
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ADd he~ tba:t:··: tilfhe ~- otYirtue is this-.· constantly to· pursue· 
tha-t. w~cb to·· riSht zoe8Son seems best•· · l'or indeed She bers8lf .is even · 
· ~~u~ 8Dd·81mp]i.the·best,. aot only as she iS I!JO·C0DS011811t to divi.Jla. 
~oti. -Whiclf does uotl:iing partialJ¥ ·for ~ sake- of· tbis· or~ ·.that· ·partic-
~-·-~ ,aS ~-~~~ dictates~' like to a common :PareD.t •. such ·le.ws : 
·.-. as· tenci.,-.i.D-their:_Olin n8~, to the ~inesB or :all-mank1m:~ .. aence .. ;; .. 
~t9t~· ~:Cod,. ·the. law eternal,-,. regarding ever,y:1J93 .with equlll_ 
be'"-~·...,;;·.;·~.·. SO alSO'··as nU among tb,e-.. ~-88 tbe stoics· it vas. '~'"!f· . . . . ' • --. ' . . • ' . . . 
)le~~. 'tbat to· :ro:p.o¥ Qoct, ·or ·to f~··mture. -was jUst the same tb:ing as 
t9.- f~ll9W ri'ght. reeBoD. .... fl>r. .. tm;s.~alcme.:is~ that,.vhicb eonstimtes· our 118.t-
ure;-· and 'di,ftiD.gu:lsbes a Dian tiUfl:a ~o.l .. : 
A J2UJnber of Points -~se out of :tiws.:~·la the· tirSt ~. Bore considers 
that' ri8ht ~n 1~- that which-~ man .f'z'om· animal •. :tt. is also 
·'consc\na~ to':diVine riason•;· that is •. right reason is the divine iD man.' 
. ···fids i~ simplY,' the trati&Dal. View that man- is a cOmpound of -~the divinG' 
• • • I , ~ 
and ·•:the iu;rlinal·'· ~ the dinm in him ·is 'rl.gbt reason"'• ·It. f'oll.ows•. 
· ·th~·--tb&t the 8ood ·lite.· or the diVine: lite. is that which is ~eo~ 
·--~--- riaht ~~- · -~ - Charac~ri.-~tic of' 1'18bt reason ~ i~. object-
. itity or ~al:it¥·. and the 111'e :that is aeco%'dillg to ri&bt reason 1s 
· : impertial ~ obj~tiYe in tlie seDse -that it is DOt egocentric. ·~e eood 
l.U'e is ·not •tor .the sake ot this or tbat particul~' but tends •to the 
' ' . . . . . ~ ·,. . 
· ha~ ot: ·an avmldDd''• It is iJllparU.al iD tile,-~ ttlat Cod· is 
· · . impai.'t1a.l; that is.-, it is not prejudiced towards egoism but regards •every 
--waif with eqUSl benigrd.ty•. It is ~,'animal' in us which is egocentric 
8lld iJilmore.l; it iS ~ ''divine' or 'ri8bt reason" 1fhich is objective and 
moral. -
-·.#. 
··xt must b& admitted that the &ban passage :resembles veJ:Y closelY 
. . . . . 
mUCh of what Whichco~.e sqa. about the good lite. !he good life is the 
.. . ·- . . - ~ -
life lived ~ to reaSOL · •~~rt it smst also 'be 1'el!lfliilbe1'ed that 
· ;_·=·CuiiWorth.woul.d be~ hil ~~with tbis P888888 pl-ovided 'right 
reaeon• is not interpreted 8.s a moral aDd intellectual faculty independent 
a£ -all desire. Cudtrozth would .. agree that the good Ufe. is objective 
aDd disinterested (thOUgh :.not unintereSted) and tbat the ''aniJDal.'' lite is 
e8ocentric• but ha would maintain that SUCh a lite con only arise b-an 
. . . . 
. a passion f'or ~jecti,Vlty •· that is, 1Wm 'love' or tbe 'higher intellectual 
inatinot' • and not tram reaso~ as Whichcote conceives it~ JleDee an tmder-o 
1. Account of •utue •. pp.-14-6. 
~ 
e 
e 
e 
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. '~tandii1B'f4-I!OZ8•s ~uoa~ww·ciepeDd::J.arael.Y·upon an ~ncli.Dg of.·-· 
•what 1$ .-na··-by ;'ri&h't ftason•. 
·in ·s01De' ·cd-1mat· ht:i ••. Bo1'e ·seems to mean b.V: ri8bt reason. what. ':. . 
:~-.~ '• ···&tuh1 jiisuce• .,or ·•et&mal-~· -~table ~ty•. 
·•:_.~~'tor inst~~--thai -there~ fi- PJaw 'ot nature (which) ;clid :iD··ail-
-• am'bSist liOih b8f01'e .a;rq 1mr liaS'Written_. 'or·•mw··'Ci\V or'SOcieti'ot<.· 
, tD.en. lien ~n·'b&iitgtt.l- • . 
• ~ < •lali oi· nature• e '-tmtVBl. ·justice'· ·hS·· ~ 'as '~ea· :cODatant--'an4 
-~:: • · · ·tual win- to ...c:Ve . . : miiD his om'* and unHJm ......dt1ve las ··it · perpe &'"' ever:/ . _ t - . .. r- . . _ .. • .. 
: Produees ntbos8' BSDCt1ons·_ which are iJmnolle&ble arid JieJ'I!I9riBnttt~2.- .. Jiul'--'in 
... '---- ' .. - f .. . -
.his._~-~. ot ._quoti.Dg -ancient wri.tem as -autbor1Ues~ Bore interjxi'eta: 
-·-fa.~-~--~ thei ·thi· -.. - . . ,~ -~~eb· .' :~,, .. ··~~ .. ·h·l·-- ·:.to• · .. -
. _ - . _ . . , . . . _ s supreme ~· ~. . . ~.............., l':":~e:ra ~:;; __ . 
. . ~. aDd ~ _was ri8bt aason"·' . : . . . _ . - . _ 
'·~~.~~ ~--to-1Mt.- iS- tha~ ~t ~is ~t a fBCUlty~--iib'·. 
-tnli~te•s_-~~ ot·_the 1111D4'-. w~ tUnction.is ~ 3- t1hat is-goOd; 
(:~--~ther- the· same tbiD3 ~· uatul"al·.just~· ~· ~Ve:.tlU 
t~~ toriSbt·~ .... , 11Wol~ ~~ oi1 
~;·cii~te;·OI·tb.··~·;·to u.fe ~~ins ~-ri~t ~ 
~~,~-~~~to u.-·tbe ~ lU'e~. that:_,~~~--~ 
- ~: b principle ot · ·•dOing_ no~ puti~ ·for ti 
_ ~·-'but ~ -·~~ Wa_v. ~th eqU8J. ~~~ .'. ae·· good llte 
:h:'b .~-of risht ~Dt ·th& .ute-·-1kt be~ ·~--~bly:::,. 
, .; . . . , . , : , , . . • . , . . , . . . , .. · : . ~ ; , . ' ' , , · I . : .; . • · . , . • .. , ~ _ : : . , . . ·~ : 
. good; ~ reason 1a not the faculty vhieh Judges wMt · k1n4- ot' life is · 
. . . . . ·' ' 
goo4 or eviL 9ms llore aawa: "'l.tleze;; ts therefore a .law, which is e~ 
; and 1Dimlt8ble_- aild iD same son· emm~on both to Qod aDd men; ~ l'i&ht· · · 
rea,soa:: which although it enters not into the min4s of men whoUy vitiatect 
-- aDd ~igate, ·yet still--is- present.-. and alnp maDUest- to the souDd and 
~n.4.. . ·_ 
--The ~:lite, is the life of right reason, that is, the lite that is· not 
~ ted by egoism but· vtiich conforms to Datural justice. Th'us Jlore, · quo~ 
tug Pythagoras, sap: ·~ perfection of clivine lite is made up of tra-ib 
BDd well-doing •••• the meaaure ~f rigbt reason is to imitate the cl1vi.De . 
, . wiSdom; ·-and the divine '·gOodness, with all our might •••• !he sourc~. cause 
' . and measure of buman f:eliciv. does consist 'in the knowledge .of such things 
·. a8:'_~ :mast excellen~. · 8nd most divine".S ·. · 
. ·1. ACCoullt of Virtue, p.U3. 
2. ibtd. , it• Ul. - -
;: ibid., p.ll4. 
.-; . 
4.. ibid. • p. ll5 • 
5. ibid. f ,. 19. 
"""111111 
~ 
e 
e 
e!· 
:.· 66. 
·:;' .... 
ID the retei'eDc:es we have considered~ ·11oft seems to be conteluHng that 
the lite that is accordiDg to right 1"e8880l is the •_objective• lite in the 
sense that it tra!'eeends eso1am. It 1s the 4Jod-l.i.ke lite,: the life that 
conforms to· ~~a~ 3ust1ce. It is '1mpartial' in eudvorth's sense ot 
'impartial'; that is. it is lived without.bias.iD favouz" of_ onesel£ •.. )Sut. 
:f'rom what we bave said so tar. it does uot follow that •reason• conceivecl 
as a moral and ilrtellectual. faculf¥ independent ot ·desUe is, iJl llore's 
view, that which is· tile judge of ·sooct ~ eftl. 
Bevertheless.,. there are reteze:nuEJ _in ~; wozk ~~eh seem. ,to suggest 
that he m.eall8 'by riabt reason the 'moral la1r' or 'law.oi" JU;lture' which is· 
~ - . . . . . . . 
·.:,dictated · bY pure:b" 1Dtellectuai Jl1')Ceasea. Be says, for f,mamplea 
.. , ·"ltigbt ~ls tbat Which 'by c8rta1n and~ ~urmees, is at ; 
leusth ~lved 1n.to ·some 1nteuectu8.1 prinCiple whiCh is t=stiately true" .1 
. In .other wcm~s. ·1'1gbt. r8tison is that: v,bieh touon'..te4uctt~l3.· from axioms 
· · w tii&t Pnnciples. thus if· 1 t. 1s ~, tir&t ~- 1fhole: ot. ~~Ucs · 
':···t6il~-~--~8Dd aace~a~:~' ~a-.aet ~~oms. 
··.·then mathemti. iS ind.~ wit!Wa *t be m8aus 1»7.-~t-.~~n. .W 
. .,: .. ~.this . .- to sUaest that, ill Bore's riew~ moml MstiDOUou ~ like. : 
· ~ .. · matbematio81 distinoti.OJIB ~ · ue there~~· ••• ill .ttMJ. ~ 111\V• 
. . . . . . . •' ... 
·:···ae·-'attem.Pts. tO .SbOw· that theft are e~rMi 8llll illmutable moral.d,i.stincticms 
.. , :as there. are-~ aild iDimUW,le ma~tt~· dieatiMUoDB,: bJ ~guing · 
. . ·.-. . . . - .. . 
· .tliat there are ·certfwl axiomatic mOral principles. !be .1Dtluence of 
. '·.-the C:artesiaD. · •clear slid distinct ieu• is ··-t ·-~ ~~ ~~ twenty..;.· 
., -~principle&. WMCh are 1111111Dft41atel:y·an4.~tibl.J'.~0 .. ~wbicb ·· 
l • • '· • ; ' 
nDeed llOtproof; sUcb.I ~as 811 moral ft8li50D ma.v in.~--s~~- have ret-
-~ unto; even· a8 all mathemistical demonstratiOns ai'e fOimd in some 
first undemab:J,e axioms •. And because these principles· anse. o11t· ot tbat . 
·faCulty • ·which ~ Greeks call No'Us., that aiSD1t1'?9 - miDd. ~. 1ntel.lect; 
and that the wozds noema ~ .noemata clerive ther&r:eom, ·8D4 properly stpUy 
rUles intellectu,al:· n·to··not ·tbe~~.imp:roper]y:sttle·-the rules that . : 
· he1'eatter follow, mOral ~·s. Jat,·l~t e;rq should. f~ them to be • · 
. morose. and un~~l••; .1 ~t 11$~ atf11'1a•· ·they prOpose nottuDg for ~ • 
. ..fhich at tbe same· t1me 1~ m\ pteful also, arid atteD4e41rl.tb delight".2 
. . .· 
'l'h' truth~. however, that his ~plea; al'e:defini,tiOD&.rath9r than 
~oms.· the. fust, f~.-le, states that:-~ b. bt~ch-is grateful* 
1. Account of Virtue, p.ZT. 
2 •. ibid., p.20-l. 
* Bi 'gzoa~' lf01'e does not mean 'thauktal' blit rather 'pleasant, 
apteable. acceptable • - See OXford Dlctionar.r• 
,., 
pleasant,. and congruous to any beings- which bath life and pemaption„ , 
•or that e.ontritnitee any degree to. the preservation of it*. 1 • 
:Likewise the fifth: noeta states:: 	is 'aped . te to be ebeeent, 
slewevil to be- svoidedo.? • • 
And these are typical of the other twenty-one : of Acre ,e 'moral axioms'. 
: Even if -.1bey are true, they are not Self,ovidently„s0; they rOriotre to - 
.1)@ 7:4P.ptifif*ITV4._ for eciample,,g60cl is defined as that -which is to be 
chosen, then the fifth noema.isself-evident poop/4f; it is included in the 
definition : of Good. !kit such a definition Of goad is not ' necessarily the 
only possible , definition; it is different in character from. 'Seth definit- f 
lona, es, for example, 'a straight line is the shortest distance between 
two points*. 
does not intend his noemata to comprise the whole Of his 
theory . of ethics. !yen if they were this they could net ***Vide an adequate 
ethical theory, for '.4ey, do not include any mama cmf' deciding in a par‘- ; 	 , 
icular, cenarete wee, Which of a set Of possible mrepr Of betniving is the 
,good one. br qcsamle, even if it is true that tgood is that Which is . 
pleasing' . and that .a greater good should he Chosen in preference to a lea's, 
or, it still has to be decided in a concrete situation which of it set of „ 	 . 	, 
, possible.eVe.of behaving is the most plowing. And there is no means 
. 44144 ii4:pixte - akiaaata_gor leaking such a decision. St the .purpose 
. cd",, hia.noemata is not to prdVide,a theory of ethics or a set of moral 
criteria; it is simply: ari.attemPt to prove that there are eternal and 
immutable moral distinction:, •, that there is an objective distinction bet-
ween:the:004:11ft and the aril life. It is an attempt to show that just 
as there are mathematical axioms which need -.no :woof, so. thetref 4.K.LN) moral 
• axioms which newnino ..proef. , And, if there,are moral axioms es there are 
-mathematic:el axioms* then morality -is -just : as :eternal and, immutable as 
mathematics.. This.part of licre!s iheory-is , an attempt to prove the 
*bie()tt:ivitt'Pf 	dietir4419133 t4). 'ila recs . or lien thtriorld, who are 
:quite feared up as to:: Cod. and all: that is divine; who. allow no such thing 
as superiority in the faculties, but *sit obedience to that passion in 
Pertieilar,.. Whirl 'shall happen' to' usurp above 'the rest* and make it the 
: top of human felicity to fulfil the desires °f". , - 
In short. Nor: e is attempting to prate, like Cudworth, that morality is 
3. ilmIA.* p.20.- 
1. :Account a Virtue. p.21. 
2. ibid.,. p.22. 
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eternal: and immutable. But his attempt is .conSiderably more Mile than 
Cudworth's. Cudworth,. as we saw in the last. chapter. likens moral.dist-
inctions to mathematical distinctions' only in that they are both distinct-
ions gnat 	hut .by:nature.;', but, he maintains that norall.distinctions 
are diffesently apprehended from mathematical distinctions. - ;, And it MaY 
be sust.egilIalse to conclude that More holds that moral distinctions' are 
apprehends/1W the same way as mathematical distinctions, as to conclude 
that Cudworth does. ,..Indited. 11' it is true that More owes =eh of his 
thought , to the _influence of :Cudworth, we .should- expect to find him arguing • 
that :Moral distinctions are not intellectually apprehended. 	 - 
• Homer. in some of what More awe, he seems to suggest that, 'in his 
view, reason is an intellectual faculty which is capable of making moral 
judgements in the same ,way as .it vMces mathematical. Judgments. For examp-
le...the following passage, already' quoted ',reason to judge by; vigour to 
resist ; and overcome; and appetite for lave and enjoymeM4 - seems to 
-.: suggest a theory of ,faculties, reason. will, and desire, the function, of , 
•the reason being to judge what 'dad' of behaviour is good. The awe idea 
appears in this passage: *There is something which is simply and absolutely 
good, which in all humus actions iS to be sought for. That its essence, 
nature and truth are to be judged by right reason. but that the relish and 
delectation thereof is to be taken in by the boniform faculty. Also that 
all moral good, properly BO called, is intellectual and divines intellect- 
de- the truth and essence of it is defined and comprehended by the 
intellects and divine, as the savour and complacency thereof, is most effect-
ually tasted through that high faculty, by which we are lifted up and cleave 
unto God. (that Almighty One, who is the most pure and absolute good, and 
who never wills anything but what is transcendently the best.) -So that 
- for a ion thus to know, and thus to ascend, is not only the highest wisdom,. 
but the highest felicity. AM it is by this gradation toward things divine, 
or by this flower and perfection of the soul, that we attain to a sort of 
stialition-, With abet, is perfectly the besr.2 
Raw; this is Very difficult language, and part of the problem in interpret-
ing it is that ;Bars never defines the rather unusual terms he employs. 
For example, it is never quite clear *stip:a' ty 'right reason' he means 
!objectivity! or 'contact with whet is real* or whether be regards it as 
-. -an intellectual faculty. 'In some of the passages which we - have considered, 
- the term somas to be synonymous with °natural - justice°; in others, it appears 
1. Account of Virtue, 1493. 
2. Ili& 
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to mean 'objective' or 'impartial' such that it in be applied to conduct 
that is without bias towards egoista; but in the passage just quoted, it 
appears as a faculty which is capable of judging the 'truth and essence' 
of goodness. Moreover, k,ore appears to regard it as identical with °intell-
ect' because he refers to both as having the same function, that of judging 
the *truth and essfance of goodness. If this is so, it is not clear why 
he continually uses the term *right reason' instead of the simple 'term 
'reason*. This passage also introduce the concept of the "boniform 
faculty* a concept *Leh is apparently peculiar to lore. The distinction 
between right reason and the bonifora faculty is a distinction of function: 
right reason judges the !nature* of *at is *simply and absolutely good"; 
the bonito= faculty - stakes in' the 'relish and delectation thereof', low' 
this would appear to be a restatement of Whichcotess naive rationalism; the 
reason judges what Is good but cannot appreciate it and therefore cannot 
give rise to action, while the will for the boniform faculty) cannot judge 
what kind of conduct is good. but can appreciate the savour* of what is 
' judged to be giood, and therefore can give rise to action. And it would 
be easy to interpret None in this way. 
However, that such an obvious interpretation of /lore's theory would 
be false„ is evident from the following: 	l  , , whatever  -nem e 
subject it be, is not apparent, but to a good man aoops men do discover 
that which is best in every subject (1 mean' really and simply best) not 
as they are knowing„ but as they are good. So that methinks he (Aristotle) 
had spoken more correctly ,had, he stiled this faculty,: the very ey,e of the 
soul, than to call that -east of natural industry, which seem too much 
**daring Upon craft, But forasmuch as no man can feel the motives and 
dictates of this divine faculty, but one who bath attained to it by dilig-
ent application, we Must have recourse to some middle principle to serve 
as ... an- interpreter between God and -man. And for this we shall constitute 
that which we call right reason. Therefore that certainly is absolutely 
and simply the best, which according: to the circumstances of the case in 
nestien, comae up closest to right reason, or is rather consentaneous with 
For .-right- reason, which-lerifl -mani . is a sort of cow or transcript 
of that reason or law eternal which is registered in the mind divine. How-
ever, this law. is not otherwise made 'known _unto us, than as it is communi-
cat-e4 and'reflected on our minds by the same right reason, and so shines 
forth. But by how mash it shines forth„ by so much :loth it oblige the 
* conscience, even as a low divine inscribed in our hearts*. 1 
Now this makes llore's position clearer. There is a *divine faculty' which 
1. Account of Virtue, pp.14-5. 
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are to as the 'eye Of the soul*, and which is identical with his 
bonito= faculty*.' It is this faculty, rather than right reason, that is 
the divine in man, and it is by this faculty that the good is known. The - 
good is 'known through this faculty snot as we are knowing, but as we are 
goodk. In other words* the kind Of knowledge that one has of the good 
through the iboniform,fanuity° is different from the kind of knowledge one 
has as a result of intellectual activity. This is made clear by reference 
some of Nore's ,accounts of his own life. 
Some of More's writings are intensely personal giving- the, reader an 
insight into the life and personality of the mad.' unfortunately these 
works were not available for the preparation of this thesis, but suffic-
ient portions of them are quoted by various commentators to enable us to 
refer to them. And, as we Shall see, they are quite illuminating and are 
of - great assistance in the understanding of his Account of Virtue. In his 
-- early life, More was eager to accumulate all the knowledge he could; that 
is, to learn facts and the views of many revered authors. But after grad-
uating from Cambridge, he began to wrestle with the problem of 
"Whether the 'knowledge of things was really the supreme felicity of man or 
sonething greater and more divine was. .' Cr supposing it to be so, whether-
'it was to be acquired by such an eagerness and intentness in the reading - 
of authors, and contemplating of things - or by the purgation of the mind 
from all sorts of vice whatever. n1 
In other words, two problems confronted him. In the first place, he began 
to wonder whether knowledge was 'the supreme felicity'; and, secondly, 
even supposing knowledge to be desirable it still had to be decided how 
one went .about gaining it. Is knowledge a purely intellectual activity, 
or is it made possible only by first attaining to 's state of ,virtue? 
According to Tulloch, a ,period of scepticism, which lasted for four years, 
followed ,upon More's graduation. And, after this period - a period in 
which he concentrated on becoming virtuous rather than On expanding his 
knowledge - he was able to write in his Mystexy of Godliness: 
was fully convinced that true holiness was the only safe entrance 
into divine knowledge*. 2 
In other words, More had come to the conclusion that the highest knowledge 
is not independent of being virtuous; the vision of the highest truth could 
1. Quoted by TuLloch:Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy, Vol.1, 
;2. ibid., p.312. 	 p.309. 
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come only after ethical purification. Thus he says that he now began to 
read the Platonic writers especially Plotinus among whom there was frequent 
mention-made of the purification of the soul, and of the purgative course 
that is previous to the illuminative; as if the person that expected to 
have his mind illuminated by Cod, was to endeavour after the highest purity". 4- 
ilnd he says: "that insatiable desire and thirst of mind after the knowledge 
of things was wholly almost extinguished in me; as being sollicitous now, 
about nothing so much as a more full union with this divine and celestial 
principle, the inward flowing wellspring of life eternal.... When this 
inordinate desire after the knowledge of things was thus slimed - in me, 
and I aspired after nothing but this sole purity and simplicity of mind, 
there shone in upon me. daily a greater assurance than ever I could have 
expected, even of those things which before I bad the greatest desire to 
know; insomuch that within a few years, I was got into a most joyous and 
lucid state of mind; and such plainly as is ineffable". 2 
In other words, More is stating as a fact of his experience that the highest 
knowledge can be attained only by the good man. wis this divine angacity'  
- be wanting, by reason of the impurity of a man's spirit, he can neither 
bit upon a right scent of things himself, nor easily take it, or rightly 
-- pursue it, when he is put upon it by another".' 
Time, according to Tulloch, in the Latin edition of his works More puts his 
Ethics first explaining that in his opinion "the only solid foundation of 
a true philosophy of human life was moral purity". 4 This makes clear 
what More means when he says in a passage, to which we have already referred, 
that *men do discover that which is best ... not as they are knowing, hat 
as they are good'. 
It is quite clear, then, that for Core the highest knowledge is 
attainable only by the virtuous man. And this is identical with Cudworth's 
view that our judgements of what is good are dependent upon our 'vital 
disposition' such that it is only the good man who can know the good. But 
More, OS WO have seen, maintains that aforasmudb as no man can feel the 
motives and dictates of this divine faculty, but one who bath attained to 
it by diligent application, we must have recourse to some middle principle 
to serve as.. an interpreter between Cod and man... which we call 
right reason".5 
In other words, being good and knowing good are the same thing, but since 
not everyone is virtuous and therefore knows the good, there must be some 
Other means by which it is possible to decide, in a concrete situation, 
1. Quoted from Ward's Life of More by Bullough: Introd. to Nore's Poems, 
2. ibid., p.xxxv. 
3* eac'teei bY Tulloch,  ‘°3"' i t PP3564. 5. Account of Virtue, 	p p..14--5. 4: ibid., p.358. 
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which of .a set of possible ways of behaving is the good one. This is 
the purpose of Mere's 'right reason'. On the one hand, More is arguing, 
like Cudworth, that knowledge of the good is a function of the whole 
personality; that is to say, it is the knowledge that is attainable only 
by living the good life, or, as he pats it, 'by purgation of the mind from 
all sorts of vice°. On the other hand, he contends that 'right reason' is 
the judge of what is good or evil. 
Now there are two ways in which it is possible to interpret More on 
this point, one of which is satisfactory, the other of iglu& involves him 
in serious inconsistencies. We have seen in considering Cudworth the sort 
of theory that is involved in saying that the good can be known only by 
being virtuous. It involves the view that judgements of good and evil 
will be more or less objective, that is, more or less valid, as the life 
of the person-making the judgements is more or less virtuous. Moral judge-
ments both determine, and are determined by, one's manner of life. The 
egocentric man lives the kind of life he does because he judges to be aped 
what is in fact evil, or good only in the sense that it is in his own int-
erest; and his moral judgements are false because he is egocentric. The 
good life is non-egocentric and it is only by livingsuch a life that it 
is possible to make valid moral judgements and to know the good. But along 
with this view, More's treatment of which we shall consider more fully pre-
sently, More wants to say that 'right reason' is the judge of good and evil. 
And in so far as he holds, like Whichcote, that right reason is a moral and 
intellectual faculty which is independent of one's emotions and one's 
manner of life, he is both being inconsistent with his view that 'men do 
discover that which is best ... not as they are knowing, but as they are 
good', and also involving himself in all the problems of Whichcote's posit-
ion. His doctrine of 'right reason' can be consistently maintained with 
his other view only if he holds that 'right reason' is identical with the 
'bonito= faculty' and that its judgements are dependent the manner of 
one's life. TO maintain, that 'right reason' and the 'boniform'faculty' 
are separate and autonomous faculties of the soul is to be involved in all 
the insurmountable problems of a faculty psychology. 
It is never Cleat 'precisely what Note means by "Sight reason': . Mar 
is it clear what relationship he conceives to emis' t between Iridit reason' 
and his 'boniform faculty°. Sometimes he is rationalist enough to write: 
That we ought to pursue virtue, and fly from vice * is a thing clearly 
memifest to us by the sense and dictate of conscience. Bereaves that we 
are obliged to perform all the duties of virtue is plain* from that law 
of reason* which God has implanted in us: for that intellect* or right 
reason which is in us, is a superior thing; and all other faculties are 
by natural right, subjected to its obedience. But the law Of virtue, and 
of right seasons is altogether the same. For virtue seeks nothing in every 
action, but what is simply the best, and that which to right reason is most 
consonant. And since this law of virtue, and right reason, is not emy pos-
itive or arbitrary thing, but of a nature eternal and immutable* we cannot 
therefore doubt, but we are bound to obey its precepts and directions by 
an eternal and indissoluble obligation. Furthermore all men are bound * 
by the common law of nature, to do what appertains unto them; I mean 
these' things which are consonant to their own natures. So that men ;Meld 
live like men, and not as brutes; but certainly if life wants the fruit 
of virtue and of right reason, it is not manly but merely brutal. Mat-
ever is in us, beneath virtue and right reason.... is to be subdued 
And surely his divine law is no other, than eternal and immutable reason; 
which being sight is evermore one and the same, even as the figure of a. 
'triangle or circle, that changeth never
This might well have been written by Thichcote or Clarke. Right reason is 
a moral and intellectual faculty whose judgments are eternally and immut-
ably geed and which therefore has the right to subdue the other elements 
of the soul. 110reWeri, the 'moral ought* is essential to the views 
expressed..herea, .Buty -rather than ,good appears to be the fundamental 
. ethical concept. The Etaina rationalistic tendency in expressed as follows: 
r"There are eome =chewable ideas or impressions of good and evil, even 
as of figures in mathematics; and that the mind judges of those as much 
as sense does of these: yet reason and intellect have jurisdiction over 
both. For as those are made up by the concurrence of several lines; so 
are these made up of various and often contrary circumstances; which there-
fore denominate some things to be good, and some things to be evil. And 
this confirms what has been said, that the principle, whereby to judge what 
is either =rally _good or evil* is an intellectual principle and in some 
sort divinen.2 
The view being expressed here is that though ",staise" may judge what is 
good and evil, there are certain innate and unchangeable ideas of good 
and evil such that reason* conceived as an intellectual faculty, may 
make moral judgements, just as it maims mathematical judgements. In short, 
• reason judges whether or not a certain kind of action is fitting or proport- 
I. Account of Virtue, pp.I91-3. 
2. ibid., pp.51-2. 
•orate, and therefore whether it is good or evil. 
low it MCSOxi'adattted:that'thei .e is a very definite rationalistic : 
tendency inMUre's thought. And it seeme. telte'axtite'idpebeible- tC : reddr.' 
dile this aspect of his thought with his view that 'men do discover that 
which is best ..... not as they are knowing, but as they are good'. Dot 
it ...would be false-tormaintain that Morels thought to wholly' rationalistic, 
or even that it is Chiefly rationalistic. We have Awen.already his 
•tendency towards a theory which is more like that of Cudworth than these 
•of Whichoote and Clarke. This is further evident from such passages as 
the followings. . nemething there is, which of ite own nature, and incontest-ably is true: .so is there somewhat which of its own nature is simply good. Also that 118 the former is comprehended bythe,intellect, so the.sweetnees and delight of the latter is relished - by the boniform faculty". 1 
- The implication here is that goodness is not something that Can be express-
td'in,intellectual Concept:, but . rather 'something which is attractive 
to the lbonifdra-facalte; that is, it is something Which is emotionally . 
_.epprehended. This is futtherexpressed_in,the.folleving.passaget 
"I 'affirm this pleasure to arise from s sense of virtue; andiit is erron-eous to thier the fruitoUtittdoehorldedteistirsudh imaginary knowledge 
as is 'gotten by bare definitions of virtue: for this amounts to no more, than if a, men should, pretend to know the mature Of fire from the hare :Picture of fire, which can afford be heat. All kind of Vital goods (as 
mey take -tbelibertrlo call th*) al."0 . .bY . Our life and senses to be die-covered 'by the eye. According 'to that Memorable swing of Plotinus: If • 
'you everwere•thelhing it:sato -you may then be dad to have Sean it. 
AA once being:trOneformedintolhiS life of-virtue, then indeed you . 
.behold the beauties, and taste' the pleasures thereof; then you grow 
enamoured, and your soul is taken up with joys that cannot be utteree, 2 
This expresses what: More bad discovered in his own experience. Goodness 
'Or virtue cannot be known by 'bare .definitious°; it. as to be elperienced 4 . 
One can onlarknow goodness by being good, by living the good life. Prop. 
deltic= that purport to be Omit the good life cannot .give us knowledge 
Of thematureofsoodress any more than we can feel the heat of a fire 
by looking ate picture .Of it. Moreover, like Cudworth, More argues that: 
nWer want nothing for attracting this power unto us but that sincere love 
by which we are taught the true relish of virtuous things. For it is thus 
alone we dan growupwards, and_have conjunotion with God himself; since 
virtue being the divirest of all things, has most power to assimilate us 
- unto bim.d3 
- 1.-Account of Virtue, 191. a. ibid., pp.8-9. 
--
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This last passage might almost have been uti tten by CudVorth. In 
. . 
~cular, the pbrase •&Ssimilate us.unto bim'. 1~ ftvr;n1$cent .. ·ot CudwOrth;, 
. who had defined virtue as 0 an assimilation tO tita· DeitY"• ~-. ·,FUrther• ··· · · · · · 
~•s 'view tba~· all that is naecied. to ·giw: rise tO the ~lite~ is. -- · · 
·'th!;Lt:stncere.love'~· is stirnar to·ewiwonh's'·viev that one'does·liot .. ChoOse 
t6.uve ~··good-life Bey ·more thali one -cbooses tO· f'all iri; love~ . 'f,\'he ·good 
life··tolloWs from ·~illg- •inVaded by love• • · Ufhe ·divine- lite~* ~•Ctid-
••. I , . . ' . • • , 
worth~ "is ilot f'omed by us but in Us ••• ·it· is a thing whiCh must· inVad.e 
and ss ~t were Seize upon aU·those 1dto are -possesaed of' it••··· ''l'iiis (iave) 
will .inVade 8:nd seize upon ill those that. &1'9 };repared tor it ·anc~··have the 
obsttlCle~ ~~.2 The mOtive tb&t gives rise· to the good life, for 
both C\ldworttl an4 lore~ is love; one does not. chOose to 'live the gOod life, 
· or ~aleukte how it ·.is to ~-·lived;· tlie' ao04 Ufe 'CODSists in beiDg · pc)e&- · 
' . . ' . 
f!SSed by love •. 'lhe most one can clO is to •remove obSt&Cles•· :to love. 'lhis 
view is ex~·by Jlore aS ~_},utti~~f'f o~yes•~: ~-~ li(e.· 
. "is ~·s. ~e rather tban our own; if:by pu'tttnC off ~1~~. <t!ult :i's, 
·.Our animal affections) we contend and pant after that alone, which is . 
eJDiDSnt]N P,d; 8J'ld which only .. ~ongs to -~•, w~. equally .consults the 
bell8f'it ot the whOle UD:iverse8 .3 • ' . ' . . . . . • . . . · ; I · ' : 
•• .J • 
· . The ~- ·siiressed here · ~t th8 sooc~-· iife is nC;t · t1ie Ute ot: obedienee to 
: Cod ..Ut timt it· cCmsist.;, ~the~ in ltvil\i the Cod;_like- lite~ is· a ~petit-
. . . . .. ' . -- . 
·ion. of. Cudworlh 's view that 1~· Consists ill' a ct:PartiCipatioD . of . the rust 
goodti4. 0~ ~ baVi •. Ou:r~· wills: ueDiarged to the 'exttmt of God~s· own .. Will. 
~ 1~ ·wha~ eod.··~t.-~5. . 
~-·~pe(:t. of ~·s ~t, the, .view ~t ti- lifcir is the 
spontaDeous 'u£e oi' i~· raumr' tbai1 ~-lite or'·obedience~ 'is both aim- ' 
, ilar. to -rib·~ theorY. Sn4: ·aiso ·eoDiii.steilt wi;th· his om· vieir tb.at good-
-~ e8n o~ .be kno.n' by li~ .the aoOd ·11fe.'· What, .. then~. of the doct-
rine of'· 'right reason • ~ Clear]i., it it is Jfore' s view that risbt reason 
is a moral aDd intellectual ~acul.ty capable of' lllllking moral judgements 
and that the aood -llf'e is the life o£ obedience to the. dictates of right 
:reason so conceived, be is involved 1D the di.f'ticult position of attempt-· 
. . 
ing to hold two contradictor.v theories. And we have seen that in S9lD9 of 
. what het has ,to SS9,· JJore· does tend towa:rds tb1s rationalist view. At other 
. . 
times, however, he: maintaiDs either that right reason is subsi4iary to the · 
-~ 
1. !rue IIJt:ellectual system, Yol.l, p.315. 4.'1. InteU. Syst. ,Vol;.2~ 
2• Qaoted by Passmore: Ralph Cudvorth, P• 76. 5 SemoD p 76 P• • 
"'L .Al!!emmt: of Virtue~ -o.l99.. • ' • • ~ 
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•'bonuoim teeulty•,· or 14enticai with it; ReferrtDg tO. the •'bonifo:rin. 
- . -
f.Seu!t.v·.~: tal ~le; he avs:· .. ~· most" simple 8nd di~· ~ ana· :::; : .. 
teeUDg i.D the .boDU01'11l faCulty ·of the Soul. is tbat rule .or bolindar,y, --~ 
. whe1"eb;.' resso.·~ si:mned .aid approves heftelt~ For it she 'otters or' ·. : .. : 
~fin!$ ~: tba~ ia contrary to·-~: sense 8nd. te8ling :i!t iS .a~, 
~- d:l~t;. u·.~ to lt, ~~:.ts cnitbodcm,. fit •. Slid jUst'! . ·So_~·· 
. we,. need mt.iDYent.-~ eitemaliclea ot good; af follOw tb:ose.· ~ .. : 
· vS.iDJ.y -~·of' ·ftiiOter o'bjects;· when as this imrard lite mid -~Iise: pOint$ 
si»Bl¥ ·a· .1U!El~ idea~ ·which. is .tramed DOt from exterior· :thi.np, bUt trom -
the relish 8Jid intrinsic feeliD& of the bonifOJ!m faculty 1fitbiJ1°el-
. . ~ . . . . . 
':this is like Cudwortb.'s View that gooct 1s emotionallY discel'DSd,~ and that 
• • • • • • . • • i • ~ . • • • ·: 
the •rea8on' iS 'employed' by the emotio:ns to aSsist in the attaiD!IIAnt ~ 
.. eDd8 that m perCrive4 to. be good..~ ~-· whieh .1wtaes' mor81 distineticilia 
' 0 • • • 
· :a:s· ti •sense aDd teeUng' or * •bonU'om. faculty•.· Likewiae,· 1101\3 quotes . 
41-istone a8 ~ng "that -~ right, as .. was C()DformAble to. prud~~; 
and h9··-~ 011 to &rgaet ··"llov whereas prwtence itself is ~~ but that. 
uatural sagacitJ: •. or well cultivated diligence of the mind; which he eJ.s&.; 
'!'here calls.- the vuy e.ve of the soult. this only ·briDgs back the same ans-
wer as before;. resolvil:tg right- reason. rather into an inwar4 sense~ or an ·: 
· inward faculty at divination; tban into ·mw eerta1n ad distinot principles, 
- which a mall might 3ud&e or tbat which in ever,ythiDg. 11&1'9 the best. ••• · 
· ·'fhat we are in this, as in other occaaious. to regulate our lives by ·tl'l9 
. dictates of OlD' inte1"118l regent; that we must aspire to such babits, as · 
~- enable us to ildtate the h18h cbaracteroof such a regant,, and to con-
. £om:·thei'eto ill allthi!J8fl• tfhich ~-to tbts ... that our conseiencea. 
· ~. be kept pure aJJd: 1mmaeulate11·~2. 
'lhe: View expJ'eSSed here is that right reason ta not id~ with 
. ' 
·•.intelleqt.•,, but that tt 1s an 'lmrard sense•"- As we have~ he also 
·: ret~ to the 'bon1£cma faculty' as aD 'imrar4 sense•,. aDd this would 
SEIEID· to illdicate. that more regards 'right :reason", liS opposed to 'reason•, 
as identical with wllat he calls the 'bonitorm faculty'. 
l(owever • it seems to be quite impossible to be certai.D what Jiore means 
by '1'13bt reason''·· His remark tbat it etmDOt be Imown what risht reascm is 
. ~ss a ~~BD'tiave fithili himselt·a.~~ ·or thi~--~·W.S· natm"e•' 
. : ,::::~ .-.s~: ~~·-~r·:~ .thi.:. ~1~· ~: ~U" .~-~as to what 
' • -. < • • • • • 
· .. ··.· he·llieaJis'·by··the·~· •. · or he ~gar.cts .ript. ~,as an .~pnrard~:sense• 
- ~ . . . . . 
. __ · or.e'imrard faculty of. dlvination'.vbich is 41tferent,1s different in 
• • • •• • • .'.: - ~.. • • ~ • - • • ~ •• • • • • - • • : • • • • • • ' • ' • ' • • • - < • ' - • ... • :. • • • 
natUre aDd tunctton trom intell.ection. '-'Me JDllCb. at least seems to be 
~ear: '1'he kllotrledp tba~ Jfol'e conSiders to have a place in morall ty is · 
' . 
1. ;Aecotait. of VirtUe• pp.l57...S. • 
2. ~bid;.* PP•~7-8., ;. ibict.. p.16 •. 
~ 
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a function of 'inward sense or the 'bonito= faculty* and not of the 
reason conceived as a moral and intellect:01 faculty. Tor, as we have 
seen* he argues that the good can only be Icnown by living the good life, 
that moral distinctions are judged by 'inward sense, and that the motive 
that gives rise to the good life is love rather than the feeling of moral 
obligation. These views are consistent with each other, and comprise a 
theory which is broadly the same as Oudwarth's. Because it is not certain 
what Note means by 'right reason., it is not possible to be sure of the 
way in which he conceives it to be related to his 'inward sense' theory. 
But this _much is clear: Kure cannot Maintain consistently with his *in-
ward :sense emery_ that moral . distinctions are judged by the reason funct-
ioning in its capacity as Practical 'judgement. In so far as he does try 
tO Maintain such a iatiozialistio view* he is both being inconsistent with 
his more general theory end committiat the fallacy into which Whichcote 
had fallen - the fallacy of the faculty them of the soul, which we con-
'adored in Chapter fl. zFit- the more general theary of the nature and 
e , function of knowledge in morality that appear* in notes works is .contain-
ed in his view that moral distinctions are Iniewa,by finward:senseand the 
baniform faculty'. And it is on this aspect of Pores thought that we 
• 	 • 	 • 
shall Concentrate the tuet of oar diaougeisa. 
acre ,miintains a distinction between two kinds of : pods, a general . 	. 
and a particular yeti. This distinction is not between universal .e. 	, 	 . 	•._ 	• 
and particular, that ieik .between the good and particular instances of it; 
it is a antinetioniietWeen. aeeial•:gond •aatt private good. as we; •• 	• 	• 	• 	- 	• . 	• 	-• 	, 	• • . , 
°Aid itherise-zre-eay,, - the 'soul :putmges.What was absolutely and simply the 
best, this was .to:maniteit that fate:fun distinction of a twofold good; one 
4gienetal,„whickwas absolutely good, or absolutely better. The other partia-
*lore: and which in respect of some ;single inclination of eny . particular 
	
person, was good Or battar that is to 	either 'grata/NI or more grate;- 
iU.14 . ;Bat:abet-We hold to be the absolute good, , or better.thing, is that 
which proves grateful, or zipTe grateful, to the bouifona.facUlty of the 
"••aotil, which we have alreac*':protounded to be 'a thing . 	•, 	.. 
'Pettit:01er geode are good only in that they satisfy the inclinations of - 
particular persona. . A general good,- on the Other hand, is that which is 
socially good. It is that which Bad judges to be good, "who equally 
consults the benefit of the whole universea. There is contained in this 
I. Account of Virtue* pp.134. 
2. ibid., p.199. 
view; as the is in Cudworth's reference to °a public good 	the good 
Of the whole cesaumitel; the seed of an Idealist philoeorty. But what is 
•impctetant for otn. pzissont purpose; is the nature of the distinction bet-
ween-Renee, two ,gooda and the way .in which.he considers them to be known. • 
•Particular goods; for Rare, are private goods; things are good in this 
sense if they are desired by a particular person.. .Rat the general good is 
that which is• good for the *Whole universal; and this is the good that is 
relevant to morality. To beheare well is to behave in a. wey that is belle. 
ficial, not merel3r to one's own interest; bat to the 'whole universe'. 
In other worde, good behaviour is noniegocentric; it follows from a consid-
eration of the interests at 'society' ar "the whole universe', rather than 
from a consideration -or oneself. And„ whereas particular. ,,gooda are those 
which are in our own private interest and satiety a 'Single inclination'.; 
t.he general good is that which benefits the 'whole universe' and which 
is pleasing to - the 4boldrOrm faculty% The noniron% faculty* then appears 
as that which discerns. moral .distinctions. Good is that _which *proves 
gratercil 	to the boar= facultr. Moral distinctions, then; are 
.amotionally; not intellectually, discerned. 
New, Rare recognises ; an aCeS Chzdworth, that there are conflicts in 
the sal; awl one such conflict be considers , to be between the *intellect-- 
ual power of the soul* and the "body passional., Virtue, he says, is 
•nen intellectual power of the soul, by which it over-rules the animal 
impressions -or.bodily passions; so as-in,,,every 'action it easily: pursues 
What is abselutely and allinply the beetn.ic 
The reference to 'intellectual power' here is etaggestive of a iwitionaliet 
View. And this would seem to be supported in the following passage in 
which Rona eatplains what he_ seems - by 'intellectual* in this context. 
°We term this power intellectual, not only btitipaise of its situation, which 
is in the intellectual part of the soul (and not in the animal part of it, 
where that power resides which governs the members) but also because it 
• is always excited by some principle which is intellectual or rational. By 
animal impressions we understand every motion of the body, which being 
obtruded with any sort of violence on the soul, brings danger of sin and 
error, if tot carefully watched. Therefore all such dans:ions and imeg. 
illations; as strongly assault the mind,.. 	fitly be'referred to this 
head. Ar actions, I mean all motions made by the soul upon deliberation, 
which is to say, all such as may properly be templed lumen actions", 
• 1. ezoted by %snooze: Ralph thidworth, p.73.. 
2. Account of Virtue, p.11. 	3. Accolutt of Virtue, pp.124. 
-·e 
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Virtue• Jlm'e· argues,. c=onaists ·lJl· the •bodil¥ paSQiODS' being Ofel'-:roled by• 
. or giviDg place w. 'the intellectual power of the sou1•r aDd this pWer· 
· 1s called •·intellectusl' both beeause of its situation ill the 'intellectual 
pad o1 the ~·. aJJd ·beca»se it is 'excite4' by i.DtellectUal. and ration-
.. 
a1 priflciples. ·Ga tbe face. of i" at ~- ~- eeema to be a zoe.oetatemeut 
of Wbicbcote's view tbat there are: faaW.ti.es in .the soaJ.; 01'lS of --wbieh ia 
l 
i 
-the :r.eason diose· f1metlon· is to .1Ud&e the~ ot belulviour that is '£itt1ng'. : 
~.the meze- use o~··the ·tem 'intellectual' 4oes not, of itself', ~ 
mlt· JIOre _ to a rat1~ positicme Por. as we -haVe seen. Qu4worih retem 
to .the motive that g1Ws rise to -the goo4 _lite both as_ ·~ cena1n kind of 
lOve' am- as 'a M£bM' mtelleotual ~·. ~r# CUdworf;b, .Uke -
··~me makes· a dlstiDctloa -betwem .this.- •1nteUectua1 PQnr' alld the •animal 
.·. ;a:treottous•. !be 41atincU.. for ~ is uot bfitweeu ditfel"eJlt 
1'8cu1Ues, aa 1a 11hlaheote'a 'riew., but· ••• higbe:t and lowar 1nst1ncts 
• feeii9 • the hipr be!:DB- these_· which are -DOt eelf•.irrtierested, aDd the 
•Olt8l" beiDc those- trbich 81."8 _e&QC8BtrlC• __ AnA this.,- be ,lore's view. 
the- • tezm 'iiltellectual' 'mtf3 ireaa -~or ·himt· as it 4oes ror ~. impart.. 
-iall:ty as opposed to selt-.irlterest, I'll~ than tbi:nk:ing as opposed to 
tee:u.ng. that tbia- is in feet ·~ozre•e view is- ;clear from hi& doctrilie or· 
'in~ love•. 
-. - Jiore maintaills that .tbel'e is DOt "in the 17h0le compass ot natu:re .~~ 
. a gnater· good than ts that lO'Ie•- vhicb { t.o t:ree ~ from all other tmputo.o.. · 
ations) we eaU intellectual.· ~ ~·can more f:Ul:; elevate, aDd inad-
-iate the soul than this_ intelleCtual lovet . SUely mtbing is 110re · exaltecl 
or diVine· ..... -notb.ill3 ·more ·sharp in dis~-what in every case is 
dece1"oaa aDd right• or lllOI'e quiek m GXeC11ti.Dg Wb$tsoever is laudable and 
- ·juS~ ·S!Dce theretOJ"e this 1s ·the .most higb an4 tile most -simple good; 
it ought: ·m pret~ •. to be the role· aDd standa:rd· of all the rest; and 
_ JlOtbing_shcmld pa$8, w -b& accounted tar right· ·MlSOllt which trom this -
dl'riiJa soulrooe and t~ ~ not ~ its birth0 .1 · 
This makBe Jlore'e posiUoa clearer. VUtue 1a •u intelleCtual pm~er ot 
. . . . . 
tile soul 1 which ewer-ruleS the animal impressi.cma• 8lld this 'intellectual 
pOtiEtZ'b love. I~ is zetez.red t& as 'intellectual love' not because it 
· ~sts in tbinJth:JB as opposecl to t•Ung, ·but ~ to •tl'ee it trcm all 
. . .. . -~-.. :' . - . . . . . . 
other~ iliiputaticms• ~- J:n other' words, 11ore does not W8l.1t to be interpretedl 
. ' 
or :rather mis-interpreted- as holdiDg that tbe: sood .lite consists iD 
1. Account ot Jirtue, p.l56. 
~ 
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satisfying one's subjective feelings. The good life, then, in More's view, 
is the life motivated by love, because love is that motive which is not 
self-interested. To behave well is to behave in a way that is to the 
'benefit of the whole universe' and not merely to the benefit of oneself. 
Good behaviour is non-egocentric, and therefore can arise only from a 
motive that is not egocentric. The assumption throughout More's argument 
as well as throughout a similar argument of Cudworth's, is, of course, 
that there is such a thing as the 'benefit of the whole universe' and that 
in loving one is benefitting the whole universe,, or the 'community', or 
'society'. This is one of the difficulties of their position, which we 
Shall consider later. 
More maintains, further, in the passage just quoted, that love is 
not merely the motive that gives rise to the good life, but that it is 
•'the most high and the most simple good'.•In other words, the ethical 
term 'good' does not properly apply to certain ends which ought to be 
•pursued or to certain acts which ought to be done, but rather to a certain 
kind of activity, the activity of loving. This is exactly parallel! with 
Cudworth 'a view that good is "the active exertion of love itself".I It 
follows, then, that good is not an end or a way of behaving which can be 
known independently of being virtuous, for an activity cannot be known 
without acting. It is true that one may know that the good is love, but 
this is not knowledge of goodness; it is merely knowledge about goodness. 
If the good is love, then it can only be known, by 'the active exertion of 
love'. In other words, if the good is love, then knowing good and being 
good are the same thing - they both consists in the activity of loving. 
It follows from this, as Cudworth realises, that there is no real sense 
in which one may be said to choose the good life; it must, as he puts it, 
'Invade' us. And this is expressed in More's view, already referred to, 
that the good life 'is God's life rather than our own'. The same idea is 
expressed as follows: "As soon as we advance to the knowing what appertains 
to virtue, and become masters of the divine sense, there is a power above 
all that is human, that associates with us and gets into us... Those who 
with sincere affections, do even pant and thirst after virtue, they on the 
sudden are caught up by that intellectual spirit, which replenishes every-
thing; they are animated and supported by it, and finally therewith joined 
1. Quoted by Pamemore: Ralph Cudworth, p.75. 
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I 
in the strictest association of love ••• They are. a.S men rapt up, and 
inspired by some divi.Dity; and they are easily and spontaneously led on 
. to every good work.· .. It is plain, w& want nothing for attracting this 
power Unto us, but.that sincere love,- by which we are taught the true 
relish of virtuous thiJJBS. For it is thus alom we Call grow. upwards, 
. and have conjunction with God himself; since virtUe, being the divinest. of 
all things, has most~ to ass1milate us unto himn.:J,. 
. . . . . . 
It is cl~~ then~ that in deflni.Dg -~ as •an intellec~ power of 
the sou1' which over-rules the bodily passions, ·More does 110t mean that it 
is a _function of thought. What he is s~ng rather is tha:t the .. Virtuous 
·man is he who is motivated by his 'beneficent• ,rather than by his 'self-
ish • , instinCts. IJ:'he clistinction between the good man and the evil man 
l:s not . that the good man obeys bis •reason • while the evil man succumbs 
to his desires; it is a distinction between the kind of desires ~t 
. motivate ~ two kinds of li:fe. It is not a distinction between thinking 
__ and feeling, but between dii'ferent kinds of feeling •. ~t it is More's 
View that the good life follows from a 'higher kind of desire • rather than 
from ratioual.calculation .is clear from the follOllingl intellectual love 
'•' ,• ,I • . . ' . • • •' 
"!:· 
"is the peace and trBDquillity o£ ~ mind~ ns:1 a s~te of' such serenity, 
as bath 110 other motions than those of benignity and beneficence.... And 
therefore we may iilclude· this lave, to be the most angelic thiDg of all· 
others; f;ar ,excelliug even in~llection. itselfn. 2 
More's .theory is made clearer fl,-om a consideration of the following 
. . . . . 
passa&e in wtlich )le states that ~ does not consist in the desires 
. . 
o:r passions obeying the 'intellect•, but :rath~r in the conflicting passions 
bei.ng brOlJ8h,t into bar1noJW with each other. "If we can but skill our pass-
ions a:risht, they ere as lamps ()r beacons,. to conduct and excite us to ou:r 
journey's end. For thOU&b :reason ma..v cry aloud;. yet ve walk without legs, 
and. fly without wings, if .we are not quickened by their instigatio:ns ••• 
Virtue had its original from the .passions, and did associate with them, 
and was preserved by them. For the. prinCiple part of Virtue is placed in 
·their due C()1!1Dlixture"·' · · · . . . 
· SeVerSl points arise out of this pe.ssqe. In the first place, More realises 
as Cudworth realised, and as Whichcote failed to :realise, tbat reason 
conceived as independent of. desire cannot give rise to actioli. Action 
arises trom motives which originate in our emotioDallife; without emot-
ion there can be no action. Thus Virtue does . not consist in the reason 
domina:ti.Dg the emotions aJJd demanding obedience to its dictates; it consists 
1. AcCount of Virtue, pp.l97-8. 
2. ibid., pp.l58-9. 
'· ibid.' p.~. 
-.., 
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the 'due commixture' of the passions. And this, he apparently thinks, is 
a condition achieved by *intellectual lave*. The sans view is expressed 
in one of his poems thus: "The good is uniform, the evil infinite". 1 The 
good life is integrated and harmonious; the evil life is diverse and full 
of conflict between various passions.. 
More's doctrine of 'intellectual love' is identical with his 'inward 
sense of the boniform,faculty° which 'takes in* the !relish and delectat- 
ion* of what is good. He defines it as an "inward life and se , that 
moves in the boniform faculty of the soul (and which) relisheth what is 
simply the best".? 
Move's thought is, of course, based upon a faculty psychology; he does 
• not develop a 'new psychology' as does Cudworth. But his psychology is 
not the crude 'reason, will and desire' of rationalists like Whichcote 
and Clarke. One of the faculties is what he calls *the Waif= faculty' 
which he refers to as "the most divine thine: within us, but has nothing  
in it that savours of fanaticism". 3 
It is never made clear what he considers to be the nature_of this faculty, 
but he does make it clear that its function is to 'love intellectually'. 
In other words, just as the function of the 'mamma' in the crude faculty 
theory is to argue or judge, and the function of the 'will' is to give 
rise to action, the function of More's *taniform faculty' is to lave 
intellectually,that is, to love impartially and without bias towards 
self-interest. In short, what More is maintaining is that just as there 
are selfish desires in the soul, so there are disinterested desires. The 
selfish desires are what he calls the 'passions', which he describes as 
being incapable of "deliberation and choice". 4 These are passions "of the 
body'. The beneficent desires are functions of the 'boniform faculty', 
and their highest expression is 'intellectual love'. Intellectual love is 
not "lave from the body; but either from the soul itself or from God above, 
who calls and quickens the soul to such a divine effort... Though this perception may, if they please, be termed a sort of passion, yet it will 
derogate no more from the dignity and excellency of it, than from intell-
ection itself".5 
Life is a conflict, More holds, between selfish desire and disinterested 
love. The virtuous mantis he whose life is motivated by intellectual love. 
1.Mbre's Poems (Bullough edition). p.40. 2.Account of Virtue, p.156. 	4. Account of Virtue, p.79. 
3. ibid., p.I7. 	5, ibid., p.158. 
More, like Cudworth, realised that behaviour =lam not from intell-
ection but from desires and inclinations. It is emotionally determined. 
Pure intellection * that is intellectual activity independent of emotion, 
can never be a motive for behaviour. Thus he argues that good condUct 
arises no less from a passion than does the 'animal' life. The good life 
consists in being ."drawn into one and the same mind with God. This is a 
passion that can only make man divine; for such the man is, as his affect-ions and inclinations make him. It is not here enough to have simple int-
ellection. no, it rather calls and summons the bonifors faculty, which is replenished with that divine sense and relish, which affords the highvst pleasure, the chiefest beauty and the utmost perfection of the soul".' 
The good life is mot the life of obedience to either God or the 'reason'; 
it is the life motivated by the 'divine' rather than the 'animal' passions 
of the soul. 
Now it i8 quite clear, both from this last reference and from what 
we have seen of More's doctrine of the 'boniform faculty' and 'inward 
sense', that his position with regard to the nature of the good life and 
the motives which give rise to it, is, in general„Imuullel to Cudworth's. 
He maintains that the good life is not the obedient life but the spontaneous 
life of love, and that it arises from emotional perception of the good. 
Virtue, in More's view, is 'intellectual love', which we have seen to be 
a beneficent desire, as opposed to the selfishness of the *bodily passions'. 
Moreover, he argues that good can be known only by being good; it cannot 
be known intellectually. This view he justifies from his own experience. 
And, fUrther* such a view is consistent with his doctrine that °intellect-
uarlove is the good. For, if the good is the activity of loving it can 
be known only by being good, that is, by loving intellectual/. On this 
view, knowing good, being good and loving good are identical. However * 
as we have seen, More tends to argue that moral distinctions can be judged 
by 'right reason', which frequently appears to be identical with Whichcote's 
'reason of the mind'. He says, for exampae, as we have seen, that the 
function of 'right reason' is to judge "the nature, essence and truth' of
goodness, while the !boniform faculty' is to 'take in' then:relish and 
delectation thereof". 2 And this seems to suggest, that the reason judges 
moral distinctions but cannot give rise to action, Alio the 'boniform 
faculty', seeing what the reason judges to be good, is attracted to it and 
1.Account of Virtue, p.106. 
2. ibid., p.28* , 
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thus gives rise to good conduct. In otber words. the 'bonif"om :faculty' 
would appear to serve the same -parpose ss the- will in the Wbi.chcote-Clarke 
rationalist theory. 'lbis seems to be supported -~ More's definition of · 
'intellectual love' as "that part of the will which moves towards. that 
which we judge to be absolutely the best, when. ss it vere with unquench-
able -thirSt and affectiOn it is hurried on towards so pleasing an object; 
and being in possession of it,_ is swallowed. up in satisfaction that can--
not be exjlressed".l 
The sucgestion here is that the judgement of what is· good is independent 
ot willing to pursue it, and that 'intellectual love' is that which is 
attrac~ by what is judged (by the reason?) to be good. Thus, if the 
-~nd is divided into three faculties, reason, will and desire, the 'will' 
b&ing a combination of rational and emotional. elements• More• s • intellect-
ual love•· would seem to eomprise the •rational' element of the will. In 
so tar as this is More's position- and as we bave seen. he does tend to 
adopt, on occasions. such a ~tionalistic view - he falls into the same 
fall.s.ey as Whichcote. that of allotti»B the activi'ties- of jndg:i ng and will-
ing to separate faculties which are so ditferent. in nature as to be incap-
able of influencing each -other. 
leverth&iess, we have seen •t there is no more than a tendency to-
wards the 'traclltional rationalist theo:ey in •Rore•s etbical thought •. And 
not only is this rationalist tendency unsatisfactory in itself, but it is 
also inconsistent with the more general position adopted by More. B1s 
general view is that the knowledge that is relevant to morality is a funct-
ion of the 'bonitOl'lli faculty' and 'intellectual love' rather than the rea-
son. For example, be deScribes the boniform: faculty as "a :faculty of that 
divine composition, and supernatural tEmture, ss eDables us to distinguish 
nOt -Only._ what .. is. ~~-and absolutely the best,, but to relish it and to 
have pleasure in ~t ~one".~ 
The knowledge, or rather the motive, that gives <rise to the good life, in 
More's view, is intellectual love,- which, ss we m-v:e seen, is a bem:fi~nt, .. 
as op~ to a selfish,. desire. The good life does not eoDSist in the 
desireS obeYing the reason or the intellect; it consists in the 'lower' 
desires giviDg place to the 'higher' ones. Tb,e· distinction between higher 
and lower is between beneficent and selfish desires. fhus in the good man 
1. Account of Virtue, p. 7. 
2. ibid •. , p.6. 
~ 
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"the inferior part of the soul snbmits, and is overawed by the superior; 
and ... the whole man is as it were in the fieruchariotaf his affections, 
Elias-like, carried up towards God and heaven". 1 
In More's view, as in Cudworth's* the good man is be who is directed by 
his 'superior', or beneficent, affections as opposed to his 'inferior', 
or self-regarding, affections. The good life does not consist in the 
desires submitting to the reason, but in the selfish desires giving place 
to the beneficent ones; and its highest expression is 'intellectual love'. 
Now theories which maintain that behaviour is emotionally determined 
and that moral distinctions are emotionally apprehended, are bound to be 
at variance with the traditional doctrines of "sin' and "free-will'. 
Cudworth, as we have seen, maintains that sin is not a failure to do what 
is known to be good, or arefUsal of the will to obey the dictates of the 
reason, but rather a 'privation'; that is, a failure to know what is good. 
For if it is a fact that we always behave in ways that seem to us to be 
most desirable, or most valuable, it is nonsense to say that we may know 
good as good, or rather love good as good, and yet refuse it. 'Sin' is 
due not to a wilful choice of evil, knowing it to be evil, but to a choice_- 
of evil believing it to be good. This, broadly, is the position adopted 
by Cudworth, and if More were consistent with his view that knowing good 
and being good are the same thing, it would also be his view. However, 
the conflict in More's mind between the rationalism of Whichcote and thete0 
psychology of Cudworth is -evident from the uncertainty which he displays 
in connection with the doctrine of 'sin'. 
He begins this part of his discussion with an argument which amounts 
to saying that the same man cannot. be both good and evil at the same time. 
"An, honest man -has -power indeed, by his wit and bodily force, treacherous, 
ly to destroy an innocent man and even one that has deserved of him. But 
can that honest man do this thing? No, God forbid! ... I grant (indeea) 
that if he would1 be were able to commit so wicked a thing; but that he is 
able to will it„, or-bring:his will unto it, is what I utterly deny".2 
As he expressed the same idea elsewhere: "He who is truly good, is always 
good0.3 It is not lack of 'power' to do evil that keeps the good man ' 
from doing evil, but rather lack of 	In other words, any man is 
capable of committing evil, but the good man is characterised by the 
absence of a 'will to evil'. This view is closely associated with the 
1. Account of Virtue, p.40. - 
2. ibid., pp.1764. - 	3. ibid., p.233. 
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view expressed by all the Cambridge Platonists that there is no virtue in 
. . . ' . . .. , ... ·, 
the kiDd of freedom that enables the' good J1!81l. ~ choose to do evil. · Both 
. . . . . ~ 
WhichcO;te· and Cudvortb, as we have seen. maintain that God. is necessarily 
. . . . . . . 
good aDd in 11.0 sense is bee to do ~1. This same idea is expressed· by 
. • • • r ' ' ~ : • • • ' • • • 
More wileD he argues that it is false _to maintain that •it is a derogation 
. ' . . •' . ' . . . . ;' . . . .. 
f1'QJD. human na:tuJ-e, t~ make man necessarily good" since "tt4s. would mean ~t 
God ''who is gooc1, shOUld be the less adorable, ~use he oarm,o~ be naugbt11•1 
'l'hus he contends that. the good. man has DO 'free-will • to choose evil know-
ingly. With this even Whichcqte would be in agreement, for he holds, as 
. . ': . . '. . . . .· . 
we have seen, that the good man denies his •tree-will' and sul;mdts to what 
. . . ' . :• . . .. 
his reason dictates to be good. ~t Whichcote also argues that one lll8N' 
~ • • • J • • 
know the good and refuse it; that~.-~~ do _evil kno~. And More 
tends towards the ~ view. .Referri.Dg to the SoQratic d~trine that -
-~ -~- is ~11blgly wicked~ lm!. "Do man ~ trickect, ~t ~ igno~"2, 
. . . ·. . . . .. ' ' . . 
he _rightly. interprets .. it .to .. mean .. that,_.,th .. ··ll·of· ........ · ted +lo.-4 ... ~ but 
. . · ,. . , e n . ......... wan nouu--s, 
the ·k:Dawledge ot· wbat vas good 8Jld virtuous, to force him to embra~e it. 
~; the.t.·the wlli -W&s so tramed. aa·mt to be able to. resiSt ~:t ·gooi!, 
which '-it- did but. once understandu•' · 
-
Yet he indicates that he -is daubttul:whether the Will is so ·constituted 
as to put'Bll$ what it Jmows to be goocL.- A!ld he does argue that it is poss-
. ible to -be "will.1Dgly viclc9d".3 Bowever,.he seems to be-rather uncertS:in 
aDd sceptiCal on this whole problem. .. Be argues,: for instance: 11lDBsmu.ch 
as we find that idea of· the chief end,. which is termed beauti tude or happ-
iness, to be but confusedly aprehellded by us; it is eveJ!T man's duty with 
principal care to find out,· in what this· chief' happiness doth consist_, 
and how we me_y attain· it: yet whether all this- be placed within every man's 
reach, is a .. very .hard .thing ~o-determine"~4 · 
'!'his confUsion is characteristic .of More's thought. Like C.udworth, 
. .. . . . . . . . . 
he maintains that knowing good 1s an -emotional,. ~- not an intellectual, 
·activity, and that for the good~~ good mid ·being good are ident-
ical. But, unlike ~orth, he has no adequate theory of the 'cause of evil. 
He can only be consistent vith his view .that behaviour is emotionally det-
e:aliined and that moral distinctions are emotionally apprehended, if he 
maintains, like _Cudvorth, that one does necessarily what one judges to be 
. good and that the goodness or other-wise of orie•s· behaviour is dependent 
upon the validity ar otherWise of one's judgements. But the rationalistic 
1. Account of Virtue, p.l73. 3. Account of Virtue, p.184. 
2. ibid~' p.l84.. 4. _i~id~;j· p_.lB4. . 
~ 
~ 
element in More's thought causes him to regard 'judging' and 'willing' as 
separate activities, and therefore to maintain the possibility of judging, 
for example, that A is good and yet willing to do B. His scepticism 
asserts itself in the view that the majority of mankind is unable to know 
what is the "ultimate good, and what the most excellent object of human lifea. 1 
And this Units towards the view that evil is due to ignorance; that is, 
that virtue consists in knowing what is good and that evil is due not to 
a wilful choice of evil knowing it to be evil but to a failure to know the 
good. In short, it: almost parallel with Cudworth's view that 'sin' is 
a 'privation'. But, as we have seen, More also tends to maintain that it 
is possible to be 'willingly wicked'. In every aspect of his thought there 
is a confusion of the naive rationalism of Whichcote with the highly sig-
nificant thought of Cudworth. 
The same confusion is evident in More's theory of freedom. He says: 
"There is some difference between having free-will, and being a voluntary 
agent". 2 But then he becomes rather confused, and argues that free-will 
is "more restrained and particular, and obtains in fewer cases" than spont-
aneity which is "more large and general". 3 And, finally he defines free- 
will., with Aristotle, as "a deliberate wishing or appetition of those things, 
which are within our power". 4 But he also wants to WV that it is good 
to exercise one's free-will to choose the good, and that it is evil to 
use it to choose evil. The "power of not acting, when it regards those 
things which are base and dishonest, is a great perfection; but when it has respect to things that are noble and honest, it is a great imperfect-
ion.... To know we are able, and possessed with a power to abstain from a vile thing (though possibly we do not abstain) this is a sort of perfect-
ive state, and of high consequence for man to discover in himself whether 
he have it or not".5 
Again, he maintains that free-will is the "power of abstaining from ill".6 
We have considered in the two previous chapters the issues that are raised 
here. And there is nothing in Mors's theory of freedom, or free-will, 
which is not considered More satisfactorily by Cudworth. It is necessary 
to refer to Morels theory of freedom only to indicate further the general 
confusion that persists throughout his thought. 
It is difficult to make apy general :assessment of More's theory of 
1.. Account of Virtue, p.185. 	3. Account of Virtue, p.177. 
2. ibid.,- p.177. 	 *4. ibid., p.178. 
5. ibid.." p. 179- 
	6. ibid. , p.180. 
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the nature and function. ot' knowledge in morality~ for,: as we have seen, no 
coherent theory emer~s' ~hi~ w~rk. Be apPears to have b~n gl:eatJ.y 
influenCed~~ -~tionau8m Ot. tnnchCo~.aiui a1so·b,Y· the •new psychology' 
.• :~ Cuciworth,. ~t· he does not ap:P.ear· to' b&ve reali~ h~ incompatible these 
. ~~- theories,~-. · · ~ the ~ne himd, li.JCe wMchcote, be. argues that the . 
~1~. that .is rel~~t to ~riui,ty ia 'ri&bt reason•, which, in aame 
. of' what he has to sq at least, appeSrs as a faculty like lbichc<,te's 
. 'reason of' the_ mind' • Which .is capa)Jle ()f making mo~ jUdgeznents. This 
. . . . -. 
asP8Ct • of his thought is apparent ·also in· his . theories cf' the cause of evil 
.. and the'~~ of' ~om. ;For i£ the_. knowledge that is rel~~ .to mor-
&li ty is a. fwiction of 'the 'reason:•. there must be a distinction between 
: . . . ·. ' .. · . 
judging and Willing. Even if' the •reason' can· apprehend moral distinctions 
. it: Cannot give :rise tO action, as .More realises ·full well• Action can Srise 
onJ.Y from emc>tiotlal perception of' desirable ·eDds and not. from rational 
judgement. Thus :i.f ftasori· judges, there must. be another faCultY which can 
81V8 ril[l& tO ·ao~ion; and with this arises the possibility· of· a confiict 
.between :jUdging and- wilUDg; and henCe the possibility cf' being . 1willingly 
· ··ricked •. · ·In ·this &Spect . of his thought• More is merely repeating what 
had. been Said by Whichcote; and he :lliti.V 'be diacredited on the same • grounds. 
H~r, ·there is the other side of ·More. He tendS to f:ll81ntain, like 
Cudworth, that moral distinctions are emotionally di.scerned . and that the 
knowledge of goodness is identic8l With being good. He ·argues that the 
good is 'iriteilectoal ·love',. which is not merely a motive but an activity. 
nif it· had not 'the fo:ree to puNue-, i't would not be virtue, but only a 
·disposition towards._it ... 1 And·ir 'intellectual love•, or the activity of 
loVing;. is the gc)oo., then it ·cannot be known except by being-virtuous; that 
is,. by 'loving intellectually'• · This is· consi.stent·witb More•s· account of 
· his own experience that the -highest good· can be kDown oilly by 'purging the · 
DiiDd of vi.~' fJJ1d iiot by intellectual means•' If the good is a certain ld.lld 
of' B.ctivitj', 8nd not an em or a pattem of -behaviour whiCh mq be express-
ed ·:ProPositi.~i:ty,. then it can only be knoWn by engaglrig in that- activity. 
MOreover, this is consistent with More's view ~t . ·the goOd llie does not 
cOnSist in o~- God, or reason. or laws, but rather in spontaneously 
liviDg, what he describes as, 'the divine life•. Further, such a view 
1. Account of Virtue, p.l3. 
~ 
~ 
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involves, as Cudworth discovered, a vastly different theory of freedom 
from the traditional one. For if the good is an activity, the activity 
of loving, and not an end, there can be no sense in which one may be said 
to choose the good in preference to evil. One cannot choose to love as one 
can choose, for example, to pursue a certain end in preference to another. 
In no sense can it be said that it is one's 'duty' to love, as some Christ-
ian thinkers tend to say that it is our 'duty' to love God and our neighbour. 
If love is the good, then the traditional doctrine of 'free-will', which 
maintains that one is free to choose the good or the evil, is totally 
inadequate as well as being inconsistent with the empirical facts. The 
only theory of freedom which is adequate, if love is the good, is that 
maintained by Cudworth; that is, that freedom and goodness are identical. 
Such a theory, however, is not developed by More, though it appears to be 
contained in his view that "those who, with sincere affections, do even 
pant and thirst after virtue, they on the sudden are caught up by that 
intellectual spirit, -which replenishes everything; they are animated and 
supported by it, and finally therewith joined in the strictest association 
of love ..."They.are semen rapt up, and inspired by some divinity; and they 
are easily and spontaneously led on to every good watn. 1 
If lave is the good, the only satisfactory theory of moral freedom is that 
which maintains that freedom or spontaneity are identical with the good. 
In More's ethical thought there is a confusion of ideas which he 
derived apparently from both Whichcote and Cudworth. There appears to be 
nothing, except his odd terminology, which is original. He, therefore, is 
of historical, rather than philosophical, interest. No consistent theory 
of the nature and function of knowledge in morality emerges; the most that 
can be said is that More presents an impossible compromise between the 
views of Whicheote and Cudworth, occasionally expressing ideas comparable 
with the most significant utterances of Cudworth, but often falling into 
the same rationalistic difficulties as Whichcote., 
1. Account of Virtue,. pp.197-8. 
-v - 
• 
SUM'S INTUITIONISM 
• 
90. 
Smith argues, like Cudworth, that all activity is motivated and directed 
towards the attainment of ends which are perceived to be desirable. In 
everyone, he maintains, there is "a restless appetite" which "craves for 
•SOM8 supreme and chief good, and will not be satisfied with anything less 
than infinity itself". 1 And it is this craving,_ he thinks, which is the 
•motive for all behaviour. All behaviour is a pursuit for some 'satisfying 
gwcil * "The whole work of this world is nothing but a perpetual contention 
,for true happiness, and men are scattered up and down the world, moving to 
and fro therein to seek it. Our souls ... feeling their own original, are 
perpetually travailing;with new designs and contrivances, whereby they may 
purchase the scope of their high ambitions. Happiness is that pearl of 
great price which all adventure for, though few find it. It is not gold 
and silver that the earthlings of this world seek after, but some satisfy-
ing good which they think is there treasured up... And thus, indeed, when 
men most of all fly from God, they still seek after him. Wicked men pursue, 
indeed, after a deity in their worldly lusts..:. fca•God is not a mere emp-
ty name or title, but that self-sufficient good which brings along with it 
that rest and peace which they so much seek after".2 
This is a remarkable piece of analysis of the empirical facts. All 
behaviour, Smith is arguing, whether morally good or bad, springs'from the 
same desire for satisfaction or happiness, and is directed towards its 
attainment. Those who seek God do so.because they believe that therein is 
to be found happiness; those who spend their energy' in the accumulation 
of wealth do so not because they desire wealth for its own sake, but be-
cause they perceive it as amens to the desired end - happiness; and 
those who indulge their .tworldly lusts do so because they feel that in 
that manner they Will find.the satisfaction they desire. God, in Smith's 
view,., is not a 'mere empty name or title' (that is, an' intellectual con-
cept), but rather 'the self-sufficient good' in the knowledge of whom true 
Satisfaction is to be found. Knowledge of G do, happiness, and satisfact-
ion for the 'restless appetite' are synoniomus; and therefore Smith argues 
that, since all behaviour is motivated by a desire for happiness, the end 
which is being pursued in all activity is God. Thus he says that 'wicked 
Mn pursue ... after a deity in their worldly lusts'. The difference bet- 
ween good and bad behaviour is not a difftrence of motive, but a difference 
in the perception of what constitutes the good. 
Now from what we have said, we should expect Smith to argue as Cudworth 
1. Smith's Discourses, p.138. (All references to this work are to the 2. ibid., p.140. 	• 	1859 edition). 
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does that 'sin' is due to ignorance rather than to amilful rejection of 
what is known to be good. And this is, in fact, what we find. In the 
passage which we have just considered he argues that all desire is far 
the good and that even the man who 'indulges his *worldly lusts' does so 
in 'the belief that be is doing good. Moreover, Smith argues elsewhere 
that 'Sin is nothing else but a degeneration from true goodness, conceived by a dark and cloudy understanding, and brought forth by a corrupt Will: it 
bath no consistency in itself, or foundation of its own to support itn.1 
In other words, 'sin' is, to use Cudworth's terminology, 'a privation'. 
It is the result of a *dark and cloudy understanding' failing to perceive 
what is really good. The reference to 'sin' as being 'brought forth by 
a corrupt will' is, however, on the face of it, suggestive of a, view rather 
like Whichcotess; that is, the view that *sin' is due to a failure of the 
will to do what the understanding judges to be good. But this is because 
Smith continually expresses himself in language that is appropriate only 
to a faculty peychology like that of Whichcote, and not because he wants 
to support Whichcote's theory of the cause of evil. The reference to a 
'corrupt will* is just as suggestive of a theory that 'sin' is due to a 
failure to know the good as is the reference to a 'dark and cloudy under- 
standing'. For it is Smith's contention that "God is not better defined 
to us by our understandings than by our wills and affections: he is not 
only the eternal reason, that almighty mind and wisdom which our under- standings converse with; but be is also that unstained beauty and supreme 
good to which our wills are perpetually aspiring: and wheresoever we find 
true beauty, love and goodness, we may say, here or there is God". 2 .  
Knowledge of God or the good is just as much a function of the will and 
affections as of the reason and understanding. Indeed, the suggestion 
seems to be that in so far as God is goodness, as distinct from wisdom 
or truth, he is to be known by 'our wills and affections'. A 'corrupt 
will', then is a will that fails to know God. 'Sin* is ignorance rather 
than disobedience. And as we shall see, this is the view that is contin-. 
ually presupposed throughout Smith's thought, though it is not always 
explicitly stated. 
It is clear, also, from what we have said, that 'good' and not *duty' 
must be the central ethical concept for Smith. For' if all desire is for 
1. Discourses, p.483. 
2. ibid., pp. 140-1. 
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the good, (that is, if the good is an object of 'desire), there can be MD 
meaning in saying that one ought to do what is known to be good or that 
it is one's duty to behave in a certain way. The terns 'ought' and 'duty' 
apply only in a theory of ethics which maintains that good behaviour, con- 
sists in doing what is dictated by the 'reason' or *moral laws'; they can-
not apply in a theory which holds that the good is that which everyone 
really desires, and which is sought in every kind of behaviour. Smith 
maintains that the good is what is desired so consistently that the terms 
'ought' and 'duty' probably do not occur more than once or twice in the 
whole of his Discourses. "The restless appetite within man", he contends, 
"(seeks) after some infinite and sovereign good without the enjoyment of 
which it could never be satisfied") 
Now Smith realises that the soul is normally a mass of conflicting 
desires, or rather that it is torn between various ends each of which seems 
to be desirable. Different ends satisfy the soul indifferent ways. But 
the good, he maintains, is that which is capable of satisfying the soul 
integratedly. Thus he argues that the fact that the soul is continually 
"divided against itself" is indicative to the inward sense and feeling, 
that there is some higher good than ourselves; something that is much more 
amiable and desirable, and therefore must be loved an&preferred before 
ourselves". 2 
This internal conflict is what be refers to as the 'restless appetite' 
which craves for some good that is sufficiently comprehensive to satisfy 
and integrate the soul. And he maintains that God only is the good which 
is capable of integrating_the,conflicting desires of the soul. 
"The union and conjunction of the soul with God, that primitive unity, is 
that which is the'centre of rest.... God only is such an almighty goodness 
as can attract all the powers in man's soul to itself, as being an object 
transcendently adequate to the largest capacities of any created being, 
and so unite himself, in the true enjoyment of one uniform and simple good.... 
Man's mind ... otherwise will be tossed up and down in perpetual uncertain-
ties, and became as many several things, as those poor particularities are 
which it meets with. A wicked man's life is so distracted by a multiplic-
ity of ends and objects, that it never is, nor can be, consistent with it-
self, nor continue in any composed, settled frame: it is the most intricate, 
irregular, and confused thing in the world, no one part of it agreeing with 
another, because the whole is not firmly knit together, by the power of 
some one last end running through all. Whereas the life of a good man is 
under the sweet command of one supreme goodness and last end. This alone 
is that living form and soul which .... making all that variety conspire 
1. Discourses, p. 423. 	2. Discourses, p.142. 
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into perfect unity It is not one and the same goodness that always 
actuates the faculties of a wicked man* but as many several images and 
pictures of goodness as a quick and working fancy can represent to him; 
which so dividehis affections that he is no one thing within himself, 
but tossed hither and thither by the most independent principles and 
imaginations that may be. But a good man bath singled out the supreme . 
goodness,which,by an omnipotent sweetness, draws all his affections 
after it, and so makes them all, with the greatest complacency, conspire 
together in the pursuit and embraces of ita,1 
This view that the good life is the coherent and satisfying life, is 
as we have seen, expressed by both Cudworth and More. And in Smith's 
view, Such a life consists in 'union and conjunction of the soul with 
God',, whom he defines as "infinite and unchangeable goodness" and the 
"highest and supreme good". 2 The good, then, in Smith's view, is' not a 
certain end which it is our duty to pursue, or a certain external . pattern 
to which we ought to conform,. but that which is capable of giving unity and 
coherence to our lives. It is that, he maintains, which everyone, whether . 
consciously or unconsciously, most desires. 
It is clear, of course,. that Smith is not stating a utilitarian 
theory like, those of Bentham and Mill.. Be does not say that •goodt - refers 
to anything that gives rise to pleasure - that is, anything that gives rise 
to . a greater 'quantity' of pleasure and pain without discrimination between 
different kinds of pleasure - and he is therefore not committed to the view 
that 'pushpin is as good. as poetry°,. It is true that Smith argues that the 
good gives rise to satisfaction; but t for him, it is the 'nature', and not 
the -Nuantity', of satisfaction that is of importance.. The good gives rise 
to the satisfaction . that results from an integration of the conflicting 
desires of the soul. Satisfaction is, as it were, a-by-product.of the integ-
rated and coherent life. Smith's theory is utilitarian only in the sense 
that, it would appear, any theory must be utilitarian, namely, that the good 
life is, in some sense at least, of value, or satisfying, for us. 
Smith's theory of the nature of the good life is based upon, as we have 
seen, a psychology . which maintains that all action stems from a desire to 
-satisfy the *restless appetite' - a desire for some 'satisfying good', 
The good is that which is capable of so integrating the conflicts of the 
1. Discourses, pp.421-3. 
2. ibid., p.464. 
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soul as to satisfy the 'restless appetite'. And it is a failure to dis-
cover the good that is the cause of 'sin'; there is no 'will to evil'. 
The assumption throughout his thought is, of course, that there is such 
a good as is capable of integrating the desires of the soul and :that this 
good is found by !union and conjunction of the soul with God'. 
Bow, in Smith's view, are moral distinctions cognized? In the first 
place it is necessary to note that he argues that morality is not external 
but internal; that is, morality is not a system of laws or commands which 
ought to be obeyed. Hence the criterion of good conduct is not an exter-
nal one; we do not judge what is morally good by deciding whether or not 
a certain kind of behaviour is law-abiding or obedient to a commend or by 
intellectually judging that it is 'fitting' or 'proportionate'. The crit-
erion of goodness is internal satisfaction. In other words, Smith's crit-
erion is like Cudworth's 'vital touches, tastes and savours' and More's 
*inward sense'. Smith's view is as follows: "As we cannot understand 
anything of an intelligible nature, but by some primitive idea we have 
of God, whereby we are able to guess at the elevation of its being, and 
the-pitch of its perfection; so neither do our wills embrace anything 
without some Latent sense of him, whereby they can taste and discern 
how near anything comes to that self-sufficient good they seek after: 
and indeed without such an internal sensating faculty as this is, we 
shouldanever know when our souls are in conjunction with the deity, or 
be able to relish the ineffable sweetness of true happiness". 1 
The 'internal sensating faculty' is that which enables us to discern 
moral distinctions. The end towards which all activity is consciously or 
unconsciously directed is the 'self-sufficient good' which satisfies all 
the desires integratedly. And there is a 'latent some' of this good which 
enables us to 'taste and discern' the moral value of anything. To put this 
otherwise: if we did not have some latent knowledge of the good, we should 
never be able to know, whether or not we have found the good. It is the 
latent knowledge we have of the good which makes it possible for us to 
judge between good and bad. Unless we in some sense know the good, it is 
impossible for us ever to distinguish between ends which are morally good 
and those which are morally bad. OW, if the term good does not properly 
apply to ends but to a certain kind of life or activity, then the Latent 
knowledge we have of the good enables us to know when we have discovered 
1. Discourses, p.141. 
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the good life or the good activity. 
Now this would seem to imply that in Smith's view a failure to live 
the good life is due, not, to a failure to know the good, but to a. milful 
•rejection of the good. This, however, is not so. Smith does not argue 
•that we all know the good such that a failure to Live the good life in-
volves a rejection of our knowledge of the good. He simply argues that 
•we must have the ability to recognise goodness when we find it, in order 
that moral distinctions can have any meaning for us. It is the ability to 
recognise goodne 	and not the knowledge Of what the good is, that is lat- 
ent. The same must be true in the case of truth'. If we did not have the 
ability to recognise truth and to distinguish it from untruth, we should 
never be' able to decide whether or not a particular Imposition was true. 
Ent this does not mean that weall have an innate knowledge of the' truth; 
it Means merely that it, is necessary to have criterion of truth before 
we can recognise any proposition as true or false. Thus Smith says: 
"If the, soul bath no• such stock of prinoiples to trade with, nor any proper 
notions of its ara that might be atcpirvrovof all opinions, it would be so indifferent to any, that the foulest error might be as easily , entertained 
by it as the fairest truth; neither could it ever know what 'guest it rec-
eives, whether truth, or falshoodn.1 
And it is for this reason that Smith argues, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, that knowledge is latent in the soul and' that learning is a process 
of 'bringing it out'. But he does not maintain that the knowledge of the 
truth or the good exists 'ready-made' in the Soul; it is the criterion of 
truth and goodness which is 'innate', and which enables us to recognise 
truth and goodness and distinguish them from their. opposites. 
As we have seen, Smith's view is that moral distinctions are emot-
ionally discerned, or at least that they are discerned by the 'internal 
sensating faculty', and not by intellectual apprehension. No maintains 
that the good, or, as he calls it, 'divinity', cannot be expressed in terms 
•of laws or sets of propositions which may be learned as one might learn the 
multiplicatiomktataxe. The ethical term 'good' applies to a certain kind 
of life which can ber known only by experience. "Were I to define divinity, 
I should rather call it a divine life, than a divine science; it being 
something rather to be understood by a spiritual sensation than by any 
verbal description.... Everything is best known by that -which bears a just 
1. Discourses, 
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resemblance and analogy with it... The true method of knowing ... is not 
so much by notions as actions.... The knowledge of divinity that appears 
in systems and models is but a Poer wan light, but the powerful energy of 
divine knowledge displays itself in purified Souls... Divine goodness is 
... not for speculation but sensation..01 
Moral distinctions are distinctions between different kinds of life, or 
as Cudworth would put it, between different 'theories of life', and not 
between different ends. The distinction, then, cannot be intellectually 
apprehended; moral distinctions can be apprehended by the intellect only 
if they are like mathematical distinctions, or such that they may be exp-
ressed in laws. The good, in Smith's view, is a certain kind of life - 
the kind of life which is satisfying to the 'restless appetite' or to 
the 'internal sensating faculty'; and therefore the distinction between 
the good and the evil life can be known only by 'spiritual sensation'; 
that is to say, by emotional apprehension. It is only if morality is 
conceived as an external pattern which ought to be obeyed that it is 
• possible to argue that moral distinctions may be intellectually apprehend-
ed. But Smith maintains that morality is internal in the sense that the 
good life is a certain kind of life that one lives spontaneously and not 
a certain pattern to which one ought to conform; and he is therefore 
consistent in maintaining that the good can be known only by living the 
good life. He does not, of course, hold that moral distinctions are 
subjective; that is, that they are constituted by their relation to our 
desires. The distinction between the good and the evil life is eternal 
and immutable. But what he does maintain is that our judgements of moral 
good and evil are dependent upon our manner of life. It is only by liv-
ing the good life that one can know the good as good, and failure to live 
the good life is the result of judging a certain kind of life to be good 
when it is in fact something less than the good. This is the same as 
Cudworth's view that our judgements of good and evil are dependent upon 
our 'vital disposition'. Thus Smith says: "Such EWI men are themselves, 
such will Cod himself seem to be".2 What all men are seeking, he contends, 
is to know Cod, and the degree of goodness of the life one leads is dep-
endent upon the judgements onemakesof what constitutes God or the good. 
Likewise, the kind of life one lives determines the judgements one makes 
1. Campagnac: The Cambridge Platonists, pp.80-1. 
2. ibid., p.83. 
concerning God or the good. One's life both determines and is determined 
by the judgements one makes about moral distinctions. 
This interpretation of Smith is supported by numerous references in 
his Discourses and in passages published in Campagnac's 'The Cambridge 
Platonists'. He argues that the knowledge that gives rise to the good 
life is neitherlintellectual apprehension of moral distinctions nor the 
leerning of precepts"To seek our divinity merely in books and writings, 
is to seek the living among the dead; we do but in vain seek Cod many 
times in these, where his truth too often is not so much enshrined as entombed: No ... seek for Cod within thine own souls he is best discerned, as Plotinus phraseth it, by an intellectual touch of him we must 'see with our eyes, and hear with our ears, and our hands must handle the word of life.... And therefore David, when he would teach us how to know what the divine goodness is, calls not for speculation but sensation, Taste and see bow good the Lord is. That is not the best and truest know-
ledge of Cod which is wrought out by the labour and sweat of the brain, but that which is kindles within us by an heavenly warmth in our hearts". 1 
The good can be known neither by speculation nor by the learning of precepts. 
•It can be known only 'by an *intellectual touch'. As in the case of More, 
•it must not be assumed that *intellectual' in this context means an act-
ivity of thought as opposed to feeling; the term is used by the Cambridge 
Flatonists to avoid, as More puts it, 'all other imputations'. Indeed, 
much of the work of the Cambridge Platonists would be quite unintelligible 
if 'intellectual' were taken to mean *thinking' or an 'activity of the 
intellect'. Goodness, in Smith's view, than, is apprehended emotionally 
or sensorily; it is known by 'touch' or °sensation'. 
All activity, Smith contends, is the result of 0 	more potent 
nature which bath planted a restless motion within us that might more forcibly carry us out to itself; and, therefore it vill never suffer it-self to be controlled by any of our thin speculations, or satisfied with those airy delights that our fancies may offer to it: it doth not, it can-not, rest itself any where- but upon the centre of some Almighty good, 
some solid and substantial happines0. 2 
In other words, not only does activity originate in the emotions and stem 
from a desire for 'some satisfying good', but it cannot be influenced 
by speculation. Nor can it be satisfied by the objects of speculation. 
That is to say, the good which alone is able to give unity and integration 
to the diversity of our lives, cannot be expressed as a. set of propositions. 
1.Campagnac: The Cambridge Platonists, 
2. Discourses, p.140. 
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· .All behaViour, smith realiseS• must arise from a mo~ve. and he argues 
that at bottOm· all motives are the same ~ the desire for sOme 'satisfying 
;, sood'· -lhuS it:ve·ktJev th6· good, we should behave well; there is no 
meimhig ·:bi·sqing that we ma.v knoW the good and reject it, for gOod is· 
.. , defi,ned as that which is :desired. !.he man who seeks to accwmilate a 
vast fortune does so in the· belief that in such a ma1Dl8r he will :find 
the good wbi~ h8 deSires; no. one des;i~ a forturie for its ~sake. 
. .· . .· . 
There is a sense, however, in which the man who attains to a state of 
great material wealth,. Smith maintains,. ·realises· that he has not attained 
the good. For~. Smith argues, there is an ''interDS:l ~nsating faculty' 
· . not 
in everyone which,. althoqh it. doeS/know what constitutes the good lif'e, . 
. is abl•. to recogDise the good vhen it. is discovered• · 4nd therefore, since 
·the lite· of material wealth is not the good· life. in Smith's view, the man 
· 1fho attains to such a life \lill. also realise that it is not the good lite, 
· that it 'is not the life whiCh is integrated and satisfying. He will feel 
- · :' ··a $8JlSe of remorse and. reali.S8 that there is SQJD8- bi qper · ~ more satisfy• 
,·e 
1 
• ing life than that·to··wbich he has attained.. And if he Jmew the good he 
would pursue it. How then is the good· life to be known?· Not by specula-
. tion or .by learning propositions,. laws. or precepts.. Speculation is not 
: ltselt th~ go{)d lit~, DOr is it ,able to diScover What the good lite is. 
The good life can be known only by direct experience of it ~ living it. 
~~al cUs:tinCt:i.~ns .are emotionaily ~· not intellectual~ ~apPrehended. 
~ . . . . ' . . . . . . . 
Now 1 t · is clear vb;v Smith should argue 1n this· manne~·. If goodness 
···is the obj~. ~f desire, ~t ~t be·~ intellectually; that is to "llY• 
. . ... ' . . . . . . . . . 
it cannot be .!mown by s~at_ion. For the int~llect can diseern only 
l~cal ~essi ty and tbi~. cannot ~ the object of desire. If the good 
·is an object of desire.; that is• if it is a cert;ain kind of life; the lite 
that is most 'desirable. then it canr~be ~ only .bf emotional apprehen-
. sion. The OnJ..y 'ti8Y' iil Which· we ·can know whether or not a certain kind of 
'lite iS desirable or satisfYing.is'·by discovering experimental.ly whether 
or not we find 1 t . satiSf'ying. · SpecUlation about certain· different kinds 
·of lif'e cazmot .tellrus 1fhether they· are ·satisf'yi.ng or not. Hence Smith 
maintains not only that the good lif'e cannot be lmown intellectually, but 
; 
: 
'·:j 
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that. it cannot be known by a 'moral sense"; it can may be known by the 
direct experience of living it. The good cannot be known intellectually 
for the intellect cannot distinguish between what is satisfying and what 
is not satisfying. Likewise, it cannot be known by 'moral sense', for if 
there were a moral sense that is capable of recognising 'good' in the same 
way as we recognise, for example, 'yellow', then, to put it is Cudworth's 
terminology, there would be a-distinction between 'judging' and 'willing'. 
Ind Smith would be involved intlarke's view that judging what is good and 
deciding to. do it are as distinct "as seeing the way and walking in 
Clearly, such a view cannot be maintained consistently with Smith's psy-
chology. If we necessarily do what we believe to be good, there can be 
no distinction between 'judging' and 	And since we do not always 
do what is in feet good, there cannot be an infallible faculty of moral 
judgement, whether such a faculty is conceived as 'reason' or 'moral sense'. 
Thus Smith, like Cudworth, argues that our moral judgements are part of 
our manner of life. Knowledge of the good cannot be disassociated from, 
and is possible only by, living the good life. 
Thus Smith, in an argument reminiscent of Whichcote in his non-ration- 
alistic moments, says: "As the eye cannot behold the sun, unless it be 
sunlike, and bath the form and resemblance of the sun drawn in it; so neith-
er can the soul of man behold God... unless it be God-like, bath God formed 
in it, and be made partaker of the divine nature.... Therefore our Saviour 
bath in his beatitudes connext purity of heart with the beatifical vision 0.2 
In other words, only the good man can know the good; only the pure in heart 
shall see God. It is worth noting, also, that in this passage Smith, like 
Cudworth, expresses the view that the good life is not the life of obed-
ience to God, but rather the life of 'participation' in God. She good life 
is the 'divine life', the life that is God-like; it is not the life of 
obedience. And it is only by being God-like that is, by living the good 
life, that it is possible to know the good. Living the good life and 
knowing.the good are the same thing. Smith also expresses this view as 
follows: "If we see things as they are, we shall live as we ought, and if 
we live as we ought, we shall see things as they are. This is not a vic-
ious circle, but the interplay of contemplation and action..., in which ' 
wisdom consists. Action is the ritual of contemplation, as - the dialectic 
- 1. Clarke's Collection of Papers etc., pp.413. (London, 1717). 
2. Campagnac: The Cambridge Platonists, p.80. 
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Is its creed.- The , conduct of life rests on an'act of faith which begins as an experiment and ends as an experience 0.1 
•The good can only be known by living the good life, and if the good is 
known the good life will be lived. The manner of our life both determines 
and is determined by our judgements of good and evil. It is only when 
what we judge to be good is in fact good that . it is possible for us to 
live the good life; and it is only by living the good life that it is 
possible for us to know good as good. 
There is another reason why Smith adopts a position such as this. 
He argues that reality is not static, but living; it is not just a mech- 
anical structure, but a living being. In fact, as in the case of Cudworth 
and More, there is a seed of Absolute Idealism in Smith's thought. God 
and reality appear to be identical in his view. Therefore he argues that, 
-since reality is living, it can only be known by living a certain kind of 
life and not by intellectual activity. If reality were mechanical, then it 
could be known intellectually;, but singe it is an organism it can be known 
only by' living the kind of life that is, as it were, in harmony with the 
• real. Hence Smith says: - "Divine truth is not to be discerned so much in a-man's brain, as in his heart. Divine wisdom is a tree of life to them 
•that find her, and it is only life that can feelingly converse with life. All the thin speculations and subtilest discourses of philosophy cannot 
• so well unfold or define any sensible object, or tell any one so well what 
it is, as his own baked sense will do. There is a divine and spiritual Sense which only is able to converse internally with the life and soul of 
•divine truth, as mixing and uniting itself with it". 2 
Reality and truth are living, and therefore can never be represented in 
systems of propositions. At the most e ppropositions can give us knowledge 
about reality; they cannot give us knowledge of reality. Reality can be 
known only by living the life that is in harmony with reality and which 
therefore expresses reality. As Smith puts it, 'it is only life that can 
feelingly converse with life'. 
It would be outside our appointed scope to consider in detail the 
ramifications of this view of reality. What is of importance for our 
purpose is Smith's view that only the good man can attain to the highest 
knowledge of reality; that is to say, that ethical purification must precede 
1. Quoted by Powicke: The'Cambridge Platordsts, pp.19-20. 
2. Discourses, p.300. 
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the 'beatific vision'. This is the same as the view expressed by More in 
his account of his own personal experience. , 'Intuitive knowledge of real-
ity, as distinct from knowledge about reality, is the kind of knowledge 
with which Smith is here concerned. He maintains that there are four 
different levels of knowledge appropriate to four different kinds of men. 
These four levels of knowledge he describes as follows: nThe first is . a naked perception of sensible impressions, without any work of reason. The second .... a miscellaneous kind of knowledge arising from a collation 
Of its sensations with its own more obscure and dark ideas. The third... 
discourse and reason, by which the Platonists describe mathematical knowl-
edge, which, because it spins out its own notions by a constant series of 
deductions is.... a progressive kind of knowledge.... Fourthly,. ,1. a naked intuition of eternal truth which is always the same, which never rises or sets, but always stands still in its vertical, and fills the 
whole horizon of the soul with a mild and gentle light. There are such 
calm and serene ideas of truth, as shine only in composed souls, and 
• cannot be discerned by aiy troubled or unstable fancy.... Such are the 
archetypal ideas of justice, wisdom, goodness, truth, eternity..... These 
we always know to be the same..., neither could we ever gather them from 
our observations of any material thing, where they'were never sown. n1 
The doctrines of 'innate' and 'archetypal' ideas contained in this passage 
need not concern us here; we shall consider Smith's epistemology more fully 
in the next chanter. The point to notice here is that Smith considers that 
neither scientific knowledge ('a collatiomofits sensations with its own 
more obscure and dark ideas') nor mathematical knowledge ('discourse and 
reason') are capable of giving us knowledge of reality. The knowledge of 
reality is knowledge of the 'eternal ideas', and this is possible only for 
the virtuous OMML 
Smith maintains that reality is a unity which is reflected in the 
unity of self-consciousness, and therefore he argues that my knowledge 
which divides reality into different compartments cannot be knowledge of 
the real. "As the more we reflect upon our own minds, we find all intell- 
igible things are more clear ... so, when we see all intelligible being 
concentring together in a greater oneness, and all kind of multiplicity 
running more and more into the strictest unity, till at last we find all 
variety and diviaion sucked up into a perfect simplicity, where all happily 
conspire together in the most undivided peace and friendship... For though 
in our contentious pursuits after science, we cast wisdom, power, eternity, 
goodness, and the like into several formalities, that so we may trace 
down science in a constant chain of deductions; yet, in our naked intuit-
-ions and visions of them, we clearly discern that goodness and wisdom lodge 
I. Discourses, pp.97-8. 
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• together, justice and mercy kiss each other: and all these, and whatso-
ever else, into which our distorted reason may sometimes break divine , and intelligible being, are fast knit up together in the invincible bonds of eternity.... The soul partaking of time in its broken and particular 
conceptions, and apprehensions, and of eternity in its comprehensive and 
stable contemplations.... The intuitive faculty corrects the scientifical, 
because, by a progressive kind of analysis, it divides the intelligible 
object, where itself knows and sees thinge together in their undivided 
essence: wherefore this only is immovable, and science, or scientifical 
reason, is inferior to it in the knowledge of true beingo.1 
This is very difficult language, but Smith's argument seems to be this: 
reality is a whole, and any attempt to abstract from it must destroy the 
unity of the real. Hence, knowledge of the real cannot be arrived at by 
abstraction., Any activity which involves abstraction from the unity of 
the real cannot give us knowledge of the real; at the most, it can give 
us knowledge about the real. Thus Smith argues that knowledge of the 
real is 'intuitive'. Since reality is a unity it can be known only through 
the unity of self-consciousness. The unity of self-consciousness reflects 
the unity of the real, and therefore knowledge of the real is possible only 
by a knowledge of oneself. If reality is organic, that is, if it is an 
origents whole as Smith like the later Idealists seems to think it is, 
then"knowledge'of the real involves knowledge of oneself as an organic 
whole. This is why Smith argues, as 4o all the Cambridge Pletonists, that 
knowledge is essentially self-knowledge. And if knowledge of the real 
involves knowledge of oneself as an organic whole, the highest knowledge 
is attainable only by those whose life is integrated.' In other words, 
it is only the good man, the man who has attained an integrated life in 
which the 'restless appetite' is satisfied, who is capable of the highest 
knowledge of the real; for it is only the good man, in Smith' s view, who 
is able to know himself as an integrated whole. 
The good life, in Smith's IAA% consists in a mystical union with the 
real or the 'divine',, and it is in such a life that the highest knowledge 
of the real is possible. Hence he describes the good man as the n 
metaphysical end contemplative man ... who running and shooting up above 
his ova logical and self-rational life, pierceth into the highest life: 
such a one who by universal love and holy affection abstracting himself 
from himself, endeavours the nearest union with the divine essence that 
1. Discourses, pp.99-101. 
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may be ... knitting his own centre, if he have any, unto the centre of the 
divine being. To such an one the Platonists are wont to attribute 	a 
true divine wisdom, powerfully displaying itself... in an intellectual life, 
as they phrase it. Such a knowledge they say is always pregnant with div-
ine virtue, which ariseth out of an happy union of souls with God, and is 
nothing else but a living imitation of a god-like perfection drawn out by 
a strong fervent love of it. This divine knowledge.... makes us amorous 
of divine beauty, beautiful and lovely; and this divine love and purity 
reciprocally exalts divine knowledgen. 1 
In other words, Smith is maintaining that both virtue and the highest know-
ledge consist in a 'union and conjunction of the soul with Cod'. To be 
virtuous is to know God, or rather to participate in the life of God, and 
this is the highest knowledge of reality. And this consists, Smith maint- 
ains, in the knowledge of oneself. "We may best learn from a reflection 
upon our own souls.... He which reflects upon himself, reflects upon his 
own original, and finds the clearest impression of some eternal nature and 
perfect being stamped upon his soul".2 
There are certain epistemological difficulties with this view, which we 
shall examine in the next chapter. But for our present purpose it is 
sufficient to notice that in Smith's view both virtue and the highest 
knowledge consist in a mystical union with the 'divine'. It is important 
to notice, too, that there is a tendency for Smith'to say that the good 
life is the life of 'cloistered virtue'; that is to say, the good life 
consists in a monk-like contemplation of God. This is suggested in his 
view that the good man is the 'true metaphysical and contemplative man'. 
It would also seem to follow from Smith's psychology. If all activity 
arises from a desire to satisfy the 'restless appetite' and the good life 
consists in arriving at a state of satisfaction by the contemplation of 
the 'satisfying good', then it would appear that the good life is the life 
of inactive bliss. For, if activity arises from the 'restless appetite', 
once the 'restless appetite' found rest in the contemplation of the good 
there would be no motive to give rise to further action. And this view 
is bound up with the Absolute Idealist tendency in Smith's thought. It 
should be noted also, however, that Smith does not maintain that God is 
a transcendent being capable of being known only by the completely unworldly 
man, for he contends that "wheresoever we find true beauty, love, and 
1.Campagnac: The Cambridge Platonis s, pp. 96-7. 
2. ibid., p.161. 
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goodness, we may say, here or there is Gor. I In other words, he maint-, 
sins that God is just as much immanent in the world as he is transcendent. 
Nevertheless, it remains true that Smith's view is that the good man is 
the *true metaphysical and contemplative man*. The Cambridge Platonists 
have often been accused of quietism, and although this is not altogether 
true of Cudworth and More, there is some validity in such a criticism of 
.Smith. However, it is understandable that a man who spent the whole of 
his adult life at Cambridge should maintain that the good life is the 
contemplative life. 
, Now whatever else is contained in Smith's view that the highest 
knowledge is attainable only by the virtuous man and that the highest 
knowledge consists not in speculation but rather in *participation*, at 
least one significant point arises out of it. And it is this: the intell-
ect is cabable neither of attaining the highest knowledge of reality nor 
of arriving at the knowledge that is relevant to morality. Intellectual 
activity cannot give us knowledge of the real world of experience because 
the intellect is concerned only with concepts and logical relations; it 
cannot be concerned with particulars, and everything that is real - that 
is, everything that exists in the world of experience - is something in 
particular. What the intellect does is to abstract from the real world 
of experience and formulate general laws or construct ideal logical 
objects. It is always concerned with things-in-general' and never with 
anything-in-particular. At the most it can formulate propositions about 
the real; it cannot have knowledge of it. Knowledge of the real world - 
the world of experience - arises from experience and not from a priori 
speculation. We may speculate about a dozen different possible worlds, 
but only experience can establish what does in fact exist. Moreover, if 
the real is *good*, as Smith maintains; that is to say, if knowledge of 
the real is satisfying and desirable, the intellect cannot know the real. 
That which is desirable or satisfying can only be emotionally discerned. 
Further, if our experience of the real world is part of our manner of life, 
the real can be known as good only by the good man. If the real is good, 
that is, if God is the good, and if our judgements of good and evil are 
1. Discourses, p.141. 
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dependent upon our manterof life, then it is only the good man who can 
knew thia -goo4 that in to s, it imonly -the good Man who can know: the 
real. Hence Smith argues; "Notkithstanding all our acute reasons and sUbtiledisputed, truth prevails no more in-the-world, (because) we so 
often disjoin truth and true geednest,whiCh in' themselves Can never be 
disunited; they,grow both from the same root, and live in one another. We nay, like :those inIllato's.deep pit with.their faces bendei downwards * converse with soUnde And shadows; but not with the life and substance Of truth, while_our souls remain.defiled.with any -vice or lusts.. Xt is but a thin, aiery knowledge that is got by mere speculation, which is ushered in by syllogisms and demonstrations; but that which springs forth from true 
goodness' 	brings such a divine light into the soul, as is more clear and convincing themsnydpmanstration. Those filthy mists that arise from 
-impure and terrene minds, like anatmosphere, perpetually encompass them, that they cannot see that sun of divine truth that shines about them, but never shines into ax unpurged souls; the darkness :comprehends it not * the 
•foolish man understandsit not. Allithe light and knowledge that may seem sometimes to rise up in Unhallowed minds, is but like those fuliginous fladei thatArise - up'from our culinary fires * that are soon quenched in their own amOke..... While we lodge any filthy viceinus this will be perpetually . twisting up itself into the thread of our finest-spun specul-
-itibilst•Itwill' be Continnally climbing up into 	hegemanical powers of the soul, into the bed of reasoni-and defileits like the wanton- ivie twisting itself About the oak* it will twine about our judgements and under,- Standings, till it bath suobadout the life and spirit of them.... There 
•ta - a benumaiiNg:spirit* a . congealing :vapour that ariseth from sin, and vice, that will stupify the senses of the soulo. 1 
Smith argues that speculation cannot give us knowledge of reality; it 
pan only apprehend necessary connections. TrUth is known only by exper-
ience; it is e function of the emotions* or rather of the whole personality, 
and not of the speculative intellect. However,Smith argues also that 
it is only the umukftee from vice who is able to make .sound intellectual 
judgements; even the intellect is impaired by vice. Now this, if it is 
true,: is highly significant; in particular , it is Of considerable ethical 
significance. All activity, we have seen, involves, ends which are perceived 
as desirable, and this perception is a. function Of our emotional life. As 
cudecroth puts it, the emotions 'employ' the intellect, to analyse all the 
factors in a situation, in order that we may 	how it is possible to 
gain.the ends we -desire. ,The intellect cannot detsimdnesthe way in which 
we behave; it can simply analyse the factors that are 'involved in any 
particular (=rise of action. But the way in which we behave is emotionally 
1. Campagnac t pp.82-3. 
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determined. The intellectual apprehension of the factors involved in ,a • 
particular situation will, of course,. influence the decisions we make; but 
theAntellect can determine neither the.lecisions,we make nor the .ways in 
Which we behave„ Every decision weaake:dependsultimately upon the way 
in which we evaluate our feelings about the various factors which the int-
ellect perceives. The more intelligent we are.the.more quickly and accur-
ately we will perceive the factors that are involved. But. the influence 
these factors have on_our behaviour, depends finally on our feelings about 
them. And if these feelings are sufficiently strong they may interfere 
with clarity and accuracy of our intellectual judgements; or at least, 
they may influence our ability to accept the. results of our intellectual 
examinationofthe'problem. People who have strong emotional attachments 
to.certainviews,are unable to argue impartially when such views :are in,. 
volved.1.-.Hence it follows, as, Smith argues,:thatvies may impair either ,  
our intellectualexaminationaf,thelactors involved ins Situation or 
our ability to accept.' the results. Of.eudh an examination.. Therefore, even 
if morality consists in.obeying:laws. or the dictates of the 'reason', there 
is 'stilla:sense in which evil_is,ignorance. For ifevil consists in 4 
-desire.for4 and .pursuit of, a certain kind of life which is' not good, then 
the emotional attachment the evil man has for such a life will impair 
either. his moral judgements or his' ability to accept the results or such 
judgements., And such non-acceptance of the results, of his moral.judge-
mentsisdusto an inability to accept them rather than to a wilful reject-
ion of them.. 
In Smith's view truth and goodness are inseparable; knowledge of both 
the truth 'and the good consists in'a knowledge of God. And such knowledge 
is not expressible in' propositions and cannot exist apart from the living 
of the good life. In other words, virtue, knowledge of the good, and 
knowledge of, the truth all consist in the 'union and conjunction of the 
soul with God.' It is because God is a living being that the truth cannot 
be expressed propositibnally. Thus 'Smith says: "They are not always the 
best men that blot most paper; truth is not, I fear, so voluminous, nor 
swells into such mighty bulk as our books dion.2 
1. Fbr a good discussion of this whole point see D. Stafford-Clark's work Psychiatry To-day (Penguin A 262), pp.72-3. 
2. Campagnac:The Cambridge Platonists, p.89. 
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To know the truth is to know:what-is most real, and to know what is 'most 
• :real is to kno* God. And 'since God is a:conscious being, our knowledge of 
him cannot be expressed in propositions.. We may express facts about God 
• in propositional form,. but-if:we are able to know Godas a conscious being 
• such knowledge cannot be completely expressed in propositions.. The artist 
cannot express his knowledge of the world in propositional form, but only 
in the form of art. Likewise, we are unable to completely express our know-
ledge of other persons as persons in propositions; the most that can be 
conveyed in propositions are facts about.other.persOns. If a person,A, 
could express' as a set of propositions all his knowledge of a second per-
son, B,: then it would follow that a third person, C, could know B' by, 
learning A's set of propositions about B. -But clearly this is not so; C 
can know .B only by meeting him, talking 'to him, engaging in various act-
ivities with him, and,in . generaI, by edommunioW with him. Bence Smith 
argues thatArrecannot. know Cod by learning propositions about him; we can 
know him only by a 'union and conjunction of the soul with him'. And this 
involves being God-like. "We must not think we have then attained to the 
right knowledge of truth, when we have broke through the outward shell of 
words and phrases that house it up; or when by logical analysis we have found out the dependencies and coherences of them one with another; or 
when, like stout champions of it, having well guarded it with the invincible 
strength of our demonstration, we dare stand out in the face of the world, 
and challenge the field of all those that would pretend to be our rivalsn. 1 
The truth can be known only by living the good life; that is to say, by 
living the God-like life. "There is an inward beauty, life and loveliness 
in divine truth, which cannot be known but only then, when it is digested 
into life and practice.... Without virtue and real goodness, God is but a name, a dry and empty notion...Divine truth is better understood, as 
it unfolds itself in the purity of men's lifts, than in -all those subtle 
niceties into which curious wits may ley it forth. And therefore our Sav-iour, who is the great master of it, would not,..., draw it up into any 
system of body, nor would his disciples after him; he would not lay it 
out to U.8 in any Canons or Articles of belief, not being indeed so careful to stock and enrich the world with opinions and notions, as with true piety, 
and a God-like pattern of purity, as the best way to thrive in all spirit-
ual understanding. His main scope was to promote an holy life, as the 
best and most compendious way to a right beliefv, 2 
It is only the good man who can attain to the highest knowledge. We do 
1. Campagnac p.85. 	2. Campagnac, pp.86-7. 
e 
e 
e 
108. 
not firSt learn a set· of moral precepts.· or use our· reason in·. its eapacity 
. . . 
as practical judgement· to· judge. which of a set· of poSsible --~ Of behaving 
is. the good one. and: then decide ·eeparatelj- whether. or _not· to do· wb8t iS 
. . . 
· seen to be &0:00·· For the . good ~t be expi'essed in precepts or jUdged . 
by. the reason. · It can. 'be lmown only by living ·the good life. . ·In othe1-:' · 
. . 
voi'ds.lmowledge is not ~or· to virtue as Vhi~oote thought.,· lnit virtUe : 
is prlo~·to knowledge.· :Moreover~· in Smi'th's vi~,: the ethic81 terms 'gOOd' 
and •Virtue• do not.·apply. properly to·~ ld.nds of acts whiCh ousbt 
. to be done or· to eertain ends which ought to be pursued. but rather to · 
a certain. kind ot life 'which 1s· worth living; that is to say,· morality 1s 
eonce.i-iled not· so much vith exte:rDal .behaviour' as with intemal life •. In· 
·other words•· morality is concerDed with the_ whole pereonallty. Thus we 
find Smith ar~ that "A superficial religion lli81V times intermeddles 
onl.Y vfth th&··circumference aDd outside of men: it lodges only in the 
suburbs, and stoma the outworks, but enters not the main fort of men's 
souls, which is strongly defended with i.mrard pride •••• and such other 
. mental vices... There· ma.v be JII8IV' who dare not pursue revenge, and yet are 
· not willing to forgive injuries; who dare not murder their enemy, and yet 
·cannot love him •••• 'fhey are not willi.ng that the divine prerogative should 
extend itself beyond the outward man. and that religion should be ~ 
busy with their imrard thoupts and passions ••••• and, not feeling the 
mighty power of any higher good,. they will endeav:our to p.resei'Ve an unhall-
owed autaesthesy and feeling sense of themselves; and, by sullen melancholy 
stoicism. when religion would -deprive and bereave them of the sinfUl glory 
and pleasures of this ·outward world, they then retire and shrink themselves 
up. into a centre of their own.... And erect a self-supremacy within, 
eXerting itself in self.;.ftll and particular loves, and so become eo-rivals 
with God for the crown of blessedness and selt-sufficieney. "1 
What a retort to the conformists! A religion or morality which 
concerns itself with only the external conduct of persons is superficial 
and false. It is neptive, being concerned with :what one ought not do 
rather ·than with what is worth doing. It states what must .not be done 
bat it cannot s.ay vhat one ought to do or What kind of life ODe finds . 
.. 
most satisfying and worthwhile. Moreover, Smith argues, such religion 
and morality breed self'-:rigbteousness. 'fhey maintain that the good lite 
consists in refra1ning from cerWn pleasures and this negative view gives 
rise to a feeling of sel.f'-,satisfaction in the vhol.ly negative man who ref-
rains from doing anythi.ng that is said to be 'wrong' or •siJifW.' , bUt wboh 
1. Discourses, pp.,.71-2. 
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at the .same:...~ does nothing that is good or :worthwhile •.. Bene$ Smi tb ·sa.vs 
-. · ~ ot our ·most refined moralists may' be,. in 'a worst sense • • • full with 
their o1im. pZegDaDCY; thei:r 8ouls may too JIUCh heave and swell with the 
sense of their· own virtue and knowledge:· ·there 1118¥ be an ill ferment of 
self.oolove·~ng··at·the bottom,_~which ID.EW pUff it up the more with pride,; 
ar.rogaJJce, aDd sett-conceit ••• And therefore if this knowledge be not . 
attended -with humility and a deep seDSe of self.;.;penury and self-emptiness, 
we ~ ea3i}.J' fall short of that true. knoWledge of God Which ve seem to .. 
aspire ·after;. Jfe.mq ••• -~ .too apt .. to rest in a mere logical llf'e ••• 
without ari:J true participation of' the divine·lif'en·•l, 
In Smith's view,., as in Cudworth's.- the highest lmowledge and the highest 
:virtue both consist in a 'participation of the divine life'.-. Like Cud-
worth, Smith replaces the e<mcept of 'obedience to God' lfitb the concept 
of • participation in God'. 
low from .what we have said 119 should expect $Di. th to argue against 
the legalists who hold that virtue CODS:ists in obedience to laws. And this 
is what we find. The- good life cannot be expressed in tems · of l&Ws and 
precepts. "For though these irmate notions of truth ma.v be but poo~, empty,. 
and h'IDlgl7 things of themselves,. before they be fed and filled w1 th the 
practice of· true virtue; yet they are not capable of being impregnated 
and exalted with the rules and precepts of itll.2 
Slllith argues, as we sball see in the -next chapter, that there are 'iDnlite 
notions' ili the soul and therefore tpat all la1owledge is essentially self-
laiowledge. But his is mt the crude doCtrine .of 'iunate ideas', for he 
argues that although· we have innate. notlODS in the soul ve csnnot know 
the truth without livinc the good life. ADd he mainta:i.Dsl also• that 
the 'imlate notions' cannot be ''impregnated' with virtue by the process 
.of learning rules and precepts. The good cannot be expressed. in tems of 
ruies and. :prece~. . Moreover. Smith contends that .,8 _ mere conformity . 
of the outward· man to· the law of God is not suffici.ent to bring a man to 
eternal life; but .. the. imrard man also must defi!ply receive the stamp and: 
impression of the divine law~r. so as to be made li.lfe· God"·' 
The good life does not co~ist in conformity to ex,:ternal imposed lair, 
even it that law is 'the law of God'; it consists in the 'imrard man' 
:•participati.Dg•· in the- 'diVine life' • -- ,~_ th mini ..._ f d •1. · 
.. -"- .a.a..- was e s ..... ., o ea:"",. · 
and in itself an external. and lif'eless thing• neither could it procure 
or beget that divine· lite •. and spiritual form of godllness, in the souls 
of men •••• Whereas, on 'the"·other side.,. the gospel is set forth as a mighty 
~1. Campagnac: The Cambridge Platonists, pp.95-6. 
2. ibid., p.94. 
~. Discourses, . p. 366. J 
110. 
efflux and emanation of life and spirit, freely issuing forth from an 
Omnipotnet source of grace and love, as that true god-like vital influ-
ence, whereby the divinity derives itself into the souls of men, ehliv-
ening and transforming them into its own likeness,!Nird strongly imprint-
ing upon them a copy of its beauty and goodness... ! It is that whereby 
God comes to dwell in us, and we in him".1 
And by the 'gospel* Smith does not mean a set of precepts, but rather .  
"an internal thing, avital form and principle seating itself in the minds  
and spirits of men". 2 "By the gospel lie meant), something more than a 
piece of book-learning, or historical narration of the free love of 
God".' The good life is not the life of obedience to law, but the god-
like life, or the life that 'participates in the divine life*. 
Moreover, Smith maintains, like Cudworth, that, not only can the good 
life not be expressed in laws,but it is not something that may be freely 
Chosen as an alternative to the evil life. The good is that which we most 
desire, and if we knew it we should pursue it; it is meaningless to argue 
that the good and the evil are often presented to us (or to our wills, to 
use Whichcote's terminology) as alternatives, and that we are free to choose 
either. Cudworth had said that we do not choose to live the good life; 
it must 'invade' us. And Smith sgya that it is "an efflux from God 
upon the minds of good men 04  „ and that "it is impossible for men ... to 
comply with his divine will, without his divine assistance". 5 The legal- 
ist thinks, Smith argues, that "in the model of life contained in that' 
body of laws .. (is) comprised the whole method of raising man to his per-
fection; and that theyt having only this book of laws without them, to con-
verse with, needed nothing else to procure eternal life, perfection and 
happiness - as if this had been the only means God had for the saving of 
men, and making them happy, to set before them in anamternalsw, a, volume 
of laws, statutes, and ordinances, and so to leave then to work out, and purchase to themselves, eternal life in the observance of them".6 
Such aview is based upon the assumption that man has " such  a sufficient 
power from within himself to attain to virtue and goodness, as that he 
only needed some law as the matter or object whereon to exercise this in-
nate power; and, therefore, needed not that God should do anything mop 
for him, than merely acquaint him with his divine will and pleasure.' 
In other words, Stith argues that we do not choose to be virtuous, as 
1. Discourses, Pp.3234. 5. Discourses, p.325. 2. ibid.:, p.326. 	6. ibid„. p.303. 
3.. ibid., p.327. 7. ibid., p.303. 4. ibid., p.301. 
Whichcote and the rationalists maintain. The distinction between good and 
evil is not a legal one, nor is such a distinction capable of being appreh-
ended by the reason. If moral distinctions were legal ones, or such that 
they could be apprehended by reason, then it would be meaningful to say 
that we are often presented with two alternatives one of which is known to 
be good and the other known to be evil, and that we may choose to do either. 
But on Smith's view, as on Cudworth's, the good is that which is most des-
irable or that which 'our intellectual nature' desires. Thus it cannot be 
said that the good may be chosen as an alternative to evil; the good is 
that which is most desired and therefore that which would be pursued if 
we knew it. To know the good is to do the good; that is to say, knowing 
good and being good are identical. And the knowledge of the good is not 
something that one may choose to have; it is, as Smith puts it 'an efflux 
from God upon the' minds of good men'. Hence the good is not something that 
may be chosen as an alternative to evil; the good life, as 'Cudworth puts it, 
has to 'invade' us. 
Smith's view, like the views otthe other Cambridge Platonists, then, 
is essentially antinomian. There is no virtue in obeying laws. However, 
Smith is prepared to concede that law may have a place in morality; it may 
be a guide to those who do not know the good and who therefore cannot live 
the spontaneously good life. "I would not be misunderstood to speak against 
those duties and ordinances which are necessary means, appointed by God, 
to promote us in the ways of piety: but I fear we are too apt to sink all 
our religion into these, and so to embody it, that we may, as it were, 
touch and feel it, because we are so little acquainted with the high and 
spiritual nature of it, which is too subtile for gross and carnal minds 
to converse with. I fear our vulgar sort of Christians are wont so to 
look upon such kinds of models of divinity and religious performances, as 
were intended to help our dull minds to a more lively sense of God and true 
goodness, as those things that claim the whole of their religion: and, there-
fore are too apt to think themselves absolved from it, except at some sol-
emn times of more especial addresses to God...al 
The purpose of rules and laws is not to embody the.whole of morality or 
religion, but to provide a guide to those who do not know the good. But 
it is false, Smith maintains, to think that the good life consists in 
obedience to laws. There is no virtue in obedience to laws just because 
they are laws; the only laws which ought to be obeyed are those which 
1. Discourses, p.373. 
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are based upon a knowledge of the good and which express, in so far as 
laws are able to express, the good life. But the highest virtue consists 
in doing what follows spontaneously from a knowledge of the good. And the 
kind of knowledge of the good which Smith contimial 1y refers to is not 
'speculatiVe' knowledge ( tbat is, it is not the ld..Dd of lmowlecJ&e which IIUi\V 
be stored up in propositions and dogmas), but rather an immediate acquaint-
ance with the good 1 or as he puts it; •a union and conjunction of the soul 
with God • •. Clearly, this kind of lmovledge is better expressed by the 
term 'love•., altholJ8b Smith bimaelf, unlike Cudworth and More, does not 
express it. in. that wrq. But it is evident f'rom what we have said that 
. there is no distinction between Smith's view· and Cudwortb • s 'certain kind 
of love' and More's 'intellectual love'. At least they all maintain that 
the good life is not the life ot obedience to God but the life that 'pBrt-
icipates • in God. 
Row frODII what we- have said, especially in regard to the view that the 
good lite is not something that lllQ' be chosen as an alternative to. the evil 
lite, .we .should expect .SDith to. maintain a .theory. of freedom like tbat ot 
Cudworth and discard the trad1 tioDal doctrine of tree-will. And this is 
in general the position Smith adopts. Like Cudworth, Smith argues that 
only the good .man is the really tree man. Be sa.vs that "right apprehensions 
of Cod beget 1n man a nobleness and freedom of soul" and goes on to argue 
that it. is only by a 'right apprehension of God' that freedom is possible.1 
· 'lo be tree is to be self-determined and unccmstrained, and this is possible 
. . ' 
only when. our behaviour is based upon a lmowledge of reality.. If our be-
haviour is based on an illusion, then it is bound to be constrained an4 
frustrated by the real world; because it has failed to take into accouht 
the nature of the real world such behaviour is bound to come into conf'11ct 
with reality. In other words, the Smith-Cudworth viev of freedom is ident-
ical with Christ's view that liThe truth shall make you tree•.2 It is onl7 · 
when ODe behaves in: terms of reality that one can be tree. And for Smith 
this involves a 'right apprehellsion ot Qod'. 
Smith does DOt consider the problem of freedom and tree-will to tb8 
same ex'ten:t as Cudworth does in the ma:nuscripts - probably he did DOt see 
l.Di.scourses, p.25 
2.Jomr--viii, 32. 
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all the problems that presented themselves to Cudworth - but in some of 
What he does say on this question there is a suggestion of a faculty 
psychology, and with it the possibility of a free-will capable of either 
following or rejecting what is discovered by the reason to be good. But 
at the same time Smith maintains that it is only the man who both knows 
and does what is good who is able to be free. wWhenwe converse with our 
own souls, we find the spring of all liberty to be nothing else but reason; 
and therefore no unreasonable creature can partake of it: and that it is 
not so much any indifferency in our wills of determining without, much 
less against, reason, as the liberal election, of, and complacency in, that 
which our understandings propound to us as most expedient: and our liberty 
most appears when our will most of all congratulates the results of our 
ownjudgements; and then shows itself most vigorous, when either the partic-
ularness of that good which the understanding converseth with, or the weak 
knowledge that it bath of it, restrains it not. Then is it most pregnant 
and flows forth in the fullest stream, when its object is most full, and 
the acquaintance with it most ample: all liberty in the soul being a kind 
of liberality in the bestowing of our affections, and the want or scarce 
measure of it parsimoniousness and nigardis0.1 
It is true that in this passage Smith tends to assume, like Whichcote, 
that there is a distinction between judging and willing and that the will 
is free to accept or reject the findings of the understanding. But unlike 
Whichcote, he is careful to argue that it is only 'when our will most of 
all congratulates the results of our own judgements* that we can be free; 
that is to say, it is only when we live the good life .that we can be free. 
The faculty psychology was, of course, the current view of the way in which 
the mind functions, and it is natural that Smith should occasionally exp-
ress himself in language that is appropriate only to such a theory; indeed, 
the faculty psychology finds a place occasionally in the works of all the 
Cambridge Platonists. But it is quite clear that a more adequate psych-
ology is presupposed in the general theory maintained by the later members 
of the School. In particular, in the case of Smith who maintains that all 
activity is motivated at bottom by a desire for 'some satisfying good' and 
that 'sin' is due not to a wilful choice of evil but to a failure to know 
the good, the traditional faculty theory with its doctrine of 'free-will' 
is out of place. 
Smith's view that moral distinctions are emotionally apprehended 
I. Campagnae: The Cambridge Platonists, p.170. 
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appears to be -contradicted in the following passage . .. "Agóoman eniieavoura  
walk 'by' eternal 'ánunchangeable. rules of .reason; reason. in a good man 
sits in thethrone s: and governs all the poiere of his Boni in sweet har-
. - .Mony. and 'agreement with itself: whereas. wicked _men live only 	being 
• led up and down by the .foolish .fires of .their own sensual apprehensions 11.1 
This seems ,to - euggest -. that be thinks that moral distinctions are appreh-
ended by the reasons a moral and intellectual, faculty,: which, in the good 
man„ ,overrules the desires. In other words, this passage seems to sug-
gest a rationalist .view of ethics like. that of Whichcote., That Smith is 
not involving himself in a contradiction,. however., is made clear by a 
• consideration of what he means by reason. Reason, he argues,. is that 
which makes man . capable of religion "enabling and fitting man to converse 
with .G0d by knowing him and loving him„ being a character most unquestion-
ably' differerming ifian- from brutes".2. 
Reason 'is not an intellectual faculty but the capacity for knowing and 
loVing God.•The sharp distinction there is between Smith and the • ration- 
alists ie evident from the followine: "When reason onto is raised by the 
• mighty force of divine spirit into converse With God, it is turned into 
sense: 'that which before' was only faith well built upon sure. principles ' . 
now becomes vision", 
be rational is to know the truth; that LS, in Smith's .vies, to know 
• Reason is our 'capacity for knowing the truth, and the truth is 
known not by intellectual, apprehension but by 'sense". When Smith says 
that in-the good mart 'reason . sits in the throne* he is not giving express-
ion to a 'theory like Whichnotels; such an expression is just another way 
'of-sing that .the . gOod life: Consists in . the knowledge of, of 'participat-
ion' . in, God. 
Nuirhead s in discussing the Cambridge Platordsts' theory of, freedom, 
says: "It is one of' the . strong points in the teaching and preaching of the 
Cambridge .men that to them fin' edom and rationality were not two different 
things,. but one and the same. To be. free was to be determined by reason, 
and to be determined by reason was to be determined by what was most real 
.. in -oneself 7 in, other words, to be self-detemained."4 Now this is an 
accurate account only if it is remembered that for the later Cambridge 
Platonists - for Cudworth and Smith at least - 'reason' is not a moral 
1. Campagnac: The Cambridge Platonists, p.185. 
2. ibid., p.186. 3. ibid., p.93. 	4. The Platonic Tradition,p.63. 
and intellectual faculty whose function is to make moral judgements, but 
either a 'higher' kind of desire or the capacity for knowing God. 
The knowledge that is relevant to morality, in Smith's view, then, 
is a function of the emotions rather than of the intellect. Moreover, 
such knowledge is not prior to virtue in the sense that we may judge 
that certain kinds of behaviour are good and certain other kinds of beh-
aviour are bad and then, independently of such knowledge, decide how to 
behave. All activity, Smith maintains, is motivated by a desire for *some 
satisfying good*, and this desire is satisfied only by 'participating in 
the divine life'. In other words, the good life is the life that *partic-
ipates' in God. The criterion by which we are able to judge whether or 
not we have attained to the good life is not an external intellectual one, 
but *internal satisfaction'. The distinction between the good and the bad 
life, then, is judged emotionally, not intellectually. But it is not poss-
ible to judge whether or not a certain kind of life is good or otherwise 
without living it and discovering experimentally whether or not it is 
satisfying. There is no sense, therefore, in which we may be said to 
know the good without living the good life. In Smith's view, knowing the 
good and living the good life are the same thing; they both consist in 
a *participation of the divine life'. Moreover, he argues that to know 
the good is to know the truth, for both consist in knowing God. The high-
est kind of knowledge is to know God, and God can be blown only by being 
god-like. In other words, both the highest knowledge and the highest 
virtue consist in a 'participation of the divine life'; that is to say, 
virtue and knowledge are identical. 
In the next chapter we shall consider the epistemological issues 
raised by this theory. 
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We have now reached the stage where it is necessary to briefly review 
the main argument of the thesis. Having done this, we shall be able to 
consider the theory of knowledge of the Cambridge Platonists in relation 
to their theory of ethics. 
This thesis began with a consideration of Whichcote's view that 
knowledge is the first step to virtue. Such a theory was found to be 
untenable for a number of reasons. In the first place it was found to 
rest upon the rotten foundations of a faculty theory of the soul which 
maintains that the 'reason' judges and the 'will' gives rise to action. 
The reason is held to be the faculty of knowledge and the will the fac-
ulty of action. Good action, it is held, results when the will follows 
the dictates of the reason, for the reason is the infallible judge of 
moral distinctions. The fallacy in such a theory is that the 'reason' 
and the 'will' are conceived as two faculties different both in nature and 
function, and it then becomes impossible for one to influence the other. • 	They, as it were, speak different languages. Whichcote's psychology makes it impossible for knowledge to be the first step,to virtue; indeed, 
it makes it impossible for the 'reason' to have any influence on action. 
Secondly, Whichcote's view of the nature of knowledge that is relev-
ant to morality is unsatisfactory. The 'reason' which is the faculty of 
knowledge is conceived to be totally independent of the emotions; the 
emotions can have no place in determining good behaviour. It is the 
failure of the will to direct the emotions to obey the reason that is the 
cause of evil. But the reason, so conceived, cannot determine behaviour. 
For, in the first place, no activity takes place without a motive, and 
motives originate in the emotions. Thus the activity of reasoning is 
dependent upon an emotion. Even scientific activities can stem only from 
a motive - the love of truth. Intellectual activities are instrumental, 
not determining; they are means of attaining emotionally determined ends. 
The same is true of behaviour. All behaviour is directed towards desir-
able ends. The intellect may perceive the factors that are involved in 
a particular course of action, but the way in which we behave is dependent • 	upon the way in which we evaluate our feelings about such factors. Intell- 
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ectual activity arises from a motive and the influence it has on behaviour 
is dependent upon the way we feel about the various factors that it per-
ceives to be present in a particular situation or in a certain course of 
action. Whichcote, of course, wants to say that the.'reasons is a Moral, 
as well as an intellectual, faculty; that is to sew, he tries to hold 
that the 'reason' is able to perceive that a particular course of' action, 
of a set of possible courses of action, is morally obligatory. But this 
is not possible on his view of the nature of reason. For the reason, as 
he conceives it, is impartial, impersonal and disinterested; it is such 
as to be able to perceive only facts and logical relationships. And moral 
obligation is, if there is such a thing, a feeling rather than a fact or 
a logical relationship. The perception of moral obligation is an interest-
ed perception which would, to use Whichcote's terminology, indicate to 
the will that, for example, A ought to be pursued rather than B. But a 
reason which is wholly independent of emotion is capable only of discover-
ing the facts .aboutA and B, and not that one is in any sense to be pre-
ferred to the other. Moreover, the reason, as Whicbcote conceives it, 
is incapable of providing a criterion by which one may decide haw one 
ought to behave in a concrete situation, for it can be concerned only 
with universals and not with particulars. To take a simple example: it 
may be shown that if lying were universalised, that is, if everyone made 
a practice of telling lies, lying would defeat its own purpose. For the 
point of telling a lie is to deceive by having it accepted as a truth. 
If lying became the norm, then no-one would accept a lie as the truth and 
there would no longer be any point in telling lies. Thus it is argued, 
it is wrong to tell lies. But it is only if lying became universalised 
that it would defeat its own purpose. And such a theory provides no 
means of deciding in a particular situation in which one coal have a lie 
accepted as a truth whether or not one ought to tell a lie. The fact that 
if lying were universalised it would cease to have apy meaning is no rea-
son for not telling a 'particular lie; it merely provides a reason for not 
universalising the practice of telling lies. 
There are a number of further difficulties with a position such as 
-e 
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Whichcote•s. Be maintains, for. example,. that the "'will' is. free either 
to accept or ·reject the judgements of the •reason• • and tbi.s involves 
him in the paradancal position that it is the evU man who is most free 
aDd the gQOd 111811 who iS the slave. J'or he argues that evil is due to an 
abuse ot the bee-will and that virtue consists in choosing to be subser-
vient to the •reason•. Moreover. such a view of freedom as the ability 
to be arbitrary 1s i.Dconsistent with the empirical facts. But the two 
chief difficulties with Whichcote's view are: first. the inadequacy of. 
the faculty pSychology; and secondly., the view that •reason. conceived ·as 
an intellectual faculty_is-.able to determine behaviour.. EVen if it is 
held that one ougtlt to behave in -wa.vs that the •reason' perceives to be 
of a certain killd, it is the feel.i.Dg of moral obligation, and not the 
perception of the reason, tbat determines the vsy in which one behaves. 
Theories of ethics in which the central concept is 'duty• rather than 
' -· 
'good' usually maintain that one oll8ht to do one's duty rather. than ldlat 
one .desires. But the paradox of such ~theories is that unless there is 
some sense in which one desires to do one's duty, ODe Cam'lOt behave duti-
~- And in practice this is realised by moralists who argue'"'~t 
virtue cons~ts in doing om• s 'duty •. tar in their moral exhortations 
they exalt ·dutiful bebaviour to a level, where it becomes attractive; It 
is referred to as 'challenging' and those who do their 'duty' are said to 
be made of •sterner. stuff' than those who •succumb'· to their desires. In 
extreme cases (in· var • · for exampl;e) the person who deliberately sacrifices 
h1,s own-life in· order to'lio his duty' is proclaimed a natioDal hero and 
is said to die the •kiDd of death which it is impossible to contempla~ 
. T!ri thout envy•. All laDguage such as this is us8d because of its emotion-
al appeal. One does one's 'duty'. onlJr it in some sense one desireS to do 
so. The difficulty with theories like Whichcote•s is that they taU ·to 
realise that the w~s in which we behave are at bottom emotionally.,. not 
intellectually,. determined. And the basic problem ~th such theories 
is not so mu.ch e~~ or epistemological as psycholo~cal; they rest on 
an iDadequate psychology. Whichcote, as we saw in Chapter II,.· had a th.eo17 
of· a different kind of.knovledge f'rom his •reason of the mind' which he 
-.., 
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considered to be attainable only by the good man. But this is in the main 
undeveloped, and, in any case, is inconsistent with his general theory and 
impossible on the basis of his unsatisfactory psychology. 
In general, the difficulties inherent in Whichcote's theory of ethics 
were realised and overcome by the later Cambridge Platonist°. They argue 
that all action is directed towards emotionally discerned ends and that 
therefore it is emotion, and not "reason', that is "the first principle 
of motion in the soul'? Action begins in the 	temper', as Cudworth 
puts it, or in the 'restless appetite', as Smith expresses it, and the 
reason, or the intellectual powers of the soul, are 'employed' in various 
ways to assist in the attainment of the ends that are desired. Moreover, 
Smith and Cudworth maintain that we desire and pursue what we judge to be 
good and that evil is due not to a rejection of what is known to be good 
but to a failure to know the good. We cannot, they maintain, pursue after 
anything that is seen to be evil. We may be faced with a number of poss-
ible ways of behaving and we make our_decision on the basis of our evaluat-
ion of thefactors involved in the various possible courses open to us. 
Such factors are perceived intellectually, and the more intelligent we are, 
the more quickly and accurately we shall perceive such factors. But the 
wig" in which we behave depends upon our feelings about the factors that _ 
are perceived. The way in which we behave follows from the decision we _ - and this is determined by the value we place upon the factors that 
are involved in theTerviliepessole courses of action that are open to • us. In other words, our decisions are dependent upon our sense of values; 
we believe -in-the way that we judge to be most valuable. If, for example, 
we feel that the accu amultion of money is that which is most valuable, - thenwe Shall choose the course which-is likely to result in the greatest . 	- gain. If on the other hand, we feel that pleasure is the most 
valuable factor, then.we shall choose the course which is likely to give - 
rise to the greatest pleasure., Our decisions are determined, provided we 
are able to analyse the yarious,possible courses of action and discover 
the various factors that each, involves, by our feelings of what is most 
In:Linable. But whatever decision we make, we always, Cudworth and Smith, 
1. Quoted from the Cudworth MSS by Tassmore: Ralph Cudworth, - p.52. 
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maintain, choose what we judge to be most Valuable; indeed, they hold 
that the judgement that a particular course of action is most valuable 
is the same as the decision to act in that way. There is no distinction 
between 'judging' and 'willing'. In other words, Cudworth and Smith 
contend that we always 'will' what we 'judge' to be good; we cannot judge 
that a certain kind of behaviour is evil and will to do it. They do not 
mean, of course, that we always do what is in fact good, but only that 
we do what we believe to be good; that is to say, we do what we, on the 
basis of our particular principle of valuation, judge to be of most value. 
A failure to live the good life is due not to a wilful rejection of what 
is known to be good, but to a failure to know the good. 
Now this theory that 'sin' is a 'privation' and that it is due to 
ignorance is of fundamental importance to the ethical theories of Smith 
and Cudworth. And, on the face of it at least, it appears to be fairly .  
satisfactory. It appears empiricallk,evident that our behaviour is det-
ermined by our evaluation of our feelings about the various courses of • 
action open to us, and that we behave in the way that is felt to be most 
valuable. If our behaviour is not in fact good, it is because we do not 
know the good; that is to say, it is because our judgements of what is 
most valuable do not coincide with what is in fact most valuable. Even 
on a legalistic theory which maintains that moral distinctions are legal 
distinctions, that is, that goodness consists in obeying laws and evil 
in breaking laws, it still does not follow that evil may be done know-
ingly' It is true that we may knowingly break moral laws, and we may 
also know that it is said, or it is generally considered, that law-breaking 
behaviour is evil. But the point at issue is not what is in fact good or 
evil, but whether or not when we do evil we do it knowingly. We may know 
when we act in a certain way that we are doing what is generally consider-
ed to - be evil, but that does not mean that we ourselves believe it to be 
evil. And when we do what is generally considered to be evil, for example, 
when we break moral laws, we always attempt to justify our conduct; and 
such attempts at justification seem to indicate that in breaking laws we 
are behaving in away, which in the particular situation, is felt to be 
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more valuable than obeying laws. In other words; such law-breaking 
behaviour seems to be due to a belief that it is good in some sense and 
•not to a wilful choice of evil knowing it to be evil. And if judging 
and willing are identical and a function of the whole soul as Smith and 
Cudworth maintain, then to judge that, for example; A is good on the basis 
of one's particular principle of valuation is to decide to do A, and to 
judge that B is bad is to decide to refrain from doing B. But the whole 
problem of what happens at the moment of moral choice is an extremely 
complex one the solution of which can be found only by empirical investig-
ation.. Cudworth and Smith maintain that we cannot choose evil knowing it 
to be evil, but the traditional view of 'sin' has been that it is due to 
a wilful rejection of• what is known to be good, and the doctrine of °orig-
inal sin' holds that there is in everyone a 'will to evil', that is, a 
will to choose what is known to be evil. Moreover, the traditional view 
of rewards and punishments seems to rest on the view that evil is not 'due 
• to ignorance but to a wilful rejection of the good. This indicates:how 
radical the Smith-Cudworth view is. The question of whether or not there 
is a 'will to evil' and whether or not 'sin' may be due to a wilful reject-
ion of the good is one that needs to be empirically investigated; and at 
• this point moral philosophy must wait upon the findings of psychiatry. 
But at least this much is clear: behaviour is emotionally, not 
intellectually, determined. We may intellectually perceive the factors 
that are involved in various courses of action, but the way in which we 
behave depends upon the way in which we feel about these factors. And • 
this is the significant point realised by Smith and Cudworth and, to some 
extent, by More. The later Cambridge Platonists maintain, also, that 
moral distinctions are emotionally, not intellectually, discerned. They 
are, therefore, more akin to the 'moral sense' theorists than to the ration-
alists. There is, however, an important distinction between the 'moral 
sense' school and the later Cambridge Platonists. Whereas moralists like 
Bucheson hold that there is a specific 'moral sense' just as there is a 
specific sense of seeing or hearing, the later Cambridge Platonists maint-
ain that our moral judgements are part of t our manner of life. The appreh-
ension of moral distinctions, in other voids, is a function of the total 
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personality. But they do not maintain that moral distinctions are 
constituted by their relation to our judgements. The distinction between 
good and evil is 'eternal and immutable'. It is only our ability to rec-
ognize moral distinctions that is dependent upon our manner of life. 
The argument that moral distinctions are eternal and immutable appears 
in Cudworth's treatise of that name, but the view is supported by all the 
Cambridge Platonists. Cudworth's argument, as we have seen, does not 
conclusively establish the existence of 'natural justice' and therefore 
the existence of eternal and immutable moral distinctions. But it does 
provide a critical weapon which detects what G.E. Moore has more recently 
called the 'naturalistic fallacy'. In other words, Cudworth's argument 
shows that theories which maintain that good is what is commanded cannot 
maintain that the proposition 'It is good to do what is commanded' is 
non-tautological. And it is for this reason that Cudworth thinks Hobbes 
is involved in a vicious circle. Hence Cudworth argues that if the terms 
good and evil are to have any meaning such that good behaviour necessarily 
exhibits certain qualities or relations (depending on what is maintained 
as the characteristic of goodness), moral distinctions cannot be constit-
uted by their relation to the arbitrary will of a human or divine sover-
eign. If moral distinctions are held to be constituted by their relation 
to an arbitrary will, then it must be held that 'good' means 'willed'; and 
if this is so, it is not significant to say that it is good to do what is 
willed. This argument of Cudworth's is critical rather than constructive, 
and in it Cudworth does not sky what is the nature of moral distinctions; 
and, in particular, he does not say, as some commentators have thought, 
that moral distinctions are the IMMO in nature as mathematical distinctions. 
He likens moral distinctions to mathematical distinctions only in that he 
maintains that both are eternal and immutable. ' 
What, then, is the nature of the good life for Cudworth and the later 
Cambridge Platonists? In the first place, they maintain that the good 
life is the free life; that is to say, it is the life in which one behaves 
spontaneously and without constraint. This is possible only by behaving 
in terms of what is real, and not in terms of illusions about the real. 
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The good life is the life that is harmonious with reality, for it is only 
when one sees things in their true significance and behaves accordingly 
that one acts without constraint. We can be free only 'when we understand 
ourselves and the world in which we live; to ignore reality can be nothing 
but deception. Thus it is only when we judge to be of most value that 
which is in fact of most value, that it is possible for us to be free. In 
other words, in the view of the later Cambridge Platonists, it is only 
when we know the good as good that we can live the free life. But our 
moral judgemente, they maintain, are part of our manner of life; they are 
a function of the total personality. Therefore, it is only the good tan 
• who can know the good. °Judelne and'Iwilling' are the same activity; 
that is, knowing good and being good are identical. 
But the later Cambridge Platonists maintain that we do not choose 
to live the good life; it is never presented to us as something that may 
be arbitrarily chosen as an alternative to the evil life. This follows 
from their view that 'judging' and 'willing' are identical. But they 
also support it on other grounds. Tradittmial rationalistic theories 
maintain that there is a moral and intellectual faculty, the 'reason'i 
which is capable of judging that, for example, A is good and B is bad, 
and that there is second faculty whose function is to give rise to action 
and which is free to arbitrarily choose either A or B or some other poss-
ible alternative. But such naked choice, the later Cambridge Platonists 
hold, is inconsistent with the empirical facts. If we were free to choose 
in such an arbitrary manner,, Cudworth rightly argues, "the wickedest per-
son might in a moment by his free will make himself as holy as the sere-
phim". 1 And Smith and More realise with Cudworth that the doctrine of 
arbitrary free-will involves the paradox that it is the evil man who is 
most free and the good man whose life is ' One of, servility. Consequently, 
although the 'doctrine of free-will in its traditional and unsatisfactory 
form persists throughout the thought of all the Cambridge Platonists, 
there is a strong tendency for the later members of the school to discard 
it completely. 
Traditional theories which hold that the good may be knowingly accepted 
1. Quoted from the Cudworth MSS by kassmore: Ralph Cudworth, p.60. 
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or rejected are bound to introduce the concepts of 'ought' and 'duty' and 
to maintain that the good life consists in some form of 'obedience'. For 
if 'judging' and 'willing' are separate activities, that is, if it is poss-
ible to know that a certain kind of behaviour is good and at the saIlllhoose 
to behave in some other manner, then it has to be held that one ought to 
do what is known to be good. Moreover, if knowing good is separate from 
being good, and if the good life consists in doing one's duty, that is, in 
doing what one judges one ought to do, then the good life is the life of 
obedience. This is true of both legalistic ethical theories and rational-
istic theories like those of Whichcote and Clarke. In the one case, the 
good life consists in obeying laws; in the other, it consists in obeying 
the dictates of one's reason. But the later Cambridge Platonists maintain 
that the good life is not the life of obedience. The good life is the 
free life, and therefore cannot consist in obedience. Moreover, the good, 
they hold, is that which is most desirable and therefore that which we 
should pursue if we knew it. The concept of obedience 'then, does mot 
arise. 
The Cambridge Platonists, however, like the'Puritans against wham 
some of their arguments were directed, do not want to dismiss God from 
the sphere of morality. It is true that Cudworth's 'Eternal and Immutable 
Morality' may be interpreted in terms that are wholly secular, for his 
theory tends towards the viSt9Soral distinctions are not ontologically 
dependent upon God but are in fact antecedent to God. And all the Cam-
bridge Platoniats maintain that God wills what is antecedently good. 
But a secular interpretation of Cudworth or any other members of the 
school would be false, although it'may be true that the theory of 'Eter-
nal and Immutable Morality' gave rise to later theories which were wholly 
secular. That the Cambridge Platonists, unlike the Puritans, do not argue 
that the good life consists in obedience to God. Theories which hold that 
virtue is obedience to God presuppose the view that God is wholly external 
to man; that is to say, that God exists outside man such that the good 
life for man consists in conforming to an external pattern. Such a view • 	of the God-man relationship is notably absent from the thought of all the 
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Cambridge Platonists: Whichcote maintains that "there is a seed of God 
in us"1, and he continually refers to man as having a 'deiform nature*. 
The same idea seems to be expressed in Nore's peculiar doctrine of the 
'boniform faculty' which he describes as "the most divine thing within 
Likewise, Smith says "seek for God within thine own souln3. and Cudworth 
argues that owe should find the great eternal God, inwardly teaching our 
souls"4. In short, it is the Cambridge Platonistss view that God is not 
a being wholly external to man (if he were he could never be known) but 
a being who exists, as it were, within the life of man, or who at least 
is known and expressed in and through the life of UM. Thus, since God' 
is not a being wholly external, virtue does not consist in conforming to 
his external pattern; that is to say, virtue does not consist in obeying 
God. Virtue consists in having the god-like life 'formed in us', as Cud-
worth puts it. Virtue is not something that we are free either to choose 
or reject; it is a certain kind of life or activity which has to 'invade* 
us. The most We can do, says Cudworth, is to 'remove obstacles' to the 
good life and let it *invade' us. In other words, the good life is a 
certain kind of life which the good man spontaneously lives. And the 
good man, in the view of all the later Cambridge Platanists, is he who 
both realises himself (that is, realises his own potential god-likeness) 
and also 'participates' in the life of God. More, therefore, describes 
the good life as Vcd's life rather than our owns", and all the later 
Cambridge Platonists refer to it as *participating in the divine life*. 
It is at this point that their ethics and epistemology meet. rca., as 
we shall see, the Cambridge Platonists maintain not only that virtue 
is both self-realisation and a 'participation' in God, but also that 
knowledge is both self-knowledge and a. *participation' in God. We shall 
turn now, therefore, to a brief consideration of the epistemology of 
Cudworth and Smith. We shall not consider Whichcote's epistemology be-
cause we have already seen that his theory of ethics is quite unsatisfact-
ory and his psychology preclUdes the possibility of knowledge having any 
influence on behaviour. Neither shall we examine Nbre's theory of knowledge 
in detail because the works in which this is developed were unavailable 
1.Discourses, Vol.2, p.149. 	4. Sermon p.80. 2.Account of Virtue, p.17. 5: Account of Virtue, p.199: 3.Campagnac: The Cambridge Platonists, p. 81. 
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for the preparation of this thesis. However, since More's general ethical 
theory, and in particular, his view that it is only the virtuous man who 
can attain to the highest knowledge, is broadly similar to those of Cud-
worth and Smith, it may reasonably be assumed that the general remarks 
that are here made in regard to Smith and Cudworth apply equally to More. 
Cudworth and Smith begin their theories of knowledge by making a 
distinction between knowledge and sensation. Sense-perception, they argue 
is relative, but knowledge is "public, catholic and universal". 1 A rel-
ativistic view of knowledge such as that of Protagoras is impossible 
because if knowledge were relative we could taVirt_to be so; the propos-
ition,'Knowledge is relative', is itself meant to be universally true. 
Thus Smith says that if it is held that we can know nothing objectively 
"then neither do we know this, that we know nothing .... neither could 
they know what it is to know, or what it is to be ignorant... But yet 
if our senses were the only judges of things, this reflex knowledge, where-
by we know what it is to know, would be as impossible as he makes it for 
sense to have innate ideas of its own, antecedent to those stamps which the 
radiations of external objects imprint upon it. For this knowledge must be 
antecedent to all that judgement which we pass upon any sensatum, seeing, 
except we first know what it is to know, we could not judge or determine aright upon the approach of any of these idols to our senses". 2 
In other words, even the knowledge of the physical world presupposes a 
kind of knowledge which is other than sensation. The objects of sensat-
ion,. Smith and Cudworth maintain, are external to the mind and are received 
passively by the mind. But sensation itself cannot distinguish between 
reality, and illusion; that is, mere sensation cannot tell whether or not 
its objects are fanciful or have a real existence. Thus Cudworth says: 
"All the assurance we have thereof arises from reason and intellect judg- 
ing of the phantasms or appearances of sense, and determining in which of 
them there is an absolute reality, and which of them are merely relative 
or fantastical". 3 
For these, and various other reasons which it would be outside the scope 
of this thesis to consider, Cudworth and SMith argue that there is a dist-
inction between knowledge and sensation and therefore between the objects 
of knowledge and sensation. "The immediate objects of intellection and 
knowledge, cannot be these individual material things as such, which our 
senses are passively affected from, but must of necessity be something elaan.4 
1. Cudworth:. True Intellectual System, Vol.% p.36. 
2. Discourses, pp.77-8. 
3, Eternal and Immutable Morality, p.577. 4. ibid., p.621. 
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Mere.senneerception, Cudworth argues, is notsufficient to explain 
the knowledge tie have of even the physical world. Thus ,pit 	t of nec- 
essity be granted, that besides passion from Corporeal things, or the passive perception of sense, there is in the souls of men another more active principle i.. an 'innate cognoscitive power', whereby they are enabled to understand or judge of what is received from without by sense... This ...• can be nothing else but a power of raising intelligible ideas and conceptions of things from within itselfnl. 
The objects of sensation are changing and relative such that one cannot 
"twice enter into the same river*2, but the objects of knowledge are 
. *permanent, and having always the same nature".: Knowledge *reaches to the comprehension of that which really and absolutely is, whose objects are the eternal and immutable essences and natures of things, and their 
Unchangeable relations to one another0 .4 
In other 'words, what Cudworth is saying is this: the objects of knowledge 
are universals, not particulars. For example, if we are to know a part-
icular triangle as a triangle, we must know the nature of triangles; that 
is to say, we must knew the universal that is present in the''particular. 
This is what Cudworth means by 'the eternal and immutable essences and 
2 . natures of things'.. Without the knowledge of the Universal, the partic-
ular is merely a meaningless sensation. Therefore Cudworth says:, 
a geometrician considers a triangle,'beingabout to demonstrate that it bath three angles equal to two right angles, nodmibt but he will have the 
-phantasmatical picture of some triangle in his mind; and yet notwithstand-ing he bath also a noematical perception or intellectual idea of it too, as affeOrs.frap  hence, because every express picture of a triangle must of Iiecessity'be either Obtusangular or rectangular or acutangular, but that _-which in hie mind is the subject 'of this.. proposition thought an, is the ration, 'reason', of atriangle undetermined, to any of these species 05 
The objects of knowledge, then, are.universals. But Cudworth maint-
ains,that.universals cannot be constructed out of particulars. Knowledge 
is not the result of *any abstraction or separation 	for it-is a thing utterly impossible that vigour, activity and awakened energy, ed,intell-ections are should be raised out of dull, sluggish and droway passion or 
4Ymtlat47"6- . 
• Universals are not abstractional•rom"particulars, "88 were hewing off 
certain chips from them"7.- Cudiroith argues that the knowledge of tmiver-
sals must be 'latent' in the mind, for Maass the understanding knows 
1.Eternal & Ism. Morality, p.579. 	4. Eter. 	Imm. Morality.p.603. 2. ibid., p.622. 	;15. ibid., p.584. 
3. ibid. . , p.622. 6. ibid., p.615. 7. ibid., p.614. 
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"what he is to do with these phantasms before hand, what he is to make of 
them, and unto what shape to bring them.. he must needs be a bungling 
workman... He must needs have the intelligible idea of that which be knows or understands already within himself; and thereforeknow to what purpose 
he should use his tools, and go about to hew and hammer and anvil out 
these phantasms into them and subtle intelligible ideas, merely to make 
that which he bath already, and which was native and domestic to himn.1 
Passmera'-well sums up this passage thus: "Universals cannot be constructed 
out of particulars, because if we have a plan of construction, we already 
know the universal, and if we have no plan we have no method of procedure". 2 
Knowledge, then, Cudworth argues, is a process of "the mind's look- 
ing inward into itself.... It .. doth .. intellectually comprehend its 
object within itself, and is the same with it".3 
In other words, the objects of knowledge are universals and are found 
within the mind itself. In fact, that which is known is identical with 
that which knows. "Actual knowledge is in reality the same with the thing 
known, or the idea of it, and therefore inseparable from it. It being 
nothing but the mind's being conscious of some intelligible idea within 
itself... The primary and immediate objects of intellection and knowledge, 
are not things existing without the mind; but the ideas of the mind itself 
actively exerted, that is, the intelligible rationes, 'reasons', or things 
.... the immediate objects of intellection are not without the mind that 
understan4s".4 
Cudworth's theory of knowledge, then, escapes the difficulty inherent in 
theories like these of Locke - the difficulty of how the mind is able to 
'get outside itself' to the object that is known. The objects of knowledge 
are, for Cudworth, within the mind, and all knowledge is self-knowledge. 
It consists in becoming aware of what is already in the mind. Nor does 
Cudworth maintain that sense-data are the material of knowledge; that is 
to say, he does not argue that the mind supplies only the formal categor- 
ies while sense-perception supplies the material. The objects of sensat-
ion are no more like reality than a word is like the object which it 
represents. And this is in fact how Cudworth expresses "Sense, if we 
well consider it is but a kind of loquela, 'speech' 	nature as it were 
talking to us in the sensible objects without .... as in speech men talk 
to one another, they do but make certain motions upon the air, which can-
not impress their thoughts upon one another in a passive manner; but it 
being first consented to and agreed upon, that such certain sounds shall 
signify such ideas and cogitations, he that hears those sounds in discourse, 
doth not fix his thoughts upon the sounds themselves, but presently exerts 
1. Eternal & Imm. Morality, p.614. 	3. Eter. & Imm. Morality, p.566. ' 2. Ralph Cudworth, p.36. 	4. ibid., P145796560. , 
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from within himself such ideas and cogitations as those sounds by consent 
signify, though there be no similitude at all betwixt those sounds and 
• thoughts. just in' the same manner nature doth as it were talk to us in the outward objectsof sense,,and import various sentiments, ideas, 
'phantasms and cogitationan. 1 
Sense-perception is, as it were, the occasion of knowledge, that which 
gives Aim to knowledge, but in no sense are the objects of sense-percept- 
ion the objects of knowledge. As Cudworth puts it; 'Sense is but the 
offering or presenting of some object to the mind, to give it an occasion 
to exercise its own inward activity upon", 2 
But the objects of knowledge are contained within the mind itself. - "The essence of nothing is reached unto by the senses locking outward,. 
but hvthe mineslooking.inward into itself.. - That which wholly looks 
abroad outward upon its.object i„ is, not one with 'that Which it perceives, 
but - isat a :distance from it, 'and therefore Cannot knOw:and Comprehend 
it; but: knowledge and intellection doth not merely 4v4 look. outward upon 
a thing at a-distance,. but -Make an inward reflection upon the thing it knowa... The intellectdoth read inward characters written, within itself, 
And is the samemith'it."jh abstract things themselves, Which are the 
Prinsry objects of science, the intellect andthe thing known are 'really
One and :the same. For those ideas or objects of intellection are noth-
ing else-but -Modifications of the mind itself".3. 	. 
Cudworth!s view, then, is that the objects of knowledge'arelmodific-
ations Of the mind.... But if he maintains that they are 'modifications' 
oUparticultmcisinds,,he:is launched. intoa subjectivist position. For if, 
for example„.the objects of re7 knowledge were contained within my mind, 
then if I ceased tcrexistthe objects of my knowledgelanild disappear; 
they*Ould depend for their existence upon the existence of my particu-
lar min& This is'obviously a position which Cudworth cannot accept. 
Be argues, therefore, in a manner not unlike Berkeley, that the objetts. 
of knowledgeexist in the 'mind of Cod°. "These things have a constant 
being,: when our particular 'created minds do notactually think of then, 
and -therefore they are immutable in another sense' likewise, not only 
because they are indivisibly the same.whenwe think of them, but also 
because they have aoonstant and never-failing entity; and always are, 
whether our-particularminds think of them or not 0.4 
In' Other walla,. the objects of, knowledge are universals and exist with-
in the mind, being, in fact,. 'modifications' of the mind', but they do not 
cease to exist when:a particular mind ceases to be CODSC10118 of them. 
I. Eter. & 1mm. Morality, p.612. 3: Eter. & Imm. Morality, p.566. 
2. ibid., P.564. 	4. ibid., p.625. 
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The objects of knowledge are 'eternal and immutable'. A triangle, for 
example, is eternally and immutably a figure exhibiting certain charact-
eristics, and the good life is eternally and immutably a certain kind of 
life exhibiting certain characteristics. And this is so whether or not 
any particular mind is conscious of the triangle or the good life. The 
objects of knowledge, then, in Cudworth's view, exist eternally and 
utably in the 'mind of God.' °The Deity is the first original fountain 
of wisdom and truth, which is said to be the brightness of the everlast-
ing light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of 
his goodness... created beings have but a derivative participation there-
of, their understandings being obscure, and they erring in many things, and being ignorant of more. And it seems to be no derogation from Almighty 
God to suppose that created minds by a participation of the divine mind, 
should be able to know certainly that two and two make four; that equals 
added to equals will make equals ... and such-like other common notions, 
which are the principles from whence all their knowledge is derived ... 
Knowledge is the only thing in the world which creatures have r that is in 
its own nature firm; they having here something of certainty, but nowhere 
elsen. 1 
Knowledge, in Cudworth's view, is both self-knowledge (a becoming aware 
of what is already in one's own mind) and a 'participation' in the mind 
of God. When one knows any certain truth (Dudworth's 'common notions') 
one is 'participating' in the mind of God. 
A theory such as this, of course, precludes the possibility of any 
dualism between the 'divine mind' and 'particular' minds. For the objects 
of knowledge are held to be within the mind, that is, within one's awn 
mind, and to be 'modifications' of God's mind. If one can know only that 
which is within one's awn mind, and if in knowing one is participating in - the mind of God, there must be some sense in which God's mind is 'within' 
one's own mind. Cudworth, however, does not consider in any detail the 
problem of the relationship between the 'divine mind' and 'particular' 
minds, and this is perhaps the weakest point of his theory. It is import-
ant to notice, however, that Cudworth's is not the crude theory of 'innate 
ideas' against which Locke argued so forcibly; that is, Cudworth does not 
argue that the mind contains a stock of ready-made ideas and has no need 
to learn. What Cudworth wants to say rather is that the mind is so 
constructed as to be able to arrive at certain knowledge; it is not ready-
made ideas that are 'innate' in the mind in Cudworth's theory, but rather 
1. True Intellectual System, Vol.3, p.37. 
131. 
an 'innate cognoscitive power', that is, the capacity to know. The mind 
is so constructed as to be able to recognise *clear and distinct ideas', 
which for Cadworth, as for Descartes, is' the criterion of truth. nhe 
entity of all theoretical truth is nothing else but clear intelligibility, 
and whatever is clearly conceived is an entity and a truth". 1 
Particular minds, like the *divine mind',are so constructed as to be able 
•to arrive at certain knowledge, and in knowing the particular mind is 
both beam:Lag aware of what is latent within it and participating.in the 
milli of God.  "Neither are truths mere sentences and propositions written down with ink upon a book, but they are living things, and nothing but modifications of mind or intellect; and therefore the first intellect is 
essentially and archetypally all rationes and verities, and all particular 
created intellects are but derivative participations of it, that are print-
ed by it with the same ectypal signatures upon them". 2 
Cudworth's theory of knowledge may be briefly summarised thus: The 
objects of knowledge are not the *individual 'material things* which are 
the objects of sense-perception, but the 'eternal and immutable natures' 
of things. In order that these may be known it is necessary that they 
should be 'within the mind'. The objects of knowledge, however, cannot 
be dependent for their existence upon the existence of any particular 
mind: They are, therefore, 'modifications , of the mind of God. And 
therefore, in the process of knowing particular minds both become aware 
of what is 'latent' within themselves and also participate in the 'divine 
mind'. The eternal and immutable objects of knowledge are what they are 
'by nature, and not by will*, that is, they are not constituted by their 
relation-to the will of God. They are, however, ontologically dependent 
upon God;t ehy have "certain, determinate, and immutable natures of their 
own, whirl are independent upon the mind, and which are blown away into nothing at the pleasure of the same being that arbitrarily made them". 3 
In other words, the objects of knowledge are dependent upon God for their 
existence, but while they exist they have 'eternal aid immutable natures' 
which are not constituted by their relation to the arbitrary will of God. 
Thus, for example, the triangle depends upon God, for its existence, but 
God cannot arbitrarily make a triangle whichedoes not have the properties 
of a triangle. Likewise, the good is dependet,foeits existence on God, 
1. Eternal and Immutable Morality, p.635. 
2. ibid., p.626. 
3. ibid., p.624. 
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but as long as there is such a thing as the good life it must necessarily 
exhibit the eternal and immutable properties of goodness. And it is the 
eternal and immutable nature of goodness that is the object of the knowledge 
that is relevant to morality. Such knowledge, like all knowledge, is both 
self-knowledge and a 'participation' in God. It is because all knowledge 
is self-knowledge that Cudworth argues that learning does not consist 
studying what others have written but rather in 'bringing out' what is 
already in the mind. "Overmuch reading and hearing of other men's discourses, 
though learned and elaborate, doth not only distract the mind, but also 
devilitates the intellectual powers, and makes the mind passive and slug-
gish, by calling it too much outwards. Por which cause the wise philosoph-
er Socrates altogether shunned that dictating and dogmatical way of teach-
ing used by the sophisters of that age, and chose rather an ... obstetric-  
lone method; because knowledge was not to be poured into the soul like 
liquour, but rather to be invited and gently drawn forth from it; nor the 
mind so much to be filled therewith from without, like a "Vessel, as to be 
kindled and awakened. Lastly, from hence is that strange parturiency that 
is often observed in the mind, when it is solicitously set upon the inves-
tigation of some truth, whereby it doth endeavour, by ruminating and rev-
olving within itself as it were to conceive it within itself... 'to bring 
it forth out of its own womb'; by which it is evident, that the mind is 
naturally conscious of its own fecundity, and also that it bath a criterion 
within itself, which will enable it to know when it bath found that which 
it sought".1 
All knowledge is essentially a process of becoming aware of what is already 
latent within the mind; and in becoming aware of what is within the mind, 
one is 'participating' in the mind of God. 
We have considered in the previous chapter some of Smith's theory of 
knowledge, and it will not be necessary, therefore, to consider his views 
here in as much detail as has been necessary in the case of Cudworth. We 
shall attempt to show merely that basically Smith's epistemology is similar 
to Cudworth's. Then we shall be in a position to make a, general assess- thelr meat of the relationship between/ethics and epistemology. 
Smith, we have seen, argues that 'truth and goodness' are inseparable 
and that it is only the virtuous man, the man whose life 'participates in 
the divine life', who is capable of attaining to the highest knowledge. In 
other words, Smith tends to identify virtue and knowledge. He realises 
that there is a difficulty inherent in this position as it stands, for 
"if divine truth spring only up from the root of true goodness; haw shall 
1. Eternal and Immutable Morality, p.502. 
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we ever endeavour, to be good, before we know what it is' to te.so? or how shall. we conVince the gainsayingworld . of truth, unless we could. also inspire virtueinto ite.l . . 	. If At is only the good man who can know the good and the truth, and if it 
is possible to be goodonly* kneeing the good, how is it possible for . 	. the man who is net good, and who therefore does not knee' the good, to be-
Ole good? And Unless he becomes good, how is it possible for him to 
be convinced of the truth? In other words, Smith finds himself involved 
in avicious cirdle; His solution to this problem lies in his doctrine 
cOr.IPO43 . 4mwY44?!:**There.are.some radical principles of knowledge that are so deeply 'sunk into the souls of men.,as that the impression cannot 
eatilybe . Obliteratedi'though it may be darkened. 'Neither are the common_ OrinCiplee:Of-virtue so pulled up by the roots. in all, as to make then. so , dUbioue'ialitating the bounds of virtue end vice as Epicurus was,. though he could not but sometimes take notice of them.... The common notions of 
Cod and Wirtue-impreat upon the Souls-a:nmnu are more clear and perspic-UOmt:than anything else;. and.., if they hate not more certainty, yet have they kore'eVideatee,..and diepley . themselOmewithlessdifficulty to our rekleiiite . facUlty than any geometrical deammulusticamm.and.these: are both eiailabletepmescribe out ways of virtue.to men's ownetouls e .and to force an atknowledgementof-truth from thote that oppote, when they are well 
guided by a'skilfUI habe,2 , " - .• 	. 	• , Like. pudworth,. Smith maintains that there are 'print:4100'0f knowledge' 
latent :in-the Si. 
1:, .'i,. view 	frequently expressed throughout SMith's 'Discourses!. 
:EOremaiaple,•in stating.hisview.offeurlowels of knowledge, to which we 
referred in the last .chapter, he says the second levelofknowledge is 
• -a*atiscellane.ous:kind,of ,knowledge .arising from , a collation of its, sensations 
with its . oim more obscure and dark idease. 3 , The2third . level.of . knowledge 
is referred to as epinning "out its own notions by . a constant series of. 
deductions4.... Likewise,:the fourth and highest level of knowledge aa 
•naked intuition of eternal troth!isregarded,08,45aNawntling -4sach calm . 	. 	. and serene ideas of truth, as shine only in composed souls, and cannot be 
	
discerned by any troubled or unstable 	SMOh are the archetypal ideae:of justice, wisdom. goodness ' truth,:eternity.omapotency..and , all those eithermor:l. physical, ormetaphysicalnotions, which are either the 'first principles of science, Or the ultimate C'emplament and' final perfect ,- ion - of it. -,Theie.we always know: to be the.sa00. ,...-asither could, we ewer . gather them .from ourcbservation of any msterAal thing, where they were . 	, never sowe.5 
1.Campagnac: The Cambridge Platonietsp.90. 2.ibid!„,, pp.90.4. 	- 	j! 4. Discourses, p.97. 
3.Discourses, p.97. 1 5. ibid., p.98. 
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The doctrine of *innate' and 'archetypal° ideas expressed in these pass-
ages is similar to Cudworth's *ectypar and 'archetypal' ideas. Smith, 
like Cudworth, is contending that knowledge is 'latent' in the mind and 
that the objects of knowledge are universals which cannot be constructed 
our of particulars. 
Smith does not maintain, of course, any more than does Cudworth, 
that the soul is born into the world with a stock of ready-made ideas. 
This is clear from his view that there are four different levels of know-
ledge appropriate to four different kinds of people, and that the highest 
knowledge can be attained only by "the true metaphysical and contemplative 
man". 1 Moreover, it is not Smith's view that the objects of knowledge are 
discreet and unrelated ideas. In self-knowledge, he maintains, we find 
"all kind of multiplicity running more and more into the strictest unity, 
till at last we find all variety and' division sucked up into a perfect simplicity, where all happily conspire together in the most Undivided 
Peace and frianAsh1p". 2 
For Smith, then, as for Cudworth knowledge is essentially self- __ 
knowledge. -"We may best learn from a reflection upon our, own souls. 
he which reflects upon himself, reflects upon his own original, and finds 
the clearest impression of some eternal nature and perfect being stamped 
upon his soul". , 
But knowledge is not merely self-knowledge; it is also a'participation' 
in Cod. The highest knowledge is of the 'archetypal ideas', and this is 
attainable only by the "true metaphysical and contemplative man ... who 
running and shooting up above his own logical and self-rational life, 
pierceth into the highest life; such a one, who by universal lave and 
holy affection abstracting himself from himself, endeavouring the nearest 
union with the divine essence that may be ... knitting his own centre, if 
he have ann, unto the centre of divine beine.4 
Like Cudworth, Smith realises that to maintain that the objects of knowledge 
are dependent for their existence upon the existence of particular minds 
is to be involved in a subjectivist position. Hence he argues that there 
suet be one "infinite source of all that reason and understanding which 
themselves partake of, in which they live, move, and have their being". 5 
Enough has been said to indicate that in their general outlines the 
theories of knowledge of Cudworth and Smith are identical. It is true that 
1. Campagnac: The Cambridge Platonists, p.960 
3. ibid., p.161. 	2. Discourses, p.99. 
4. ibid.,pp.96-7. 5. ibid., p.132. 
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there are differences of detail, but in general Smith and Cudworth are in 
agreekent that knowledge is both beif4nowledge and knowledge of God. And 
the reason for this kind of theory is clear: if anything is to be known it 
..must in some sense be within the mind (otherwise the difficulties of Lockets 
representative perception arise), but since the problems of subjectivism 
and relativism would arise if the Objects of knowledgewereheld to be 
Hdependent entirely upon particular minds, for their existence, it has to 
be'heid'that'they are eternally present in the mind of God. Thus know-
-ledge is.both.an awareness of what is within one's own mind and an aware-
neei 
 
of what Is in the mind'vtIod. There are, no' doubt,. a ,number of 
.0riticiame which:may:be levelled .against a theory of knowledge such as 
this: It is.not.:clear,,far.example,,what.relationship is held to exist 
between particular minds and the mind of God - but we shall Confine our 
'analytilisOnly:te,the'relittionehip between the toietemologyand'the theory 
of ,ethice. of .•Smith,:.and:cudworth.... • 
'The '.ledge: which is'relssrant to. 'moral.ity for Smith and Cudworth 
the knowledge of goodness 'consists in both a knowledge Of oneself and a 
knowledge of 1,04 The , idea of goodness is both latent in ,particular minds 
and etertiallY . an&ilkUtahly present inthe mind Of God. There are a numb- 
	
.. 	• . 
:,..eraf.ponsible.interprotationS of this view, none of which is entirely 
satisfactory. In the first place, if it is held that the idea of goodness 
415. 'innate! in the soul in the sense thet.ii.eiists ready-made from the 
moment of the birth. of the soul, serious difficulties arise. For such a - 	 . 	 , 	. 	. 
view. must maintain that the knowledge of goodness is a priori and in no 
sense the result of experience;. and it ifinot. clear how such an al-priori 
• idea of goodness onnhsvenayrelation to the particular 'goods' of exper-
ience. Buts in any case, we have ,seen that this is not the. position adopt- 
Cuamorth.eind, :g04.tb„ . ..pecondlyw. it. m4Y : 17e,held that the knowledge of 
goodnees4s,not . 'irinete. in.. the ahove . nensebUtthat What is innate is' 
the papaCity,to,knom,goodmess., And this isiearerto the view that Smith 
and Cudworth want to 	-However, if it is held that the latent 
capacity to know is the capacity to reason, -then a serious difficulty with 
regard to the relationship of knowledge an virtue arises. For if the 
knowledge that is relevant to' morality is ih4 product of reasoning, we are /1„. 
-' 
136. 
are laUIJChed into the diffical ties of ihichcote' s rationalism. .Bu.t it is 
clear that this is aot the view ot Cwtvorth and Smith. Cudworth, for 
u:ample, sqs: "lt is DOt wrangling disputes 8lld syllogistical reasonings, 
that are the migbt7 pillars that underpJ'Op truth in the world".l · 
ADd in considering the a priori proof' for the uistence of God, he sws: 
"'lere speculation and dr,y mathematical reason, in minds un:Puri.fied, alld 
having contrary interest of caraal1 ty, and a heavy load of infidelity and 
distrust s1nk1 ng them down, cannot alcme beset an 1mabaken cdnfidene~ aiul 
asSUI'aftC8 of so high a truth as this, the existence of one perfect under-
standing being, the origJ.JJal of all things. .As it is certain also, on 
the contraly, that minds cleansed an4 pu:rpd bom vice me_v, w1 thout syll-
ogistical reasonings aD4 mathematical demoDStrations, bsv'e an undoubted 
assUl'SDC& of the existence of Cod" .2 
Likewise, Smith argues: •Jej1ID8 and barreD speculations ~ be· hovering and 
tlutteriDg up and down about divinity, but they cannot settle or fiX them-
selves upon 1 t • • • We lllWJt 110t think we have then attained to the right 
· knowledge of truth,. when we bave broke tlirouBb the outward shell of words 
8Dd }mraBes that house it up; or when bY logical anal,yais we bave found 
out the depeadencies and coberences of them cme w1 th ~ther". :5 
Again, it 1e possible to interpret the theor.v that the capacity to 
. ·knOw is latent iD the m1Dd as a theor.v that the mind bas the 'innate' 
ability to recopise 'clear and distinct ideas'' or self-evident mathemat-
ical propositiODS as true. This appears to be what is cOntained in Rore •s 
':risbt reason' 8Dd his theory of 'moral DOemata•. Cudvorth,al~,. ill con-
sidering what he calls • common DOtiODS • quotes· mathematical examples like 
"two and two· mslm four • • • equals added to equals will make equals • • and. 
such lilte other common notions, Which are tbe principle& from whence all 
· •• lmovledge is derived".4 
··It is .tbis kind of l.aD&u&&e that bas given rise to the traditional view 
of Cudvorth· as 'eme of Clarke's predecessors.'. Such a view. however, if 
applied. to morality would involve the theor.v that moral distinctions are 
like in Dature 8Dd in the 1ftV' in which they are apprehended to mathemat-
... : · ie81 distinctiODS. And we have seen that both Cudworth and Sni th and, to 
·some extent lore, maintain that moral d.isti.Dctions are like mathematical 
·distinctions onlY in that both are •etemal and immntab~e•. For the later 
CSmbridge Pl.atcmists, moral clistincticms are emotionally discerned. The 
lmoYledge of aoral distinctions, hoveYer, is DOt the function of a specific 
1. Sermon. p.SO. :5. Cam})BBilsc: !he Camb. Platonists, p.85. 
2. True Intell. S,Stem,Preface, 4. True Intell. Syst., Vol.J, p.Yl. 
p.slv~ ~ 
e 
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'moral .senset, ~· more than .it is ~ function of .a specific mor81 . and 
intellectual facUlty; it is a ~tion ot the total personality. Our 
·. moral judgements. ar~ part of our. manner of life.. ·It is .. true· that the 
criterion of· knowledge for the later Cambridge Platonists is 'cll;lri ty 
and distinctness•., or, as Codvorth puts it, aclear w~lli~bility". 1 
. Bllt ·this must. not. be interpreted to mean that the knolfledge that i,s rel-
evant to morality is ·a. f\metion of ~ 'intellect'·~ rnea.ning a faculty 
which functions iildependentl,y of desire• 
It must be concluded. then, that for the .l~ter Cambridge PlatOJliste. 
, _··the mture .and ~tion of knowledg8 in ~ity is as follows:·1J.'he know.;. 
. ' 
.. ledge Of ·&OodJ:less is a flmction of .the whole personality, and there is· no 
distincti~ between 1mowing · the ~od and being virtuous. For the good is 
·. ... '' . .. . . . 
that which ve most· desire - to kDov the good is to realise. one's potent-
. . . . . . 
ial~t~es - .. and therefore there. iS DO me~ in ~·that we IDil\V 1aiow 
the goOd and rej~t· it. Arul• indeed, it is only by belng virtuolis that 
. ' . 
. i.t is. possible to know the good. Knowled&e. of the good~ like ·BJW kind of 
knOwledge, .is ~th a knowledge of oneself (otherwise it would not be know-
ledge at all) and a knowledge of~ (otherwise objectivity would be lost). 
'l'pe degree of knowledge ·one has of the good both_ ~~te:rmines and is detel'-
. ~ ~· ~ degree of goodness. of one's life. 
Bow there is one serioua difficulty with this theo;ry. in the form in 
which it appears in the thou&bt of the later. Cambridge Platonists. · fliey. 
main~, as _l;e h8ve seen, thilt knowledge of the g-Ood is self-knowledge 
' and that .in·~ oneself one is.Imowi~ God •. As Sntth puts .it: 
. . . 
"We :11187 best learn trom' a reflection upon our own souls .~. be wbich ref-
.. lects ·upOn himself, reflects upon his 01fl1 original, and finds the clearest 
,: impressiOn of· some e.ternal nature aDd. perfect- being ·-stamped UpOn his soul tt • 2 
But, there is -n.P adequate theory of how, one llliQ' know oneSelf. ·The concept 
' •· 
of .self-hCJ04 arises. Only . in the awareness of a not-self; but the Cambrdge 
. . . . . . 
Plato~st~ seem to think - and this is Where the Cartesian· influence on 
their tho~t, is most appal'ellt, - that one can 'reflect upon one's own soul', 
as it were,in isol,a~on. But one can be aware of oneself only in the 
. . . . ' 
awareness of a not~self~ and the knowledge one has of oneself is dependent 
upon the nature of the not-self of which one is aware. 'l!hus, if I am 
1. Eternal and Immutable lforality, p.6,5. 
2. Campagnac: 'fhe Cambridge Platonists, p.l61. 
-., 
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aware of a material not-self, then I am aware of myself only as a material 
being; I am not, in such a situation, aware of myself as a person. If the 
not-self of which I am aware is organic, that is, if it is a living being, 
then I am aware of both it and myself as living beings. Likewise, if the 
not-self of which I am aware is a person, then I am aware of both the not-
self and myself as persons. It is only because I am a person that I am 
able to be aware of a not-self as a person, and it is only in the awareness 
of a not-self as a person that I am aware of myself as a person. The nat-
ure of the self-knowledge one has is dependent upon the nature of the not-
self of which one is conscious and upon the nature of the relationship 
that exists between the self and the not-self of which one is aware. Thus 
• one is aware of oneself as a person only when one is conscious of a not-
self as a person and when the relationship that exists between oneself and 
the not-self is personal. Now it is the love-relation between persons that 
is uniquely personal. The chief characteristic of a personal relationship, 
as distinct from a mechanical or an organic relationship, is that it is 
mutual; that is to say, one is aware of oneself and of a not-self and also 
that the same is true of• the not-self. Moreover, in a personal relation-
ship one regards the not-self as 'equal' with oneself and treats him as an 
end and nevevas a means. Such a relationship is a condition achieved 
only in love. 
Now if the Smith-Cudworth view that the knowledge that is relevant 
to morality is both self-knowledge and the knowledge of God is to have 
any significance, it must be maintained that the knowledge that is relevant 
to morality is a knowledge of oneself as a person. It cannot be maintain-
ed satisfactorily that the knowledge of goodness is a knowledge of certain 
'moral axioms' or of a set of propositions about the good which are held to 
be latent in the soul, for, as we have seen, such a theory gives rise to 
the difficulties that are associated with rationalism and legalism. And 
in so far as the Cambridge Platonists tend to support such a vies they are 
both filing into the difficulties of Whichcote's position i and being in-
consistent with their view that the knowledge of the good is a function of 
the total personality. Nor can it be held that the knowledge that is 
relevant to morality is a knowledge of oneself as a material, or even a 
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living, being; for real self-knowledge is a knowledge of oneself as a 
person because in such knowledge one is also aware of oneself as a material 
and a living being. The outcome of the Smith-Cudworth view, then, is that 
the knowledge that is relevant to morality is a knowledge of oneself as a 
person; and, it is held, such knowledge is also a knowledge of God. As 
we have seen, knowledge of oneself as personal involves knowledge of a 
personal not-self, and this is a condition achieved only in love. The 
outcome of the Smith-Cudworth view that both virtue and the knowledge of 
goodness consist in self-knowledge or self-realisation is, therefore, that 
•both virtue and the knowledge that has a place in morality consist in lave 
between persons. But this conclusion is never drawn by the Cambridge Plat-
°nista. They fail, like Descartes, to realise that self-knowledge involves 
the knowledge of a not-self, and it is this epistemological fallacy that 
makes their theory of the nature and function of knowledge in morality, as 
it stands, unsatisfactory. 
It is true that Smith argues that 'there is an inward beauty, life and 
loveliness in divine truth, which cannot be known but only when it is dig-
ested into life and practice".1 
But it would be false to conclude that he means that the good can be known 
only in personal relationships. The kind of !life and practice' to which 
he is referring is the 'contemplative' life, as is clear from his view 
thatl the good life is that of the "true metaphysical and contemplative 
man" who by "abstracting himself from himself endeavours the nearest union 
•with the divine essence". 2 And this presupposes the view that self-know-
ledge does not involve the knowledge of a not-self. It is true, also, 
that the unique place of love in morality is, to some extent at least, 
realised in More's view that !intellectual love' is "the most high and 
most simple good's% and more especially in Cudworth's view that love is 
"the soul of morality"4 and that the good is "the active exertion of lave 
itse1f"5. But, as we have seen, they regard love as the good not because 
the love-relation is the highest expression of the personal relationship, 
but because they consider love to be a 'beneficent' motive or desire as 
opposed to the selfishness of the 'animal passions'. And this is closely 
1. Campagnac, p.86. 	4. Time 	System, Vol.1, p.316. 
2. ibid., p.96. 5. Quoted by Passmoret Ralph Cudworth, p.75. 
3. Account of Virtue, p.156. 
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associated with the Idealism inherent in the thought of the Cambridge 
• Platonists. More argues, for example, that 'intellectual love' has "no 
other motions than those of benignity and beneficence"1, and he considers 
the good life to be the life that is most like the life of Cod "who equally 
• consults the benefit of the whole universe".2 The same Idealist tendency 
is evident in Cudworth's_view that there is a "public good •• the good of 
the whole community"3 and in his theory that the good life consists in 
"being expanded from the narrow particularity of itself to the universal-
it Y  of all, and delighting in the good of all".4 The difficulties cont-
ained in theories which make a moral ideal out of beneficence are well 
known. If the good life is the beneficent life, then in order that any 
member of a society should be able to live the good life there must nec-
essarily be some members of the society who do not live the good life; 
if the good life consists in beneficence there must of necessity be rec-
ipients of such beneficence. Or, alternatively, it may be held that the 
good does not consist in being benevolent towards other persons, but rather 
in waiting for the good of society. In this case 'society' is conceived 
as somethinggreater than the persons who comprise it. The moral ideal, 
on such a theory becomes 'social service' and the goal a future Utopia, 
which, if the moral ideal is to be preserved, must for ever remain in 
the future. In other words, on this theory, the good consists in working 
• for the benefit of a race yet unborn, and which, if the theory is to stand, 
• must remain for ever unborn. And such a theory, ,apart from being unsat-
isfactory in itself, is inconsistent with the Smith-Cudworth view that 
Its good life is the life of self-realisation. 
It must be admitted, then, that no entirely satisfactory theory of 
the nature and function of knowledge in morality emerges from the thought 
of the Cambridge Platonists - at least not in the form in which the theory 
is stated by them. But at least this much is clear: the Cambridge Plat- 
onists„ arid in particular Smith and Cudworth, recognised, and to some 
extent resolved, problems, both ethical and epistemological, which their 
more celebrated contemporaries, and even successors, were inclined to 
overlook. 
o0o - 
I.. Account of Virtue, p.158. 	3. Quoted by Pasamore;. R. Cudworth, p-73. 
•2. ibid.„ 	 4. ibid.., p.71.• 
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— BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE - 
The group of thinkers with whom this thesis has been concerned are known 
severally as the 'Cambridge Platonists' and the °Latitudinarians'. The 
latter title, however, is used chiefly in theological circles, and in any 
case has a rather wider use than the former; it is used to include the 
whole of that group of churchmen who, in -,the seventeenth century, were opposed to the dogmatism of both the Puritans and the Prelatists and who 
maintained the virtue of tolerance in religion. The former title refers 
to the philosophical thought of the group and includes only those church-
men who held teaching positions at Cambridge and whose thought gave phil-
osophical and intellectual support to the movement for tolerance in rel-
igion. It is this former title, therefore, which has been used throughout 
this thesis. 
• The most important members of the school of Cambridge Platonists, 
from a philosophical point of view, were Whichcote, Cudworth, Smith, More 
and Culverwel, all of whom, with the exception of More, were educated at 
Emmanuel College, Cambridge. That this was the Puritan college of the day 
is indicative of the fact that the Cambridge Platonists came of Puritan 
parentage. But, in spite of such parentage, the Cambridge Platonists, 
without exception, opposed the dogmatism and rigidity of Puritans and 
Prelatiets alike. 
• Bei:ides the five thinkers already mentioned, there are a number of others who are usually regarded as CambridgeTlatonists, but who, because 
they published little• and because the thought which they express is more 
adequately expressed in the writings of the more important members of the 
school, are not considered in this thesis. These less important Cambridge 
•Platonists include: Worthington, who appears to have been confessor and 
!Mend of those whose thought has been considered in detail and whose 'Diary and Correspondence' makes very interesting reading into the lives 
of seventeenth century churchmen and philosophers; Wollaston; and such 
minor figures as Howe, Mede, and Rust. Joseph Clanmil, because of his 
associations with More, has sometimes been regarded as a Cambridge Platon-
ist, but since he was educated at Oxford this classification is not strict-
ly correct; it is true, nevertheless, that there are some resemblances 
between his thought and that of the Cambridge Platonists. The Earl of 
Shaftesbury, also,  is included by some commentators in the group of Camb-
ridge Platonists; and it is true that there is more similarity between 
his thought and that of the later Cambridge Platonists than between the 
rationalists and the later Cambridge Platonists. But Shaftesbury belongs, 
with Hucbeson, to the 'moral sense' school rather than to the Cambridge 
school. Some commentators, too, associate Samuel Clarke and even Richard 
• Price with the Cambridge Platonists; but this is false for two reSOMMIS. In the first place the school which is properly referred to as the Camb-
ridge Platonists had ceased to exist by the end of the seventeenth century 
• when Clarke began to write; at this time Price had not even been born. 
• Secondly, Clarke and Price belong to the rationalist tradition, and any 
attempt to include the later . Cambridge Platonists„ especially Smith and 
Cudworth, within this tradition is distinctly at fault. 
The significant members of the school of Cambridge Platomists, then, 
e 
e 
e 
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are the four that have been considered in this thesis, Wbi.chcote, Cudvorth, 
Smith and Kore, and also Culverwe1. Culverwel, however, did not write suff-
icient on the nature and tunction of knowledge in morality to warrant con-
sideration.in .tbis thesis •.. 
Benjamin Wbichcote (1609-83) entered Emmannel College as a Pensioner in 
OctOber, 1626, where his tutor was 'l'uclmey, with whom he was later {1651) 
involved in a publlo argument over the place of reason in religion, 'fuck-
. argu!Dg that reason had DO place in religion. Whichcote took his B.A. iD 
1629-30 and his M.A. in 1633,: in which yeaz he was appointed a Fellow of his 
college. Be was ordained deacon and priest of the church on the same d.q in 
1636, and was for the next twenty years SJmd'\V afteriiOon lecturer at T.rin-
i ty Church. · His· leetmes are reported to have been alwa,vs well attended, 
and it was as a lecturer 88 well 88 a tutor that he exerted the great inf-
luence he had on Cambridge religious thougJ!t. Jlost of his publications 
comprise sermons delivered at Trinity Chureb. In 1634 he became a tutor at 
Emmanue1., and two of his students were Smi tb and wortbi.Dgton. He took his 
B~D. in 1640, and three years later was appointecl to a RectorY in Somerset. 
But in 1644 he returned to Cambridge as P.rwost of ICing's College, and was 
made a ~tor of Divinity in 1649, and in 1650 became Vice Qtaroellor of the 
University. At the Restoration he was ejected from the Pzovostship of King•·s 
and retired to a Uving at llilton. In 1683, shortly before his death, be 
visited Cudworth at Cambridge - hiS cmly :retum to the VDiversi ty after his 
ejection. 
Ralph Cudworth (1617-88) the most laborious writer ot ,the 11fhole school was 
born in Somersetsbire. His father, Dr. Cudworth, bad been a J'ellow of &D-
manuel and a lecturer at st-. ·.Aildrew•s, Cambridge; but he died in 1624. 
Shortly 'atterwards, Cudworth' s mother married one Dr. Stoughton who becaiJe 
respcmsible for the upbringing and· education of CudWorth. Cudworth enter-
ed Emmanuel as a Pensioner in 1.6:52• Re took his B.A. :la 1635 and his ll.A. 
in 1639 when he became a Fellow and tutor ot his College. In 1645 he waa 
appointed Master of Clare Hall aDd Regius Professor ot Bebrelr.,. and a year 
·later took ~s B.D. Be was given the honour. in 1647,. ~ preachi.Dg befOl'e 
the HOuse of COmmons and his seJ'IIlOD was later published. Be was presented 
a livina in So1DeJ;osetshire iD 1650 •. but in 1654, shortly be£ore his marriage, 
he became JIJaster of Christ's College, where he remained till his cleath. 
JohJi Smith (161.8-52) whose writings are as delightful to read as Cudworth's 
are laborious, was born i.D Achurcb,. !lortlumts, in 1618 of aaec1 parents. Bo 
more is known of his early life. He entered Bmmannel 8s a Pensioner in 16:56 
and took his B.A. in 1640 8Dd hts R.A. in ~4. Be transferred to Queen's 
College; where he became a J'ellow, but in 1652 he died of co~ption. · 
BeD!'Y More (l614-87)came of Calvinist parentage. Educated at EtOn m:l 
Christ's College, he took his B.A. in 1635 and his LA. 1n 16:59• Ag&inst 
the wishes. of his father,. he rejected pJ'eferments,. 1nclwliD8 biahoprios. 
and spent the rest of his lite at CamlJrid4e, whe1'e he became a prolific 
· .. writer of both pbilosophical treatises and poetry. · With Glamrill he be- · 
.. ·;come interested in psychical phenomena, and spent a sreat deal of time in 
the i.INestigation of reports of the appearance· of such phenomena. -In a 
se~ .. then• he is with Glanvill one of the fathers of payehieal research. 
., 
~ 
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